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- (b) to promote the collection, preservation and classification of source material of all kinds relating to South Australian and Australian history.
- (c) to publish historical records and articles.
- (d) to promote the interchange of information among members of the Society by lectures, readings, discussions and exhibitions.
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1977-1980
MORE VARIETIES OF VICE-REGAL LIFE

P.A. HOWELL
EDITORIAL

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MORE VARIETIES OF VICE-REGAL LIFE

P. A. HOWELL

Between 1853, when the fifth Duke of Newcastle ordered four of the Australian colonies to prepare for the introduction of responsible government, and 1968, when two successive premiers requested a change in the practice, each of the twenty men sent out to govern South Australia was a native of the British Isles. As I suggested in a previous article, the majority of these governors served both Britain and South Australia well.¹ Of the remainder, three were relatively harmless. Sir Dominick Daly had performed useful service in Canada and the West Indies from 1822 to 1859, but by the time he arrived in Adelaide in 1862 he was too far past his prime. Gout made him short-tempered, and incapacitated him for days at a time. For years he had lived beyond his means, and now his wife became so crippled by paralysis that she needed constant nursing and could take no part in public or social functions. His dispatches reveal his worries, not only about ill-health, but because he could not afford to retire.² He carried out his duties perfunctorily, and died in office in 1868.

The ninth Earl of Kintore, by contrast, was too immature. He had scarcely put away childish things when he succeeded to the earldom. Queen Victoria had made him one of her lords-in-waiting, and then in 1889 had persuaded Viscount Knutsford to nominate him governor of South Australia. Sadly, he fell too much under the influence of that most narrow-minded of chief justices, Samuel Way, with consequences I have already described.³ Further research has revealed that he also incurred a good deal of ribbing from radical journalists, mainly because he had made 'thousands' by investing in Barrier mining shares. At a time when the province was struggling to recover from a financial depression, his entertainments became the most lavish that Adelaide's Government House had ever witnessed. There was some resentment that his hospitality was reserved for the chosen few, and much banter that, because he was a Scot, his response to charitable appeals did not grow in like proportion. This furnished the environment for some South Australian echoes of contemporary New Zealand calls that a governor should be chosen from the knightage of the colony. Their reverberations soon died because the next governor, Sir Fowell Buxton, was a great success.⁴ The only long-term consequence was that Kintore's behaviour had enabled the Kingston government to reduce the total official emoluments of the governor by 48 per cent — and that situation was not properly remedied until the eve of the appointment of our first Australian-born governor in 1968.

In the medium term, one of Kintore's responses to Kingston's churlish conduct prompted some thinking people to wonder about the utility of governors. When

Kingston began sending him the documents needing approval in Executive Council so near to the time of meeting that the Governor had no hope of reading them, Kintore, for his part,

tried to introduce the brilliant reform of attaching the vice-regal signature to [those] documents by means of a rubber-stamp — a dazzling notion which was promptly disallowed, but which incidentally led to the Governor's position being disparaged as having a sort of rubber-stamp quality.



Sir Dominick Daly
Photograph by T. Duryea (S.A. Archives)



A typical cartoonist's depiction of the Earl of Kintore as the Governor who would only spend his wealth on his own pleasures.
Quiz and the Lantern, 19 July 1894 (State Library of S. Australia).

As this anecdote was published in a leader in the *Register*, the paper which most consistently supported the retention of governors, there is no reason to doubt its authenticity. Yet the leader-writer did not retail it until he believed (unwisely) that the governor's position had again become impregnable.⁵ A little more than eighty years after Kintore's quarrel with Kingston, South Australia's second Australian-born governor, Sir Mark Oliphant, made an identical response when faced with similar treatment at the hands of a ministry led by Kingston's spiritual heir, D. A. Dunstan. Sir Mark wrote to the Premier in August 1974: 'I suggest that the Clerk to the Council be issued with a rubber stamp which he can affix to documents instead of continuing the farce that the Governor's signature is required.'⁶ On this occasion the proposal was quickly submerged by the tide of more momentous problems.

Sir Archibald Weigall, appointed governor in 1920, besides being an expert on animal husbandry and other rural pursuits, had had useful experience in business and public affairs. Yet it was his fate not to last long in any job, whether in the City, Parliament, the Army, or public administration. Thus he had a genius for accepting directorships in companies which turned out to be shady and went bankrupt, so that towards the end of his life he lost his great houses in Mayfair and Lincolnshire. Meanwhile, as a further example, in January 1918 he had been appointed Surveyor of Food Consumption (with the task of effecting food economies in the Navy, Army and other public services), but he resigned that post later in the year 'as a protest against the treatment of officials' in the Food Ministry.⁷


Though his attachment to his prize bulls made him homesick while in Adelaide, other governors believed he had the capacity to do well in office in an agricultural state.⁸ However, in this instance he was undone by his recently-acquired wife. Her first marriage, to the Prussian, Baron von Eckhardstein, had ended in divorce after England's declaration of war against Germany in August 1914. She was the heiress of the furniture-trade magnate, Sir John Blundell Maple, but had only a life interest in his estate, and always spent her annual allowance long before the year was up. Weigall became so embarrassed by her outrageous extravagance and hypochondria (her personal staff included two resident doctors), that within a year of taking office in Adelaide he was compelled to beg leave to relinquish it.⁹

Yet one of the men appointed to represent the sovereign in South Australia prior to 1968 unwittingly did more than any radical politicians of that era to discredit his office, and to weaken the British connexion. That individual was Sir Henry Lionel Galway, governor from April 1914 to April 1920.

Many governors have had a conservative social and political outlook, but their conservatism generally was of a liberal and enlightened stamp. Moreover, as long as they remained in office, they knew when to hold their tongues. Galway was no Burkean statesman. While his physique was 'small and natty, almost petite',¹⁰ in all other respects he was a veritable Colonel Blimp. Every town in the Empire had its quota of pompous, diehard reactionaries, which is why the cartoonist David Low's lampooning of them was so popularly received. But most Secretaries of State had too much sense to promote such men to office in any of the self-governing dominions. Galway was a poor choice for an Australian state. He abhorred Australian egalitarianism. Traits such as self-esteem, independence and the love of liberty, which nationalist writers hailed as virtues, were, in his eyes, vices. He complained: 'The marked lack of discipline and the want of respect for authority of the man in the street in this country is a "danger spot" in the future development and prosperity of the Commonwealth'.¹¹ He had an ill-bred contempt for the working-classes, whom he sometimes referred to as the 'hoi polloi' or 'the brutes', and he became convinced that Australia would become 'the laughing-stock of the Empire', because the growing power of the trade unions had made it a country 'where the people are ruled by the coolies'.¹² Perplexed that 'the wave of socialism' was 'gathering strength', despite 'the marked absence of poverty', he adopted the view that 'a bad year or two would be an excellent tonic', because it would give the masses 'the opportunity of practising self-denial and of learning what adversity really was'.¹³

A great challenge came when war broke out in Europe, and when the Commonwealth government assumed that as part of the Empire Australia was also at war. Within weeks, thousands of South Australians were thrown out of work

At right: When C. C. Kingston became Premier in June 1893 and proposed savage cuts in the Governor's emoluments, imposing income tax on the balance, abolishing the Governor's exemption from customs and excise duties etc., Kintore cabled London for leave to retire early. However the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Marquess of Ripon, commanded him to stay at his post and brave any torture Kingston might inflict. Cartoon published in *Quiz and the lantern*, 21 July 1893. The caption refers to the 'silken bonds' of sentiment which were commonly said to hold the Empire together. (State Library of S.A.).



because the Broken Hill and Wallaroo mines, which had been exporting most of their silver-lead and copper concentrates and all their zinc concentrates to smelters in Belgium and Germany, lost those markets and were shut down. Railwaymen, wharf labourers and others who had been connected with that trade likewise found themselves without jobs. To make matters worse, 1914 was South Australia's driest year for three-quarters of a century. In the first months of the war the drought destroyed the crops and a quarter of the sheep, driving many farmers and their hands into the labour market. To help relieve distress, the Mayor of Adelaide launched a fund which raised £38,000 by the end of 1914.¹⁴ Galway, however, had little sympathy for those who now found themselves unemployed, for he thought that their sufferings were to be attributed primarily to their own improvidence during the good times. In attempting to explain the state's economic problems to his superiors in London, he deplored the folly of the labouring classes:

They are probably the highest paid community of their kind in the world, and yet they live up to their incomes. Consequently, when a bad year comes upon them they have no nest egg to fall back upon. The Australian labourer demands his three meat meals a day, and indulges in many luxuries besides. The result is he is particularly hard hit when lean years have to be faced. The majority of labourers appear to me to live on a lavish scale, and even go to and from their work on bicycles. Those not possessing such machines use the tramways The Australian labourer and his family, at all events where this State is concerned, patronises Picture Theatres and Music Halls in a marked degree. They must have their evening diversions. Even during the present slump, from what I can learn, the institutions referred to are patronised as widely as ever. In an optimistic vein I would suggest that good may yet come out of evil, and that the present crisis may be the means of strengthening the fibre of this prosperous community, and of teaching them, especially the labouring class thereof, to become, *inter alia*, less irresponsible and more self-sacrificing.¹⁵


The Colonial Office was appalled by the callousness of this diatribe. The Assistant Under-Secretary, Sir Hartmann Just, minuted: 'I hope this comfortable rich man who begrudges the labouring man's bicycles ... will practise some of the self-sacrifice which he unctuously preaches'. In fact, Galway too found self-sacrifice unpalatable. The King had pledged to abstain from alcohol for the duration of the war, and his governors throughout the Empire had felt obliged to do likewise. Galway eventually steeled himself to follow their example, but he was still bragging about it in 1918.¹⁶

There can be no gainsaying this country's contribution to the war effort. More Australians than Americans died on the battlefields, and all of them had volunteered for overseas service. Military expenditure ran so high that by 1918 the national debt was as great as the national debt of the United Kingdom had been in 1914.¹⁷ Nevertheless, Galway continually found grounds for complaint. For example, in October 1915 he observed that:

there are a very large number of wastrels and loafers who count their own comfort and convenience as of more importance than the welfare of the Empire. These undesirables can only be dealt with under either conscription or some other drastic measure.¹⁸

Early in 1916 he wrote:

There is no doubt that in an ultra-democratic country like Australia, where independence is considered an individual right, and where every man is as good as his neighbour, there must always be a large number of men who do not count love of



Sir Archibald Weigall. Studio portrait by Janice Agar (?) dated 1922 (S.A. Archives).

country among their virtues, and with such men recruiting speeches are mere waste of words.... It is easy to be wise after the event, but it is apparent now that it would have been better in every way had conscription been enforced from the start.¹⁹

After the failure of the first referendum on conscription, he lamented that the majority of the lower classes

are either disloyal or absolutely indifferent where patriotism and duty are concerned. They are a typical example of a perverse and foolish generation, totally blind to the fact that the Empire is involved in the most stupendous war in history.²⁰

Accordingly, he claimed it 'would be nothing short of a national disaster' if Labor, the party of 'the super-socialists, anarchists, and sundry other anti-Imperialists' were to win the 1917 federal election: 'Such an happening could only further humiliate Australia, destroy public confidence, create further industrial discord, and probably bring ruin to the country.'²¹ Luckily for his peace of mind, Labor lost.

Galway deplored the tendency of the public to 'spoil' those who were invalided home from the war, and he personally took great pains to pressure them to get back to the front as soon as they were on the mend. Many of course were incapable of returning, and in South Australia, as elsewhere, the government endeavoured to start as many as possible in some trade or other urban calling, or else settle them on the land. Galway considered these exercises rather futile, because as he put it:

The average returned soldier is not an easy individual to handle. His disinclination to take up regular work is most marked [He] is easily discouraged, whilst being very difficult to please, ... the majority of these men appear to demand all that is done for them as a right. Their complaints are many, whilst any signs of gratitude on their part is [sic] not often distinguishable.²²

It was absurd for the governor to look for gratitude, as the assistance given was often inadequate for the ex-servicemen to make a success of life on the land; but his position is clear: he condemned the tendency to hail as heroes men who had simply done their duty. In the same spirit, he complained about the number of decorations he was required to present, apparently because he thought they must have been awarded far too liberally.²³

Even when he was moved to praise, his comments always had a sting in the tail. Thus he could never laud Australian exploits on the battlefields without in the same breath denouncing the 'disloyalists' who would not enlist, and who were only too willing to disrupt the country because they had 'only two aims in view, viz., increased wages, and shorter hours'.²⁴ Similarly, when reporting that the behaviour of the wildly enthusiastic crowd of 50,000, to whom he had announced 'the glorious news' of the Armistice in November 1918, had been 'exemplary, and in keeping with the greatness of the event', his next sentence was characteristic: 'I would add that all drinking bars were closed that day, which fact no doubt accounted in no small measure for the orderliness of the people on a unique occasion in the history of the State'.²⁵

Galway found at least one fatal flaw in every politician he actually dealt with — not excepting that arch-jingoist, Billy Hughes.²⁶ It would be tedious to document examples, as they are so numerous, but his general remarks on Australian political life are sufficiently striking. He often regretted that so few MPs had travelled overseas, and that the few who did came back seeing the best in everything Australian. Travel of the whirlwind kind they engaged in, as Chesterton said,

narrows the mind. Galway also frequently regretted that leading businessmen and landowners were so conspicuous by their absence as representatives of the people. In 1916 he observed that 'Parliaments in this country are composed almost entirely of professional politicians, a large number of whom are not worth the stipends they draw as representatives of the people, nor are they as a rule the type of man one would like to see in Parliament'.²⁷ A year later he remarked:

Australia wants men ... who can lead, and who would refuse to be hampered by party shibboleths. The average Australian politician lacks imagination and has little sense of proportion. His horizons are narrow and his ideals never rise to any great height. The result is mediocrity at a time when the very best is needed.²⁸

Passages like these were fair comment. However, after he had been in the country for almost five years, his complaints grew more strident:

Any bagman with the gift of oratory [sic] can enter Parliament these days, and the result is obviously detrimental to wise and statesmanlike administration.... Australia today is unfortunately without any men, or man, of outstanding ability. If ever a people required leading, the Australians do. The outstanding defects in the character of the people, the chief of which are self-complacency, independence, and disrespect, cause anyone interested in the welfare of Australia to think furiously. The outlook is not too promising.²⁹

The quotations cited above come from Galway's correspondence with his superiors in London. What did they make of him? Sometimes they were amused. When he complained of the 'nepotism' in the Labor Party (because a new Premier, Crawford Vaughan, had brought his brother and a brother-in-law to be sworn in as fellow ministers), an under-secretary observed that it was 'curious to talk of nepotism in a Cabinet when the posts are allotted by the Caucus'.³⁰ He created more merriment in 1916 when he claimed that the South Australian police 'cannot be depended upon' to enforce the law, and that 'an efficient Police Force cannot be looked for unless the post of Commissioner ... is filled by a strict disciplinarian, which article should be obtained from England'. The consensus in Downing Street was that 'the imported British disciplinarian Commissioner of Police ... would have a poor time'.³¹ Galway assumed, not without reason, that governors should 'continue patronizing their London tailor, bootmaker and hosier during their sojourn in Australia'. But after three years he was begging the imperial government to ask the Commonwealth to let State governors import clothing free of the normal 30-40 per cent tariff, because 'The Australian Customs authorities are not satisfied with charging duty on the invoice cost of an article. They add 10 per cent to such cost before assessing the duty payable.' On this occasion the hilarity in the Colonial Office was tempered by concern that he might incur the wrath of Adelaide's retailers.³²

For the most part, his superiors were highly critical of him. His assumption that as most Australian production was rural, it could be kept going by the labour of 'women and boys', ran counter to the mainstream of the English Liberal tradition. When that assumption led him to claim that Australia 'could, should the necessity arise, send well over one million men to the front', the Secretary of State for the Colonies minuted: 'ridiculous & uneconomic nonsense' — he at least knew that Australia then contained scarcely a million men of fighting age.³³ As most middle and upper-class Englishmen shared Galway's patronizing attitude to most things

Australian, it is significant that his despatches were liberally annotated with remarks such as 'not of much value, owing to personal colour'.³⁴

It is not surprising that Galway dipped his pen in vitriol when writing about Melbourne's Archbishop Mannix, who had been bold enough to pronounce World War I 'an ordinary trade war'.³⁵ Mannix became a bogey-man in the eyes of Britain's rulers, partly because of his opposition to conscription, but mainly because of his support for Ireland's struggle for self-government. Nevertheless, the Downing Street bureaucrats considered some of Galway's strictures irrational. When he wrote:

That prelate is notorious for his disloyal public utterances, and one wonders how much longer his cloth will protect him from being dealt with as he deserves. He does all he can to prevent men from enlisting, and ingeniously presents the Irish question in quite the wrong light to his ignorant admirers.

London's only comment was 'Sir H. Galway is too fond of the word "disloyal"'.³⁶ In another attack on Mannix he claimed:

This cleric hardly ever opens his mouth without sowing seeds of dissension, and his chief aim would appear to be to bring on a war of classes. I am quite unable to understand why the gentleman referred to is able to scatter his infamous doctrine broadcast without being placed in such custody as would prevent him from carrying on his iniquitous campaign against law and order.

This simply drew the stock response: 'too ill-informed to be of much value'.³⁷

How different was the praise bestowed on Mannix by another governor, Lieutenant-general Sir Tom Bridges, whose Toryism was of a rigorous but common-sense variety. Bridges's final tribute to the archbishop had concluded with the remark: 'I, for one, would not have minded seeing a Red [*i.e.* a cardinal's] Hat descend upon his head'.³⁸

Because of his rejection of the democratic ideals of liberty and political equality, Galway was ideologically a fish out of water. This limited his ability to communicate with Australians. It is an excellent thing if a governor can provide moral leadership, and if he can give real encouragement to those battling to protect the best aspects of our heritage or to enrich the quality of life. South Australia has been lucky to have had a number of vice-regal representatives who have distinguished themselves in these respects. But while we have come to grumble at the novelty of a governor who cannot provide that kind of leadership, it is important to remember that it is by no means a prerequisite for the satisfactory functioning of Parliamentary democracy. Indeed, it is one of the inestimable boons of our system of government that the private qualities and personal opinions of the sovereign's representative do not matter one iota, from a constitutional point of view, if two conditions are fulfilled. First, he (or she) must have the capacity to do the job — as Galway did. Secondly, he must be prepared to follow the rules of the game; that is, in carrying out his constitutional functions, as indeed all public tasks, he must conceal his prejudices, and must be like St Paul: 'all things to all people'. It was Galway's tragedy that he failed to satisfy the second of these conditions. He did not keep his political opinions private.

He commenced most of his controversial statements by saying 'I am not supposed to touch on politics, but ...' — or something similar. Thus he always knew when he was treading on dangerous ground. However, he often voiced his

regret that he was hamstrung by conventions which did not apply to governors in the Crown colonies.³⁹ The pattern was set at the very commencement of his term. In responding to his official welcome in the Adelaide Town Hall, he jested that he would not be able to 'rule the roost' in South Australia and pledged: 'It shall be my endeavour not to run off the rails'. Yet in that same speech he upset some of the leaders of society by expressing strong views on two sensitive political questions. He praised the Murray Waters Agreement, which had been accepted in principle by the Cabinet, but which still awaited debate and ratification by the Commonwealth and three State Parliaments. As everyone in the audience knew, no agreement about the use of the Murray could satisfy all the interested parties. He then announced: 'I am a redhot advocate for universal service', and went on to praise 'the far-sighted statesmanship' the Commonwealth (Labor) government had shown in introducing compulsory military training for all males aged between twelve and twenty-six. Most Australians had accepted that law,⁴⁰ but over 27,000 boys and young men had been prosecuted for refusing to comply with it. While most were fined, 6,000 of them were gaoled. Feeling ran particularly high in Adelaide because two teenagers, John and William Size, had been kept on bread and water while undergoing twenty days detention in the military prison at Fort Largs. In other states, similar culprits were given a loaf of bread a day, and as much water as they could drink. At Fort Largs the Size brothers were allowed only three slices of bread and three cups of water per day. They had to sleep on a concrete floor, with one blanket apiece, and at night-time they had to share their cell, which measured only 3.6m. by 2.7m., with up to seven other lads.⁴¹ This and other severe punishments had charged the subject with dynamite. Galway, as a new arrival, may not have known that, but ignorance is no excuse for a governor to make gratuitous public pronouncements on fiercely debated political problems. To take sides in such controversies destroys his capacity to fulfil his usually dormant but, when needed, most important constitutional role as an umpire. It is no wonder that Galway's support for compulsory military training set a number of his listeners' heads shaking in disapprobation nor that it drew mild reproof from the Establishment, the *Register*.⁴²

His jovial support of gambling and of minimal restrictions on liquor trading angered South Australia's many puritans. They were scarcely mollified when he hailed Beatty's sinking of the battle-cruiser *Blücher* as 'one of the best pieces of Sabbath-breaking we have had for a long time'. In the same address he urged people not to trouble themselves about news of the off-duty behaviour of Australian troops abroad, saying: 'It is sometimes very hard to stand up to temptation in countries like Egypt'.⁴³ Curiously, no one complained when he criticized the enfranchisement of women, or when he accused the State's schools of failing to prepare children adequately for 'the battle of life'. In a speech at the Salvation Army Jubilee Congress he declared: 'Our educational system is in a great measure responsible for many of the wastrels who are wandering about our cities and towns.' He suggested that social problems would persist until every child was trained to become 'a useful member of the community'.⁴⁴

A storm of protest followed a speech at the Uraidla Show, in February 1915, in which he called for an end to the White Australia policy, opining that the Northern Territory 'could not prosper' without Asian labour. The Prime Minister, Andrew Fisher, demanded and obtained a full withdrawal and apology.⁴⁵

Still greater uproar greeted reports of his address at the Caledonian Society's St Andrew's Day celebrations for 1915, where he denounced the Islington ironworkers, who had marched to Parliament House demanding higher wages. Claiming that they 'had made a great mistake' because they were already 'well-paid', he also remarked that 'they had every aspect of manliness and virility to look at, but their minds were crooked'. He declared that he 'would have liked to put all those men under khaki and discipline and ship them to the front'.⁴⁶ The *Daily Herald* charged him with 'a gross violation of vice-regal duty'. He was bitterly attacked at a special meeting of the Trades and Labor Council. One speaker said:

the Governor should be put in his place. He got £80 a week to keep his mouth shut and he could not do it.... The Governor could go to the front. If in no other capacity, he could go as a private. He could be spared from here, where he had nothing to do but malign men.

The meeting unanimously resolved to insist upon an unconditional apology.⁴⁷ The governor refused in a letter stating 'I have yet to learn that I am responsible to any Labour organization for my utterances or actions.' The Premier, Vaughan, then intervened and Galway apologized forthwith. Meanwhile the executive of the Ironworkers' Association had instructed its secretary to write to the Labour leader in the House of Commons to move for Galway's recall.⁴⁸

Galway stirred additional resentment when in speeches before each referendum on conscription he called for a 'yes' vote.⁴⁹ By August 1916, leaders of the state Labor movement had had enough, and at the federal conference of the Labor Party, held in Adelaide that month, they carried a resolution calling for the abolition of state governors. At the behest of radicals in the eastern states, the Labor Party had been toying with this idea for some time. As far as the South Australian members were concerned, they now meant business. In reporting the resolution to London Galway loftily claimed that 'All intelligent people who are free from class prejudice hold an exactly opposite view as to the uses of State Governors to that held by the majority of the labouring classes'.⁵⁰ That may have been true, but Galway had dealt an irreparable blow to many people's perception of the imperial connexion, at a time when Australia's links with Britain were of benefit to both countries.

He finally damned himself after the failure of the second conscription referendum. Speaking at the annual Proclamation Day ceremony at Glenelg, he declared that 'It must have been a joyful day for Germany when Australia turned down conscription'.⁵¹ This drew abusive rejoinders from J. H. Scullin (afterwards Prime Minister)⁵² and the executive of the Labor Party announced that it considered his remarks

were insults to the democracy of Australia, to the thousands of gallant soldiers who had voted 'No', and that they would be prejudicial to recruiting. ... the executive considered that, as Governor of the State, at a time when the nation was at war, it should be his aim to unite the people instead of sowing strife and dissension.

Though the executive recounted Galway's previous blunders, it did not demand an apology on this occasion: there was no longer any room for hoping that he might mend his ways.⁵³



THE SUPERCILIOUS ORNAMENT.

State Governor Galway, having publicly belittled a body of workers in South Australia, refuses to apologise. "I have yet to learn," he said, "that I am responsible to any Labor organisation for my utterances or actions."

LABOR: "And you have also to learn that the salary I find to keep up the useless position you adorn, would be better employed over there."

After the war had ended, Labor members of the House of Assembly moved for the abolition of the office of governor. However, Labor was in opposition, and when the proposal was debated the Speaker refused to allow any *ad hominem* arguments. The question was adjourned without a vote being taken.⁵⁴ At a farewell luncheon given him by the Chamber of Commerce, Galway called for a massive immigration program, knowing full well⁵⁵ that Labor was most anxious to control immigration so that the workers' standard of living would not be threatened. He asserted: 'Double the population of Australia and you will quadruple production. ... lack of population is Australia's weakest point'.⁵⁶

The Labor politicians thought they held one more trump. As Galway's term drew to a close, the Premier, A. H. Peake, planned a farewell Parliamentary luncheon. The Opposition members decided to boycott it. Rather than let them attempt to humiliate the Governor in this way, Peake changed plans and billed it a 'Ministerial Farewell Luncheon'. This was Galway's last chance to address the people of South Australia, and he rose to the occasion. 'We must', he cried, 'annihilate Bolshevism and its kindred creeds. (Applause).' Asserting that 'life must be founded upon service', he called upon the workers to practise wage-restraint and increase their output. He did not venture to offer any equivalent counsel to employers.⁵⁷ It is small wonder that, in an era when everyone had a nickname, Galway had two: while the working-class cartoonist, Claude Marquet, dubbed him 'The Supercilious Ornament', the patrician Sir Josiah Symon — with a touch of sarcasm — dubbed him 'The Admirable Crichton'.⁵⁸

The hostility towards the vice-regal office — and Australia's other constitutional links with Britain — which Galway engendered in the South Australian Labor movement has never entirely disappeared, although he himself is quite forgotten. His conduct explains the intensity, in the 1920s and 1930s, of Labor's demands that all governors should be Australians. By the time the grounds for that intensity of feeling were fading from consciousness, the policy itself had become entrenched as an article of Labor's political creed, which the faithful either took for granted or else defended by appealing to crude nationalism. Similarly, in our own day we have occasionally glimpsed Labor politicians behaving discourteously towards the Crown's representative. This tradition of courtesy (which until the 1970s was almost peculiar to South Australian Labor) was also established by those who had bitter recollections of Galway's governorship. It throws light, for example, on the crudity of the conduct of John Gunn and his colleagues in the Labor government of 1924-6 towards Governor Bridges. Bridges was tremendously popular with all classes, and was the very model of a modern governor. The studied insults the Gunn ministry offered him⁵⁹ are incomprehensible until one realizes that the individuals involved had considered themselves insulted by Galway a few years before, and that, now in office for the first time, they were venting the spleen they had been harbouring since 1917.

In his despatches to London, Galway made no mention of the rumpuses he created in Adelaide. The Colonial Office staff did, however, learn something about the uproar which followed his attacks on White Australia and the Islington ironworkers — perhaps *via* the Labour members of the House of Commons. The second of these incidents, which occurred when Galway had been in office for only nineteen months, prompted the department's permanent head, Under-Secretary Sir

John Anderson to minute: 'Not the first time this gentleman has fired off a "blazer". I think it is getting time to think of recalling him.'⁶⁰

A matter which came much more directly under the notice of the permanent staff in Downing Street was Galway's conduct in the actual business of government. After his first meeting with the Premier (Peake) he reported:

State Ministers are very jealous of the sovereign rights possessed by their respective States, and are very adverse to accept any changes by which these rights are curtailed. I sympathize with Ministers in the view they take.⁶¹

This sympathy led him to disobey two instructions he had been given by the imperial government. In his first months in office, he failed to send the Governor General copies of his despatches, and subsequently he did so only spasmodically. London found this defiance 'extraordinary'.⁶² Again, in 1911, control over consular appointments had passed from the States to the Commonwealth. Thenceforth, the state governments could approve the opening of consulates and vice-consulates and could give recognition to their staff only after both steps had been approved in the Executive Council of the Commonwealth. London had approved of this change and had instructed state governors to proceed under the new rules. Galway considered this too an invasion of state rights, and with Peake's concurrence, he forthwith re-established a Swedish vice-consulate at Port Adelaide and announced the appointment of A. Crompton as vice-consul.⁶³ He repeatedly defied his superiors' censures, to their astonishment. The imperial government was especially annoyed with him because the Commonwealth vetoed one of his appointments. The correct procedure was again explained to him in a despatch mailed in January 1918. After that, Galway would announce that the appointment of a new consul was provisional until ratified by the Commonwealth. This was still contrary to the letter and the spirit of the orders he had been given, for Downing Street had acknowledged the legitimacy of the federal government's insistence that it wished to vet each nomination before any announcement was made. Galway's behaviour received further rebukes. The Colonial Office staff pronounced him 'incorrigible'.⁶⁴

Why did he remain so obstinate in the matter? In January 1916 he had tried to justify his practice — and his defence of the Legislative Councillors who had thrown out a Bill to transfer some State powers to the Commonwealth for the duration of the war — by claiming that it was his duty to study

how the sovereign rights of the States can best be protected against federal encroachments. I recognize that a State Governor is bound to do all in his power to preserve cordial relations with the Governor General and the Federal authorities both in the interests of the State and the Commonwealth, and even more important, during the present crisis [*i.e.* the war] in the interests of the Empire. ...[But it is the Governor's] special function...not to allow the Constitutional position of his State to be altered except with the clear concurrence of the people of the State and by proper constitutional methods.⁶⁵

London was not impressed. Similar views were held by a number of governors in that and some other periods. Sir Gerald Strickland (Governor of Tasmania, 1904-9, of Western Australia, 1909-12, and of New South Wales, 1913-17) was the outstanding example. The staff of the Colonial Office and its successors have generally suspected that their attitude was influenced by a fear that the dignity and



Galway (left) with cigar and the Governor General, Sir Ronald Munro-Ferguson, outside Government House, Adelaide. *Register* photo. (S.A. Archives)

importance of the office of governor would inevitably diminish if the importance of the State governments and Parliaments diminished. No one likes losing status.

The British bureaucrats thought Galway's influence on his ministers quite pernicious in some respects. For example, during the war, as if he were taking his cue from the English gutter press, he became morbidly emotional, not just about the German government and the deeds of its armed forces, but about all German people. He grew especially hysterical about the thousands of South Australians of

German origin or descent. These people were British subjects. They had proved splendid settlers. They took their citizenship seriously. Many of them enlisted in the A.I.F. and served with distinction. Yet even when acknowledging that some had made the supreme sacrifice in Gallipoli or France, Galway asserted that 'it is not easy to discriminate between the sheep and the goats ... in a State possessing a German population of over 30,000'. He denounced the great majority as 'German in every thought and feeling ... more or less working against the land of their adoption'. These 'snakes-in-the-grass', these 'traitors within the gates', he claimed, 'hope to see Germany victorious'. He took alarm at a 'warning from an anonymous source to the effect that a German rising would take place throughout the Commonwealth, and that the ball would be opened in South Australia on a certain fixed date'. He assumed that the '300 German churches' [sic] in South Australia were hotbeds of sedition. Equally incredibly, he alleged that

the German spy system has worked hard during the last half century in this State to strengthen the chances of the Kaiser one day becoming the Ruler of Australia. The system of the nomenclature of towns was one of the methods employed.... The gradual process under which nearly 50 towns and districts in this State received German names is a wonderful example of the system of peaceful penetration, in which method Germany has no rival.⁶⁶

Ironically, not all the German-sounding names had been conferred by people with German connexions. After the deservedly popular Sir William Jervois (Governor 1877-83) had been honoured by having his name applied to mountains and a mine in the outback and to a bridge in Adelaide, the Christian names of members of his family had begun to be sprinkled on the map. The intention was worthy, even if some of the results were criticized as 'horrible jangles'. Thus South Australia's Petersburg and Johnsburg, so righteously renamed Peterborough and Johnburgh during World War I, had first been officially named to flatter Peter and John Jervois, just as Carrieton and Georgetown had been named after Governor Jervois's younger children, Carrie and George.⁶⁷ Perhaps no one remembered this in 1917.

Be that as it may, Galway did not rest until his ministers had agreed: to substitute British or Aboriginal names for all 'German' place names in South Australia; to deprive of their commissions all 'German' justices of the peace; to legislate that even in districts where most adults still used the German language all instruction in the primary schools must be given in English; and to decree that in secondary schools only one hour a day could be allowed for teaching 'other than English subjects'.⁶⁸

Similar steps were taken in other states⁶⁹ and other countries. In England, for example, the King was pressured to change his family name from 'Saxe-Coburg-Gotha' to 'Windsor', and to remove British subjects of German origin from membership of his Privy Council. But while many politicians are all too likely to bow before mass-hysteria, the higher civil servants saw matters more rationally. The Colonial Office staff regretted that in South Australia the Governor was heading the tide of unreason, instead of trying to restrain it. They were particularly appalled when Galway reported that he had accepted the resignation of Hermann Homburg, the Attorney General and Minister of Industry, because of his 'lineage'.⁷⁰ Homburg had been born in South Australia and had never left it. His

father, Robert Homburg, had emigrated from the Duchy of Brunswick to Australia with his parents in 1854, when he was six years of age. He had become a successful lawyer. He was a member of the House of Assembly 1884-1905, held portfolios in the Playford, Downer and Jenkins ministries, and had then been a Supreme Court judge, from 1905 until his death in 1912.⁷¹ The son, educated at Prince Alfred College and the University of Adelaide, had done well at the bar. He had succeeded to his father's seat of Murray, and had twice been chosen for cabinet office.⁷² There is nothing to prove that Galway shared in the clamour that Homburg should resign because of his Germanic ancestry. It was enough for Downing Street that he did not lift a finger to persuade the Attorney General to ride out the storm. Two members of the Colonial Office staff had met Homburg during tours of Australia before the war. E. H. Howell minuted: 'I remember that Mr Homburg impressed me as much the ablest of the S. Austn. Ministers.' Sir Hartmann Just added: 'I found him a most agreeable and cultivated man'.⁷³ Homburg re-entered Parliament and the Cabinet in the 1920s, but it is not surprising that in his later years his political views became somewhat bizarre.

In the meantime, Galway's notions had grown no less absurd. After the failure of the first conscription referendum he asserted that the 'No' majority was 'due no doubt in some measure to German money and intrigue'.⁷⁴ Nine months later, in a long passage of invective deplored the Australian workers' readiness to strike for better wages and conditions, he even claimed that 'German money plays no little part in fomenting these continued strikes'.⁷⁵ Moreover, he branded the rising stars of the Labor Party, like Queensland's E. G. Theodore (of Rumanian parentage!), as 'Bolsheviks'.⁷⁶ Yet in the last years of his term he tended to drop conspiracy theories as he became more and more convinced that the Australians' greatest enemies were themselves. Not only did one have to reckon with 'the crass ignorance of the hoi polloi';⁷⁷ the nation looked as if it would never have a capable elite. Thus, after a visit by the battle-cruiser, H.M.A.S. *Australia*, he claimed that the growing demands that ships of the Royal Australian Navy be officered and manned entirely by Australians must be 'doomed to failure': 'Nobody who knows Australia well can honestly think that such a miracle will ever be achieved'.⁷⁸ Besides being incompetent, Australians were suffering from 'moral influenza'.⁷⁹ This manifested itself in many ways, as in the 'vindictive spirit' which Galway alleged was such a 'marked feature' of the workers' behaviour in fomenting 'industrial strife': 'No sooner does a Union get what it asked for than it strikes again, and so on'.⁸⁰ Similarly, as late as October 1918 he could still write: 'Australia has not contributed her fair share in numbers to the war ... she certainly has not'.⁸¹ Perhaps his greatest disappointment, after 1917, when Labor was in eclipse at both state and national levels, was his remarkable discovery that their opponents were in some respects worse, because 'the immoral expenditure of public money' was becoming 'so prevalent throughout the Commonwealth'.⁸² In short, his initial patronizing attitude towards all things antipodean had developed into an almost paranoid tendency to suspect and mistrust others.

It pleased Galway to believe that 'Governors, as at present appointed, can do a great deal of good, more than the man in the street realizes,...by personal influence with Ministers'.⁸³ He certainly won an ascendancy over A. H. Peake, after Peake, on becoming Premier for the third time in July 1917, had improperly disclosed in

Parliament that in the dying hours of the Vaughan Labor government, Sir Langdon Bonython had been nominated for a K.C.M.G.⁸⁴ Thus it was at Galway's insistence that Sir Richard Butler was dropped from the Ministry in May 1919.⁸⁵ But Galway was not content with a counselling role. He assumed that his duties included 'protecting the public against arbitrary and irregular administration'.⁸⁶ His determination that he would not accept 'the unenviable position of an accomplice in the maladministration of his Ministers'⁸⁷ gave the Colonial Office staff much trouble. He plagued London with queries about his reserve powers, and demanded advice from the English Law Officers about the circumstances in which he could exercise his 'independent judgment' and reject his ministers' advice.⁸⁸ For example, having made up his own mind that a certain member of Parliament was unfit to hold ministerial office, he asked if he could refuse to admit that person to office even if a premier insisted.⁸⁹

Galway's superiors, on the contrary, held that 'Prudence and the principles of Constitutional Govt. alike point to the danger of the Gov[erno]r exercising too much "independent judgment"'.⁹⁰ They were dismayed that, for all their advice, he had 'failed to grasp the doctrine of Ministerial responsibility'.⁹¹ When he began quarrying Arthur Berriedale Keith's treatise, *Responsible Government in the Dominions*, for nineteenth-century precedents 'on the subject of the responsibilities of a State Governor in the control of public expenditure', H. C. M. Lambert, who had become Assistant Under-Secretary when Just retired in 1916, minuted: 'Galway's learning shows to more advantage than his political sense. He probably would not do amiss by making a bonfire of the textbooks'.⁹² The Colonial Office staff feared that he was 'certain sooner or later to have a quarrel' with his Ministers. They also expected that whenever the crisis came, Galway or his ministers would appeal to the Secretary of State 'who will then have the choice of fighting [the] Ministers on a matter of no Imperial interest or of throwing the Govr. over. Needless to say,' added Lambert, 'the odds in favour of the latter course are heavy'.⁹³ Yet because the leaders of South Australia's political parties were less sinister than the Governor represented in his despatches, the type of upheaval London anticipated never eventuated.

It is hoped that details of Galway's role in quarrels between the two houses of Parliament and other particular political feuds will be set forth in the political history volume of the new history of the state Professor Richards and his team are preparing as a contribution to the commemoration of South Australia's jubilee in 1986. Consequently, the remainder of the present article summarizes the results of my inquiries into three other matters: what was Galway's background? how did he come to be appointed to South Australia? and, given his defiance of instructions and constitutional conventions, how did he manage to escape recall?

* * * * *

While both his parents came from Britain's Celtic fringe, Henry Lionel Galway was born an Englishman — on 25 September 1859 at Breckhurst Lodge, Alverstoke, a seaside resort two kilometres south-west of Portsmouth, Hampshire.⁹⁴ Besides being the chief naval station of England, Portsmouth was a centre of military activity, and in the years 1858-62 Galway's father, Major Thomas Lionel Gallwey

(1821-1906), was engaged in the construction of Blockhouse Fort, at the western side of the harbour entrance. Thomas, a native of Killarney, came from a family of middling rank in the Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland. He had trained as an engineer at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, and spent most of his career building fortifications in Ireland, the West Indies, England, Canada and Gibraltar, eventually becoming Colonel Commandant of the Royal Engineers.⁹⁵ Henry Lionel was Thomas's son by his second wife, a Scotswoman, Alicia Dorinda, daughter of Major James Macdougall of the 42nd Regiment of Foot (the Royal Highlanders). The son changed his surname from 'Gallwey' to 'Galway' by deed poll dated 3 November 1911.⁹⁶ For the sake of simplicity, he is called 'Galway' throughout this article, save where quotations or references require otherwise.

Educated at Cheltenham College and the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, Galway was commissioned in the 58th Foot (Rutlandshire Regiment) in 1878. Six months later he transferred to the 30th Foot (Cambridgeshire), which subsequently merged with the 59th (2nd Nottinghamshire) to form the East Lancashire Regiment.⁹⁷ In 1881 he was made a full lieutenant and was posted to India, but had scarcely arrived there when his father, retiring from the army with the rank of lieutenant-general, was appointed Governor of Bermuda. Thereupon the son obtained release from active service to become his father's aide-de-camp and private secretary. Life in Government House in a lotus-land like Bermuda must have been pleasant and easy, but most young men would have found the job boring after a year of two. Young Galway kept it for seven years — and that is the first mystery about him. At the end of his father's term Galway was promoted captain, but he continued as aide-de-camp to the next governor, Lieutenant-general E. Newdigate-Newdegate, in 1888-9.⁹⁸

In 1890 he was posted to Ireland, but again the routine work of a soldier does not seem to have attracted him. He later recounted that he had soon become 'fairly tired of barrack life'.⁹⁹ He also admitted that he found time to visit County Cork, where he inspected but 'did not kiss' the Blarney Stone.¹⁰⁰ It is probable that, while in County Cork, he would have made contact with at least some members of the large family of his great-uncle Henry, late squire of Greenfield, and that he would have heard from them something of the adventures of the latter's eldest son, Michael Henry Gallwey, in Zululand and the Transvaal (Michael had been knighted in 1888).¹⁰¹ If so, those tales may have stirred Galway's imagination and ambition. In any event, before the year was out, he was offered appointment as a deputy commissioner and vice-consul in the Oil Rivers Protectorate (renamed the Niger Coast Protectorate in 1893). He later reminisced:

My chance had come like a bolt from the blue, and needless to say I accepted the appointment, which was under the Foreign Office, with alacrity. In fact, I accepted the post before even satisfying myself as to where my new field of action, or otherwise, actually lay. I knew, however, that it was one of the many blank spaces on the map known as Darkest Africa, and that fascinating fact was quite accurate enough a description for me to jump at the offer made.¹⁰²

In 1885, Britain had proclaimed a protectorate over the southern coast of what is now Nigeria, with a view to promoting trade. The chiefs who ruled that coast had no intention of giving up the institution of domestic slavery. This made the creation of a Crown colony there impossible for the time being, as Parliament had

long since decreed that slavery could not exist in British colonies. So, when in 1890 London at last resolved to establish an effective British administration in the area, it remained under the control of the Foreign Office. Major Claude Macdonald was appointed Commissioner and Consul General, and he arrived in the Protectorate with nine deputies — including Galway — in July 1891. Backed by gunboats from the Navy's West Africa Squadron, the consular corps continued negotiating treaties with the coastal chiefs, under which they were expected to submit to British control and remove obstacles to trade. As the administration was required to be self-supporting, Macdonald levied duties on imports from Europe. He made his headquarters at Calabar. Galway was ordered to establish a vice-consulate on the lower reaches of the Benin River, 400 kilometers to the west. There he had his first taste of power.¹⁰³

Luck, or an iron constitution, enabled him to escape the tropical diseases that soon deprived Macdonald of eight members of his initial team.¹⁰⁴ Galway relished the authority he wielded. He became a champion of the use of arms to enforce concessions wrung from the native rulers, and to compel payment not only of the new customs duties but also licence fees the Royal Niger Company was attempting to levy on trading canoes. He claimed it was

very patent we could not attempt to open up the country by means of smiles and white umbrellas to any great extent or for any length of time. Both the smile and the umbrella irritate if used too much, without the accompaniment of force, among semi-civilised peoples.¹⁰⁵

In this spirit he raised and trained a company of Hausa troops which he led in 'annual punitive expeditions'. His reminiscences show that he had no compunction about conducting the slaughter of hundreds of his fellow human beings: in these forays he found a 'magnetic attraction'.¹⁰⁶ The zest of the chase was heightened because he saw it as a vital part of bringing 'peace, contentment, and justice' to 'regions where hitherto from time immemorial anarchy and misrule had reigned'.¹⁰⁷ He revelled in trying out new weapons of destruction. He was delighted when the appearance of a flotilla of war canoes provided the opportunity for 'some very pretty practice... with a quickfirer'.¹⁰⁸ Another excursion gave him five days' 'merry' experimentation with a Maxim gun.¹⁰⁹ He also found 'excitement' in 'the dirty work' of burning towns and stockades, defending it as necessary for 'that grand and inspiring work of Empire-building'.¹¹⁰ The greatest boost to his ego came after he had managed to procure a couple of war rockets and fired them into a recalcitrant town. On its capitulation, a survivor told him how, 'when suddenly from the blue appeared two hissing thunderbolts into the very midst of them — and yet not a white man in sight', the people had 'fled panic-stricken' exclaiming: 'Truly the white men are gods'.¹¹¹ His only twinges of regret were for things rather than people. Thus:

We confiscated the war canoes and destroyed them. It seemed almost a pity to break up such fine craft, but there was no alternative. Any leniency in such matters ... was viewed as weakness by the tribes of the Delta, so we made no mistake in that direction.¹¹²

This was the man who could find 'sport' in shooting the languid hippopotamus — even while admitting that it had already become rare in his district¹¹³ — and who, in South Australia, sometimes relieved his tensions by spending a day shooting

peacocks on E. A. Brooks's property, 'Buckland Park'.¹¹⁴ But after he had settled in Adelaide, he once admitted that it was 'probable' that the people of Nigeria 'often sigh for the good old days before the interfering white man appeared in their midst'.¹¹⁵

For his exploits in conducting punitive expeditions Galway was often mentioned in despatches, and was rewarded with the D.S.O. (1896) and three other medals, appointment as C.M.G. (1899), and promotion to major (1899).¹¹⁶ If his severity seems barbaric by present standards, it must be remembered that it was not so unusual in his day. In the nineteenth century, Orangemen in some parts of Ireland could, on the anniversary of the Battle of the Boyne, slaughter a few Catholic peasants and burn their homes without fear of prosecution.¹¹⁷ In Australia punitive expeditions against the Aborigines were very frequent. Even in 1918, Lord Lamington could lament that it was still the custom in Queensland for pastoralists to shoot blacks for spearing cattle.¹¹⁸ In the same year, when Alexander MacDonald was found speared in the stockyards at Dick's Creek, twelve kilometers from Auvergne Station in the Northern Territory, a party of policemen rode out to Razorback Mountain, cornered a group of Aborigines and summarily 'shot seven'.¹¹⁹ Yet the fact that some of Galway's contemporaries likewise took the law into their own hands does not furnish any moral justification for his deeds. On the contrary, given his family background and superior educational opportunities, he should have known better than the Australian frontiersmen or the lumpenproletarian elements in the Orange Order.

For present purposes, it is significant that the inhumanity of Galway's conduct in the Protectorate foreshadowed the callousness of some of the observations he made in Adelaide. It helps one to understand how he could greet news of the disasters of the Gallipoli campaign with remarks such as: 'I am glad to be able to say that the casualty lists are proving to be excellent recruiting agents'.¹²⁰ Or how he could claim:

There is no doubt that it would have been a blessing in disguise had Von Spee's squadron dropped a few shells into Sydney and Melbourne during the first weeks of the war Such shells would have been an excellent awakener to what are known as the 'cold-footed brigade' The attitude of the people in this country would be entirely different if they could be made to feel the direct consequences of war. I am confident that a zeppelin raid or two would be an excellent tonic to a community which only wants waking up.

He expressed these ideas on four separate occasions.¹²¹

There was similar logic coupled with a similar sternness in his criticism (at a meeting of the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia's South Australian Branch) of the Asquith Government's failure to prevent gun-running in Ulster.¹²² Still greater ruthlessness marked his subsequent denunciation of Lloyd George for being 'so damnably weak' in handling Irish nationalists:

I am certain that if they shot a dozen Sinn Feiners a-week they would very soon tame the traitor gang The whole thing is a wicked farce and a disgrace to any Government.¹²³

How piquant is the contrast with Roger Casement, who had been one of his fellow vice-consuls in the Oil Rivers Protectorate. Casement won a knighthood for his carefully documented exposés of European atrocities in West Africa and Peru, and

later risked his all in an utterly misguided attempt to advance the cause of Irish independence.¹²⁴

In the broadest perspective of history, Galway must have a place because he was primarily responsible for the sacking and destruction of Benin City and the killing of vast numbers of its inhabitants. Apart from the appalling carnage, these events deprived the people of Nigeria of the richest jewels in their cultural heritage. The indigenous arts of the Bini have long been famous. Their ebony and ivory carvings are widely considered to rank with the finest examples of non-Western art. Yet their supreme achievements were their superb bronze castings, which remain 'unique, for there is absolutely nothing like them in any other part of the world'.¹²⁵ In the 1890s, most of these artifacts were still venerated locally for their religious significance. However, the skills required to make them had been lost during a long decline Benin City had been experiencing since about 1810. So when the lot was confiscated and shipped to London in 1897 (Galway gleefully described it as 'A regular harvest of loot'),¹²⁶ there was no one left who knew how to begin creating replacements.

The slaughter and plunder that occurred during the rape of Benin have never ceased to excite interest. However, Galway's villainous role in the events leading to that tragedy has not been understood by the British historians of Nigeria, and only imperfectly grasped by African historians, for none of them has read the cold-blooded account of the affair he wrote while living in Adelaide.

For 300 years prior to the nineteenth century, the kings of Benin had ruled a considerable empire. It was in Benin in the fifteenth century that white men were first introduced to black pepper, which soon came to be regarded as indispensable to the palatability of the Northern Europeans' limited winter diet.¹²⁷ In the following centuries, Benin also exported large quantities of cloth and, especially, slaves. Its army (at one stage estimated at 100,000 men) was constantly employed in wars with neighbouring states, and most of the prisoners taken in or after battle were sold to European slave traders.¹²⁸ In the nineteenth century, Britain's use of its West African Squadron to suppress slave trading had prompted a dramatic fall in the Bini's prosperity. Simultaneously, they lost much territory to the increasingly powerful Muslim states to the north. By Galway's time, most of the buildings in Benin City were deserted, and the population had fallen to 15,000 because the majority of its recent inhabitants had left for the countryside to engage in agriculture and cloth-making. Moreover, the kingdom's administrative machinery had become rather like that of England under Richard II, or the medieval Holy Roman Empire, inasmuch as that beneath the king there were a number of chiefs who often acted independently. Indeed, a particular chief's defiance of the king's orders was to provide the immediate pretext for the British invasion of 1897. Nevertheless, the king of Benin remained the most influential ruler in Galway's district because he was revered as a god. Consequently, Europeans who were disappointed in their hopes of increasing trade in the area began to depict Benin 'in the blackest possible colours'. Their attitude has been fairly summarized by Obaro Ikime, professor of history in the University of Ibadan:

Virtually everything that happened in Benin was attributed to the oba's [i.e. the king's] 'juju'. Thus if the oba was unhappy with the trade situation and tried to get better terms for trade by stopping the flow of goods to the markets for a while, the Europeans

reported that he was only able to do this because his people feared his supernatural powers. Even when the trade of other people, like the Itsekiri and Urhobo, was bad, European traders were quite ready to argue that the Oba of Benin's wicked influence was at work.¹²⁹

Galway accepted these allegations uncritically and concluded that Benin presented the main obstacle to his task of promoting British power in his district. He resolved that the 'fetish rule' of the king, whose name was Ovonramwen (Overami or Ovurami in some accounts), must somehow be modified.¹³⁰ He later asserted that knowledge that previous 'efforts made to conclude a treaty with his Duskinness had failed' (mainly because the Bini's capital, lying forty kilometres across country from its port, was immune from threats of naval bombardment)

whet my ardor; so, in fact, without letting my chief know of my intentions, I started one warm morning with Benin City as my goal, and with the object of concluding a treaty with the King.¹³¹

Galway was accompanied by a party of thirty-six, armed with revolvers 'carefully concealed'. For the rest, he had to rely on his own bravado and cunning.

Six days later, on 26 March 1892, after tedious negotiations, during which he threatened that if his mission was unsuccessful he 'would not return as a "friend"',¹³² and in which he assured the king at least eight times that acceptance of an agreement would mean peace, not war,¹³³ he concluded a treaty. Galway also tells us that throughout the palaver his valet, Ajaie, who was not a Bini, acted as sole interpreter, and that as the Binis could 'neither read nor write ... the king and his chiefs touched the pen, whereupon I wrote, "Ovurami, his mark!"'¹³⁴ According to this document, the king unconditionally surrendered his sovereignty to Her Britannic Majesty in return for being granted 'Her gracious favour and protection'. In several important fields, such as foreign affairs, the admission and activities of traders and disputes with other tribes, the king was deprived of all power to act. For the future, these matters were to be settled by British 'consular or other officers'. Moreover, according to article III, the consular corps acquired 'in the territory of Benin', 'full and exclusive jurisdiction, civil and criminal', over the persons and property of British subjects and all 'foreign subjects enjoying British protection'. In everything else, that is, purely domestic affairs, the king was reduced to a puppet. Henceforth he was required to act upon the advice of

British consular or other officers ... in matters relating to the administration of justice, the development of the resources of the country, the interests of commerce, or in any other matter relating to peace, order, and good government, and the general progress of civilization.¹³⁵

It was this treaty that the British enforced with great savagery in 1897.

Before more is said about that, it is worth noting that Galway's visit to Benin in 1892 was the occasion of two other incidents which throw light on his character and subsequent career. One marked the known commencement of his pursuit of 'loot' — the word he invariably used for a certain form of acquisition. During Galway's first days in Benin City the king sent him and his party 'hundreds' of eggs, packed in four 'most beautifully carved boxes'. Just before his departure, a royal messenger

arrived requesting return of the boxes, as the gift had consisted in the eggs only. Galway later admitted:

I could not well do otherwise than comply, but my conscience allowed me to kick one of the boxes into a dark corner, and as soon as the messenger had departed I put my loot into one of my own loads, and sent the carriers off at once.

He remained 'particularly pleased' that he had thus secured so 'valuable' a work of Bini art.¹³⁶

The second incident is the first recorded example of his refusing to obey instructions. At the conclusion of the treaty palaver, that is, on the day before the theft of the box, Galway had given the king some silks and a few coral trinkets as presents 'from the Protectorate Government'. In return, the king presented him with 'a very fine elephant's tusk' — apparently the first that had been allowed to leave Benin for eighty years. When the Consul General heard about this he requested the tusk's surrender, reminding Galway that the rules of the consular service, categorizing all gifts made in these circumstances as presents to Her Majesty, required that it be forwarded to the Foreign Office. Galway refused to comply, and afterwards had the tusk inscribed to flatter his vanity.¹³⁷ Thus he had achieved the feat of robbing two monarchs almost simultaneously.

Despite Galway's visit, Ovonramwen continued to maintain his recently imposed restraints on the exports of some of his kingdom's most valuable products — palm kernels, peppers and rubber — still with a view to negotiating better prices. Nevertheless, Galway did absolutely nothing in the way of exercising the plenary powers arrogated to himself and the consular corps generally under articles III and IV of his treaty. In fact he did not attempt to return to Benin until 1897, when he led his Hausa troops as part of the army which effected the holocaust.¹³⁸ Meanwhile, he was of course busy with the tribes closer to his base, and with his various punitive expeditions. Yet he took some pains to promote in Britain the belief that Benin was a morally corrupt state, whose economic development was frustrated because its people were so uncivilized.

For example, in a paper he read to the Royal Geographical Society while on leave in London in December 1892, he suggested that Benin was 'a very powerful theocracy of fetish priests' which deserved to be overthrown because its 'rule is one of terror'. To some extent he condemned the Bini with unsubstantiated smears, hinting at 'barbarous customs' which characterized their 'general mode of living' and declaring: 'It is almost impossible to conceive that such a deplorable state of affairs should exist in these civilised days.' He also alleged: 'Human sacrifices are of frequent occurrence'.¹³⁹ This, as one of Galway's contemporaries, the anthropologist H. Ling Roth, has shown, was an exaggeration. It was the custom for two or three persons to be sacrificed to propitiate the gods, at the annual national religious festival. The victims were usually persons who had been convicted of capital crimes, their fate simply being postponed till the next festival. Occasionally, when there were no major criminals, an individual was chosen who had been hopelessly crippled by disease or in battle.¹⁴⁰ Without condoning either human sacrifice or euthanasia, one can say that Galway misrepresented the scale of 'these terrible practices' when he styled the Bini's capital 'the City of Blood' and claimed: 'I assure you that I have not told half the horrors I saw and learnt about in the few days spent in that city of skulls'.¹⁴¹ As Galway quoted from works written by

previous visitors to Benin, he must have known, however, that by age-old tradition, when absolute disaster faced the kingdom, the scale of conducting propitiatory sacrifices rose enormously. He did not acknowledge this in his 1892 paper. If he did know it, he must have foreseen that if the British were to launch an invasion of Benin, huge numbers of non-combatants would be sacrificed in vain hopes of ensuring the success of the kingdom's army — as indeed they were.¹⁴²

In the course of his London lecture, Galway expressed the hope that as a result of his 'very satisfactory' visit to Benin, all its heathen customs would 'be put an end to'.¹⁴³ This may have been the source of the myth, still accepted by many British historians, that Galway's treaty 'abolished' slavery and human sacrifice. However, the treaty contained no mention of either matter. In 1892, Galway had actually defended slavery as it existed on the Niger coast. He claimed:

Domestic slavery ... has many points in its favour. There is really very little difference between the lot of a good slave and a freeman, except that the former works while the latter does not. They are housed and fed by their masters, and are given positions of trust...[etc.]¹⁴⁴

This extraordinary declaration raised some eyebrows in England¹⁴⁵ and it must have displeased the Foreign Office; yet it illuminates the bitter complaints he was later to make about the independence of 'the coolies' in Adelaide, and their disrespect for 'the people'. As for human sacrifice, his treaty could be argued to have provided for its toleration. Article VII declared: 'All forms of religious worship and religious ordinances may be exercised within the territories of the aforesaid King, and no hindrance shall be offered thereto.'¹⁴⁶

It is also significant that in their official reports on the invasion of Benin, Galway's superiors justified it primarily on the ground that it had added to the Empire almost 4,000 square miles (10,000 square kilometres) of the best remaining unappropriated land in Africa.¹⁴⁷ Nevertheless, the subsequent assumption that the 1892 treaty *had* ordained an end to slavery and human sacrifice has led British historians to treat Galway's negotiation of the treaty as a heroic achievement, and, consequently, to regard as perfectly legitimate the action taken in 1897 to enforce it.¹⁴⁸

The same mistakes were made by Australians when Galway first came to Adelaide. For example, at a meeting in honour of Dan Crawford, a visiting African missionary, Chief Justice Way claimed that Galway (who was in the chair) was singularly 'fitted to grace the occasion' because

His Excellency had ... journeyed to Benin, bloody Benin, and persuaded the monarch of that great city and territory to place himself and his country under the protection of the British Crown. (Applause.) Unfortunately that monarch did not act well, and he was ultimately deposed. The very wise act of His Excellency the Governor, however — and he recalled the fact with pride — was the means of bringing a great territory into the benefits of British rule On that occasion the Governor was the minister of righteousness to a much oppressed country. (Long applause.)¹⁴⁹

This will not do. Nigerian historians have recently begun to suspect that king Ovonramwen could not have grasped the meaning of the treaty of 1892.¹⁵⁰ In fact, Galway confessed the truth of the matter in 1916. In the revised version of a paper he had read to the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia's South Australian Branch, he revealed that the king had understood only two things about the treaty.

These were: that if it were accepted, the troublesome Captain Galway would go away; and that Galway had repeatedly given his word that the treaty meant peace, not war.¹⁵¹ That is, on Galway's own showing, the king had not the slightest conception that he was being asked to yield any part of his authority, or that the treaty purported to give the British consular officers the right to meddle in all the affairs of his kingdom. Galway introduced this admission by recounting:

On returning from the treaty palaver, my servant [the valet who had acted as interpreter] ... said to me, in great glee, 'You done them King best', and chuckled over what he plainly considered a great score on my part.

Much worse follows:

I would mention that the King, after the treaty was concluded, suggested to me that whilst the Great White Queen was ruler of the sea, he was ruler of the land. Whilst refraining from acquiescing in such a Quixotic suggestion, I was careful not to hurt the King's feelings by protesting — and on that occasion silence was, I am sure, golden. We practically disabused his mistaken ideas five years later, when all his corals and ivories, and bronzes passed from his into the hands of a British force; and when the King became a fugitive in his own country, fleeing before British justice.¹⁵²

This leaves no room for doubt. Once Ovonramwen made it so abundantly clear that he had not the slightest notion he was now presumed to have surrendered his sovereignty in domestic and foreign affairs, Galway should have clarified the matter. Because he lacked the nerve to do so, the treaty was worthless, and all further argument about that document's text and meaning is beside the point. Moreover, Galway's conduct was anything but the 'very wise act' of a 'minister of righteousness'. Yet as he and many others had the audacity to maintain that the subsequent enforcement of the treaty was an exercise in 'British justice', it is small wonder that that concept has sometimes commanded little respect in modern Nigeria.

Perhaps it is not surprising that I have been unable to trace any expression, by the people of Adelaide in 1916, of horror at Galway's disclosure. The White Australia policy, and the assumptions of white supremacy that inspired it, were still in their heyday — accepted by all political parties and virtually all white Australians. That was the generation which had adopted, without dissent, section 127 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia decreeing that 'In reckoning the numbers of the people of the Commonwealth, or of a State or other part of the Commonwealth, aboriginal natives shall not be counted'.¹⁵³ The beginning of the twentieth century was also the high-watermark of British Hegelianism, with its pernicious doctrine that God always marches on the side of the big battalions. Australians of that era were utterly convinced about the virtue of extending European power to promote the spread of European civilization, and there was no local Aborigines Protection Society to raise awkward questions about whether worthy ends justified the use of trickery or deception and brute force. Belief in white supremacy was nowhere stronger than amongst some of those members of the South Australian Trades and Labor Council who judged Galway so shrewdly. Thus, when defending the Islington ironworkers, C. R. Baker had complained that the Governor 'had been in charge of niggers, and apparently he still thought he was over niggers'.¹⁵⁴

Three further points should be made. First, it was Galway who, within twenty-four hours of learning (on 16 January 1897) that he had become Acting Commissioner and Consul General for the Niger Coast, summoned all British and native troops in the Protectorate to assemble for a massive punitive expedition against Benin, and sent 'several wires to the Foreign Office', in which he demanded reinforcements and insisted that King Ovonramwen must be punished for violations of the treaty of 1892. Twelve hundred marines and blue-jackets arrived in February, as did Admiral Harry Rawson (afterwards Governor of New South Wales), who had been instructed to lead the combined invading forces.¹⁵⁵

Secondly, when the invaders' loot, including 2,500 of the famous bronzes, arrived in London, Charles H. Read, the Keeper of Antiquities at the British Museum, 'at once endeavoured to secure for the national collection good representative specimens'. However, the Foreign Office decided to sell the treasures, to help pay the cost of governing Nigeria. 'Owing to want of proper pecuniary support', the British Museum was able to purchase only 300 of the smaller bronzes. The rest were dispersed to collectors around the northern hemisphere, most of the finest pieces going to Germany. As a result, many forms of Bini art are not represented at Bloomsbury, and some Englishmen, in their quaint way, began protesting that their national museum had been 'deprived of its lawful acquisitions'.¹⁵⁶

Thirdly, Galway was anything but magnanimous in victory. After the invasion, Ovonramwen was deposed, and Galway, as Acting Consul General, escorted him into exile at Calabar. He recorded, after the death of 'the dusky potentate': 'He was occasionally, during his first few months of exile, apt to forget he was no longer a king. I soon disabused his mind on that point.' Moreover,

On more than one occasion, when I consented to see him at a certain hour and he turned up 10 minutes or so late, I refused to see him. My turn had come! He kept me waiting for three days in 1892 before he saw me, so I thought it was quite fair not to see him at all unless he observed punctuality.¹⁵⁷

The irony here is that in 1892 Galway had arrived in Benin City demanding an audience without appointment.

For much of Galway's time in the Protectorate, he had a civilian understudy named Harcourt, who accompanied him even on punitive expeditions. In recognition of his devoted service, in 1897 Galway persuaded the Tory Foreign Secretary, the Marquess of Salisbury, to raise him to the rank of vice-consul.¹⁵⁸ It was, presumably, this Ganymede who introduced Galway to Loulou Harcourt, who became his most intimate friend.¹⁵⁹ The development of their friendship was made possible because — on account of the climate and the high rate of death from disease — the West African consular corps had extremely generous leave entitlements. Loulou Harcourt won notoriety in death: in 1922 he committed suicide to escape prosecution on a homosexual charge.¹⁶⁰ There is absolutely nothing to suggest that there was anything criminal in his relationship with Galway. However, they were an oddly-assorted pair. Loulou's mother had died while giving birth to him, and for the next forty-five years he and his father (Sir William Harcourt, Gladstone's last Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Liberal leader of the Commons during the Earl of Rosebery's premiership) had been almost inseparable. Galway no doubt admired their campaign against the excesses of the Ritualists in the Church of England and their crusade for birching juvenile

offenders instead of detaining them, but he must have found some of their political ideas dangerously radical. However, the Harcourts were the most vehement opponents of Britain's war against the Boers, 1899-1902, and it may have been due to their influence that he did not rejoin his regiment when its first battalion was ordered to South Africa late in 1899.¹⁶¹ As Galway had been in his fortieth year when he obtained his majority in March 1899, his failure to participate in the Boer War diminished his prospects of attaining more than regimental rank in the Army. On 13 April 1901 the War Office placed him on half-pay, and in accordance with the custom gave him the rank of lieutenant-colonel that same day. In the following year his name was entered on the Army's retired list.¹⁶²

Meanwhile, his future role in West Africa had looked no brighter. In 1899-1900 the Niger Coast Protectorate was absorbed into a new Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, and the whole area was transferred to control by the Colonial Office. Consular titles were abolished. R. D. R. Moor (who had succeeded Macdonald as Commissioner and Consul General in 1896) became High Commissioner. His subordinates rose correspondingly in rank, Galway becoming one of the Divisional Commissioners. Yet with Moor remaining at the head of things, Galway's prospects of real promotion in the running of the Protectorate's affairs must have seemed as remote as his chances of further advancement in the Army. At the same time, the new masters in London ordered a speedy suppression of slavery, in pursuance of the *Emancipation Act* of 1833. This meant further punitive expeditions, but Galway now participated in the less glamorous role of political officer, with instructions to stand aside when any skirmishes or battles were fought.¹⁶³

In 1902 he sought a transfer, and accepted one of the humblest posts the Colonial Office had at its disposal. He was appointed Governor, Chief Justice and Colonial Secretary of St Helena. This was a far cry from Bermuda, where his father had received a salary of £2,946. In St Helena, Galway was paid a mere £750 a year.¹⁶⁴ During the South African war, 6,000 Boers had been interned on the island. They, and most of the troops who had guarded them, had been sent home just before Galway's arrival. Thus Galway found the colony in deep depression, whereas only four months earlier it had been enjoying its greatest-ever peak of prosperity. Most of the permanent residents had been engaged in growing food for the visitors. Now that market was gone, and high shipping costs made their produce unexportable. Simultaneously, scores of prostitutes found themselves without clients. During Galway's term, a further 40 per cent of the island's population emigrated. Most of the 3,500 who remained lived in poverty.

The despatches Galway wrote from St Helena (filling almost seventeen volumes, each of about 500 folios)¹⁶⁵ are mainly concerned with his desperate yet sometimes hilarious attempts to cope in this situation. Having no legislative council, he could make laws at will, but his will was not enough. Too many islanders responded apathetically to his ordinance for the eradication of fruit fly. His attempts to make primary education compulsory were defeated by lack of funds to build schools and access roads and to employ sufficient teachers. In their quest for fuel, the Boers and their gaolers had completed the denudation of the island. Galway imported thousands of tropical tree-seeds from Kew Gardens, but as vigorously as he promoted a reafforestation program, hundreds of free-ranging goats gobbled up



Sir Henry Galway
Hammer & Co. photograph
(S.A. Archives)

the seedlings. He ordained the extermination of goats, but lacked the courage to enforce it. Noticing that some of the island's women made pillow-lace, he obtained from London a grant of £170 to import an expert to teach them to make more interesting and therefore more marketable patterns. When the money ran out, she returned to England, and the islanders returned to their single crude old design. Seeing that New Zealand flax thrived on the island, he persuaded farmers to plant thousands of acres of it, and in 1907 induced an entrepreneur to build a fibre and tow mill. However, he had not realized that flax plants needed to develop for several

years before it was worth harvesting them. The crop was soon exhausted and the mill closed in 1910. In 1909 he persuaded an English philanthropist, Alfred Moseley, to build a fish cannery. No sooner was it completed than the great schools of mackerel, which had flourished in the surrounding sea for centuries, suddenly disappeared, and the factory was dismantled after ten months without having canned one fish.

Galway's despatches from St Helena also contain many expressions of consternation — which appear even in his annual reports which were printed for Parliament¹⁶⁶ — that Downing Street seemed quite uninterested in the island's fate. Moreover, he resented being left there to rusticate so long.

In later life, he was fond of telling one memorable anecdote about those nine years of exile. In 1905 two young men, Louis and Richard Crowie, were found guilty of murder. Galway, as Chief Justice, sentenced them to death. As Colonial Secretary, he saw no reason to recommend mercy. As Governor, he resolved not to commute the sentences. However, this was the first occasion on which sentence of death had been passed in St Helena — at least it was the first since the island's transference from the East India Company to the Crown in 1834.¹⁶⁷ Accordingly, Galway had the 'necessary paraphernalia' sent out from England, but

there was still the hangman to be found. The C.O. in charge of the small garrison detachment was told to parade his men, to ask for two volunteers, each to be given five pounds for his services. The officer returned with a grin on his face. He had explained the situation and ordered the two volunteers to take two steps to the front, upon which every man jack of them stepped forward. A moment later the Government Senior Carpenter presented himself, respectfully submitting that the job was his rightful perquisite! So much for the milk of human kindness.¹⁶⁸

Due to insufficient knowledge, poor advice, bad luck, and the Imperial government's demands for economy, Galway achieved little in St Helena. However it was manifest that this was not for want of trying on his part. The islanders thought he was the best governor they had had,¹⁶⁹ and towards the end of 1910 his efforts were rewarded by his being appointed K.C.M.G.

Soon afterwards, his friend Harcourt became Secretary of State for the Colonies, and at last Galway's star began to rise. In 1911 Harcourt offered him the governorship of the Gambia, which carried a salary of £2,500.

Before assuming the duties of his new appointment, Galway took leave in England, and it was then that, at the age of fifty-two, he changed his name from Gallwey to Galway. The only things that can be said with certainty about this are that he had waited until both his parents were dead, and that his sister, Julia Mary Gallwey, of Eastbourne in Sussex, executed a similar deed poll three days later.¹⁷⁰ Perhaps careless individuals, thinking of Galway Bay, had habitually misspelt the name. Yet in the present writer's experience, people of British stock possessing unusually spelt names cherish the eccentricity as part of their individuality. As the Irish Gallweys had been people of position and substance, and no one bearing the surname 'Galway' had previously come to public notice, the change seems particularly strange. However, in Britain, the most prominent Gallwey of the Edwardian period had been the Rev. Peter Gallwey, sometime provincial of the English Jesuits, founder of *The Month*, a celebrated preacher and ubiquitous apologist of the Roman faith.¹⁷¹ It is reasonable to speculate that as an earnest

Protestant and almost life-long supporter of the British and Foreign Bible Society,¹⁷² our Galway may have wished to dissociate himself, in the minds of those who didn't know his own background, from that ogre of Farm Street.

At the same time, Galway seems to have been in search of an identity. He had never established any rapport with the regiments he had belonged to; and after the bestowal of his knighthood, it took him four years before he finally decided that he wished to be addressed as 'Sir Henry' and not 'Sir Lionel'. In Adelaide, he bragged unconsciously about his Scottish forbears (without explaining that they were all on his mother's side), and he sedulously courted the members of the Caledonian Society, who always greeted his more outrageous opinions with warm applause. They further responded by making him an honorary life member.¹⁷³ In turn, he asked the Colonial Office if he could order the flag of St Andrew to be flown on public buildings every St Andrew's Day. Downing Street indignantly retorted 'No'.¹⁷⁴ Only once did he mention his father, and that was to claim, without naming him, that he had been one of the first gentlemen to bowl round-arm — in 1842.¹⁷⁵

Galway spent barely eighteen months in the Gambia, where he accomplished two things: he doubled the revenue from taxation and founded a turf club.¹⁷⁶ He ruled both a colony and a protectorate. The colony then consisted solely of the swampy island, a mere ten square kilometres in area, on which the capital, Bathurst, had been built. The protectorate was a narrow strip of land running inland for several hundred kilometres along the banks of the Gambia River. The whole was surrounded by French territory. He was often pleased to claim that the natives were 'very contented & prosperous' under British rule, and that the latter was 'more popular than ever as compared with French methods close by'. Thus:

Natives are continually coming across the boundary to reside in British territory, and many more would come if they could bring their cattle with them — but the land is overstocked as it is.

In French Territory the natives complain bitterly of forced labour (on the railway and telegraph works) and forced enlistment ... for military service. The French coerce — we father.¹⁷⁷

Harcourt found these reports 'striking and satisfactory'.¹⁷⁸ But, as always, Galway found grounds for complaint:

There is no doubt that real development is almost impossible There is no room to expand. I take it that what the French chiefly want is the use of the Gambia River as a highway towards the Niger country. I would suggest a rearrangement of territory, by which the French should be given all the country North of the River named, & concede to us all the country between our Southern boundary and the Casamance River, would give our neighbours all they require and give us room for development.¹⁷⁹

Harcourt replied that he found this proposal 'ingenious and useful', adding: 'I shall bear it in mind in case the question is ever raised in any practical form'.¹⁸⁰ However, when the possibility of such an exchange did arise, with the Foreign Office's blessing, it was defeated by the Colonial Office's permanent officials. Like Harcourt's father, they were convinced it was Britain's duty to share with its subject peoples 'the splendour of its intellectual achievements' and its 'conceptions of social order and human liberty'.¹⁸¹ This led them to declare that they could never bring themselves 'to think that we should be justified in handing [the north Gambians] over to the French'.¹⁸²

While at least Harcourt was delighted with Galway's performance in the Gambia, there remained an obstacle to his friend's further promotion: the lack of a wife. For more than a century, the propertied classes in all the 'first-class' colonies outside the tropics, and even in penal settlements like New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land, had been insisting that they were not willing to accept governors who were bachelors or widowers, or who left their wives in England. After Queen Victoria wed Albert in 1840 and began to set so shining an example of marital bliss, the Colonial Office bowed to these wishes. Thenceforth, save in a couple of exceptional cases, including the one satirized by Belloc in his 'Ballad of Lord Lundy', no single man could aspire to the choicer plums in the colonial service. In Galway's case this handicap was removed when, back in London on six months leave in 1913, he married a widow, the Baroness Marie Carola Franciska Roselyne d'Erlanger (1876-1963). As a wedding present, Harcourt told them that Galway could succeed Sir Day Bosanquet as Governor of South Australia, and the appointment was announced in *The Times* a few weeks later.¹⁸³

It was an astonishing match. Some recent writers have claimed that Lady Galway was 'German'.¹⁸⁴ This was only half-true. Her father, Sir Rowland Blennerhassett, came from ancient Cumberland stock. Between 1586 and 1623, the then heads of the family, Thomas Blennerhassett and his son Robert, having espoused Protestantism, were granted extensive estates in Ireland. Thereafter, successive eldest sons had represented Tralee in Parliament. After Rowland succeeded his father in the Blennerhassett baronetcy in 1849, when he was nine, his Roman Catholic mother instructed him in her own faith. He was educated by the English Benedictines at Downside, the Jesuits at Stonyhurst, and at the Universities of Munich, Berlin and finally Louvain, where he capped an outstanding academic record by graduating *Docteur ès Sciences Politiques et Administratives* 'with special distinction'.¹⁸⁵ After his death, his daughter regretted that he had 'never made full use of his gifts, his wide range of knowledge, his contacts or his amazing memory. ... he was a spendthrift of his talents'.¹⁸⁶ Yet Blennerhassett's was not a wasted life. After fifteen years as a Liberal member of the Commons, where he was especially active in Irish and educational matters, he gave further long service to his native land as President of Queen's College, Cork, Commissioner of National Education, Inspector of Reformatory and Industrial Schools, and a Senator and member of the Standing Committee of the Royal University of Ireland. These labours were rewarded with a Privy Councillorship and an honorary LL.D. Meanwhile, he wrote a great deal for various Liberal periodicals, chiefly on foreign affairs. Furthermore, his contacts with the Continental theologians, Döllinger, Lacordaire and Montalembert, had awakened interests which led him to become active in the English Liberal Catholic movement;¹⁸⁷ and it was in Rome, in 1870, whither he had journeyed to lobby against any declaration of papal infallibility by the bishops assembled for the first Vatican Council, that he met and married his wife, the Countess Charlotte de Leyden, who had travelled from Munich with the same object.¹⁸⁸ A woman of exceptional beauty, the Countess had close links with the Bavarian royal and ducal houses. Moreover, she knew 'how to think straight'. While that most merciless of intellectual critics, the English historian Lord Acton, claimed that he had learnt from Blennerhassett 'much' that was 'important and concrete', he also avowed that, save for George Eliot, 'Lady Blennerhassett ... is the

cleverest woman I ever met'.¹⁸⁹ After bearing three sons and a daughter, she wrote important biographies of Mme de Staël (which won her a doctorate from the University of Munich), Chateaubriand, Mme de Maintenon, Newman, Mary Stuart and Talleyrand — some of them in two or three volumes — and numerous historical essays, including contributions to the *Cambridge Modern History*.

The Blennerhassett's daughter, known as 'Nounou' within the family, 'Marie Carola' to friends, inherited her father's phenomenal memory and plain looks, her mother's 'iron self-discipline and power of work'. From both parents she acquired the kindhearted liberalism and truly international outlook which, in the second half of the nineteenth century, had become the hallmarks of the intellectuals who belonged to the greater Catholic landowning families in Europe — taking their cue from that scion of the oldest Norman nobility, Count Alexis de Tocqueville.

Marie Carola was educated at private schools and convents in Bavaria, France and Switzerland. On 28 November 1894, at the age of eighteen, she married the biologist Baron Raphael d'Erlanger. He was the eldest son of a leading French banker, but instead of joining the family firm, he had spent his patrimony building his own laboratories at the University of Heidelberg. He taught her Italian, and she gave him two children. In her memoirs, she referred to those three years in Heidelberg as a period 'of exceeding happiness'. Sadly, she had to add that 'the bottom fell out of my world' when d'Erlanger died, on the third anniversary of their wedding.¹⁹⁰

The d'Erlangers and her own family helped her to rally, and she found she had time to do other things besides rearing her children. Instead of setting out to carve a name for herself in the world of scholarship, as her mother had done, she decided to follow her father's example and devote herself to the service of others. She began by spending one day a week as a volunteer helping with the nursing in a hospital for terminal cancer cases. Other work came thick and fast: as a visitor to Holloway Gaol; visiting the wives of poor Italian immigrants in London; helping in clubs for working-class children; participating in hospital management; and assisting destitute families of enlisted men serving in the South African War. The Baroness also became a foundation committee member and, later, Chairman, of the Advisory Parliamentary Council. This body of women was founded, during the long struggle to win women the franchise in Britain, to supply information on matters which were outside the knowledge and experience of the men who made the nation's laws. She afterwards reminisced:

The idea was that when a Bill came before the House containing legislation of importance to women or juveniles of any age, the Committee should study it and collect all possible information on the subject. A *précis* would be drawn up with the relevant text in one column and, on the opposite one, the argument for or against, to be sent to M.P.s for their information. There was no question of drawing up resolutions; it was a *bona fide* attempt to furnish the straw to make the bricks. It was a far more difficult undertaking than appeared at first sight, but a very sympathetic one, quite out of the limelight.

On one occasion only did we hold a meeting in a Committee Room of the House of Commons; this was when we proposed a bold housing scheme with lovely ideas of our own. We were not successful, but retired convinced that we were right. Time has shown that there was much to be said for the validity of our plan.

One thing I can emphasise with confidence: the members of the Society who took an active part in the work gained valuable experience.¹⁹¹

Baroness d'Erlanger was a woman of high culture, compassion, great charm and rare organizing ability. How she consented to marry a horror like Galway, whose background and convictions were so very different from her own, is something we can only guess at. There have been long-standing disagreements between the parties to many successful marriages. Marie Carola's own parents had fought over numerous issues. Thus her father had joined Baron Friedrich von Hügel and other members of the London Society for the Study of Religion in their attempts to persuade the Papacy to grant intellectual freedom to the 'Modernist' scripture scholars and theologians like Loisy and Tyrrell.¹⁹² His wife, on the other hand, delighted G. K. Chesterton with her declaration that 'I must have the same religion as my washerwoman, and Father Tyrrell's is not the religion for my washerwoman'.¹⁹³ However, we have their daughter's testimony that for all their disagreements on particular issues, 'They were ideally matched in mind and fundamental outlook' and 'were devoted to one another'.¹⁹⁴ The Galways, by contrast, were not only at loggerheads over such questions as conscription, Ireland's future, and the plight of the unemployed; they were divided by religion, political philosophy and temperament, and in their general interests. He liked Harry Lauder; she preferred orchestral concerts. The appalling solecisms and infelicities in Galway's unedited prose, as seen in his despatches, suggest that he hardly ever read a book. Throughout her life his lady read extensively in the literature of six or seven languages, including Russian. It would be fascinating to know what she thought of his pronouncements; after three years of marriage, that women were such 'hysterical' creatures that Australia's politicians had been 'both unwise and unreasonable' in giving them the vote.¹⁹⁵

The main clue she left us about her marriage to Galway is that 'he had a way with him'.¹⁹⁶ This, like some other evidence,¹⁹⁷ suggests that for all his Blimpery and his dark spells of pessimism, Galway possessed considerable personal charm. Thus he would not have been repulsive as an intimate companion. At the time of the marriage, his wife was of mature age (37), and was thus able to contemplate a marriage of convenience rather than romance (their union had no issue). She had developed her own talents and had been able to pursue her interests without a husband. The example of her parents' marriage had led her to desire and expect an independent role for herself. Yet she may have needed financial security to complete the education of her children and launch them into the world. Galway could have seemed a suitable partner because his Nigerian adventures had given him an image as something of a hero, a reputation duly bolstered by the military and civil decorations he had been awarded. She was probably ignorant of his true role in Africa. It is likely that Harcourt introduced them. As Harcourt's father and Blennerhassett had been such prominent Gladstonian Liberals — the former as the man of action, the latter as the man of ideas — it is even likely that Loulou and Nounou had known one another for years. Besides, as she made it clear, before her second marriage, that she was not prepared to live in West Africa,¹⁹⁸ she may have realized that Galway's further promotion was likely, and therefore may have seen the marriage as providing a chance to exercise her talents in a wider and more prominent sphere.

Lady Galway was the first intellectual to reside in an Australian Government House. As a governor's wife, she was unique. She created a sensation when, in the

course of an official tour of the University of Adelaide, she peered at a microscope slide proudly displayed in one of the science laboratories and exclaimed: 'Dear me, ascaris eggs' — although some wily professor, knowing of her first husband's work on intestinal parasites, may have selected that slide deliberately.¹⁹⁹ Her gifts as a public speaker became 'widely known and appreciated throughout the State'.²⁰⁰ She could address the matrons of the Victoria League and similar organisations on such unpromising topics as the causes of the French Revolution, John III of Poland, the American Civil War, the French Directory and Napoleon's rise to power, with so rich a fund of arresting and amusing anecdotes that they clamoured for more and found they had to hire larger halls.²⁰¹ Rapt audiences thronged her lectures on modern languages at the Universities of Melbourne and Adelaide,²⁰² and the *Register* remarked:

It will be a pleasure to the whole state if Lady Galway is able to remove the stigma which attaches to Adelaide University being the only one in Australia, and probably in the world, where there is no chair, nor even lectureship, in any modern foreign language.²⁰³

Meeting that challenge had to have a low priority while the war dragged on. However, she warmly defended the institution of travelling scholarships to enable Australian graduates to further their studies in countries outside the confines of the English-speaking world.²⁰⁴ Asked to address a teachers' conference on the question: 'Is individual expansion [sic] cramped by the bugbear of examinations?', she presented a splendid defence of the educational, social and civic merits of public examinations.²⁰⁵

Meanwhile, in April-May 1914 she had inaugurated the *Alliance Française* in Adelaide, and gave a wide range of talks on literary topics to it and to the Poetry Recital Society.²⁰⁶ The *Bulletin's* Adelaide correspondent impishly commented:

Sassietty is getting brain fag in the effort to keep up to the intellectual standard of Lady Galway. The British Government is supposed locally to have sent her here on account of our far-flung reputation for culture. But the general idea is that Downing-street has rather overshot the mark. The spectacle of elderly climbers whose tastes mentally don't soar higher than Marie Corelli or the speeches of Joseph Cook reading up Anacreon, and Ariosto and Lamartine and so on, for quotation purposes, is saddening.

Lady Galway cut this out in January 1915 and posted it to Harcourt with the comment: 'A laugh is such a rare thing nowadays that I must send you the enclosed ... so that you should see "what you have done"!'²⁰⁷

Another who seems to have envied Lady Galway's brains was Lady Stanley, wife of the Governor of Victoria, who after a holiday in Adelaide in 1916 reported:

She is a *wonder* in the amount she knows! There is no political aspect of the modern history of Europe she cannot descant upon nor, I believe, *any* subject — religious, philosophical, political, artistic or scientific that she has not a grasp of and cannot talk admirably upon. Her Italian, French and Spanish are all spoken with a perfection of accent and an accuracy which is really astounding.

When publishing this, Lady Stanley's daughter added on her own behalf that Lady Galway was 'delightfully friendly and easy to get on with'.²⁰⁸

While her husband was beginning to fulminate against the defects he saw in the Australians, Lady Galway, in a letter to Harcourt dated 10 July 1914, wrote enthusiastically about the 'loyalty and patriotism' and the 'genuine attachment' to



Lady Galway at her desk in Adelaide (State Library of Victoria).

Britain she found in all classes of society. Noting that 'this is between you and me and the waste basket', she added:

The Australian's good opinion of himself and everything belonging to him is proverbial and not exaggerated, but he has much to show that can serve as a pretty telling excuse for this foible.

We are a snug little Town, with an air of respectability, a good deal of character and sense and some intelligence. What is most wanted in the picture is shading. To reach a certain level you must have acquired knowledge and facts, but from there onwards — 'ce ne sont que les nuances qui comptent'. I may be quite wrong, but it strikes me that the lack of fine distinctions is what we suffer from right through.²⁰⁹

Making speeches which revealed something of her intellectual gifts was but a small part of Lady Galway's contribution to South Australia. While her husband announced that he could not undertake to participate even in the annual general meetings of the public and charitable bodies which invited him to be their patron,²¹⁰ Lady Galway was never content to be just a figurehead. She entered into all manner of good works with the same energy that had impressed committee-women and politicians in London. She took a particular interest in the Babies' Hospital at Payneham, Minda Home, the South Adelaide Creche, the Adelaide Children's Hospital, the District Trained Nursing Society, the orphanages and the Y.W.C.A. As the press reported, week by week, these and many other institutions benefited from the new ideas and fundraising techniques she brought to them. After four months in Adelaide she was apologizing for being 'more of a slavedriver than a patroness',²¹¹ but because of her enthusiasm, friendly manner and willingness to shoulder some of the burdens, no one minded in the least.

She was the first South Australian governor's wife to be a Roman Catholic.²¹²

This itself delighted members of the State's small Catholic community.²¹³ Yet they were still more pleased to witness her regular attendance at Mass with her daughter, Charlotte (now Mrs Roderick Denman),²¹⁴ her systematic visitation of Catholic schools and parishes, and her active support of the Church's charities and social clubs. She also sent her daughter to complete her schooling at the Angas Street Convent of Mercy before she matriculated at the University of Adelaide.

Ruth Schumann has argued that the public esteem the South Australian Catholic Women's League won for its patriotic and charitable work during the Great War did much to diminish sectarian bitterness in this State.²¹⁵ That is perfectly plausible. Yet it seems still more likely that Lady Galway did more than anyone to make Catholics socially acceptable, and that the leaders of the C.W.L. owed a great deal to the example and inspiration she gave them. The contemporary conduct of the Catholic Governor of New South Wales, Sir Gerald Strickland (and that is a long story), prompted the Anglican Archbishop of Sydney (who had a similar tendency to commit hubris) to write to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in June 1917:

As Metropolitan of New South Wales I take the liberty of urging most strongly... that the next Governor of N.S.W. should not be a Roman Catholic nor should his wife be R.C. either.... At any time but specially in this present state of public affairs a R.C. Governor has a prejudicial influence both in political and social life in this whole community.²¹⁶

In South Australia, Lady Galway created exactly the opposite impression.

To the consternation of some English visitors, the overwhelming majority of Australians judged individuals by their performance, not by their birth. What really made people of all classes sit up and take notice of Lady Galway was her contribution to war work. In August 1914 she founded the South Australian branch of the Red Cross Society and a Belgian Relief Fund, and she directed their operations until her departure in 1919. It was in these causes that her administrative skills had their finest flowering in South Australia. The other governors' wives assumed parallel tasks in their own states, and several of them were rewarded with the O.B.E. Lady Galway's effort, on a national as well as a local level (the former requiring frequent interstate trips on Australia's agonizingly slow trains), was outstanding, and made it appropriate that at the instigation of the British headquarters of the Red Cross she was appointed C.B.E. and D.StJ. The Belgian government awarded her the Médaille de la Reine Elisabeth, and from France she received the Médaille de la Reconnaissance. Adelaide's pressmen reported many tributes to the long hours she worked, to her sincerity, her sympathy for the afflicted, and her courage and optimism in the face of adversity — her son, an officer in the French Army's Motor-gun Corps, was severely wounded more than once.²¹⁷ She addressed meetings by the hundred, wrote letters by the thousand, organizing the distribution of patterns and knitting instructions, the collection and forwarding of huge quantities of blankets, food, pyjamas, balaclavas, socks, mufflers and 'comforts' such as tobacco for the sick, the wounded, refugees and prisoners of war. Great numbers of people were trained in first aid to the injured, and she took part in the activities of the Cheer-Up Society.

To boost the Belgian Relief Fund, she persuaded Hussey & Gillingham Ltd to print and publish without charge a *Belgium Book*, modelled on the *King Albert's Book* produced by a group of United Kingdom newspapers. She secured



War-time parade of Red Cross workers led by Lady Galway, King William IV Street, Adelaide, c. 1915.
(State Library of Victoria).

contributions from South Australian artists, poets, short-story writers, clergymen, the composer Brewster-Jones, and an impressive group of public figures ranging from William Jethro Brown, George Cockburn Henderson and Sir Douglas Mawson to Patrick McMahon Glynn, H. Angas Parsons and Admiral William Rooke Creswell. Her own offering was an essay on patriotism, honour and the claims of conscience. She edited the volume and prevailed upon various firms to donate the paper, blocks, inks, type — which was specially cast — and the leather used in the binding. The press provided free publicity, and retailers sold the book without profit to themselves.

She managed to elicit donations from sources most people thought were untappable. Thus before the drought broke she persuaded many wheat-growers to promise to give the product of one acre of their next season's harvest. This yielded £17,000. In all, with the help of her team of businessmen, she raised in South Australia over £1,200,000 (almost £3 per head of population) for the patriotic funds.²¹⁸ It was a tremendous achievement, and probably because of it, nobody except the visiting Lady Stanley²¹⁹ appears to have made any comment on her mother's German birth or the foreign intonation which could sometimes be detected in her speech.

During the war Lady Galway lost her mother (whose estate was very complex) and also her only surviving elder brother. Once again the Blennerhassett baronetcy descended to a child, but on this occasion his mother was a German (née the Baroness von Arentin) who, given the temper of the times, must have had difficulty

coping. For these family reasons, but especially because she wished to be near her own son after his ordeals on the Western Front, Lady Galway resolved to return to Britain as soon as could be arranged after the cessation of hostilities. She and Charlotte embarked in January 1919. South Australia's women 'war workers' demonstrated their gratitude by presenting her with a diamond and opal necklace.²²⁰ The bureaucrats in the Colonial Office considered that in permitting her to accept the gift her husband had further blackened his record.²²¹ It is pleasant to add that the Secretary of State, Walter Long, felt that in this instance Galway's breaking of the regulations was justified.²²²

Of the tributes paid at the time of Lady Galway's departure, the following lines from a leader in the *Register* seem particularly apt:

Her arresting personality and her untiring activities in the cause of national and patriotic service have won for her widespread affection and esteem.... As a speaker she has occupied a unique position, and her oratorical powers have enabled her to exercise a very real influence over the trend of public thought. From that standpoint it is not too much to say that she has raised the whole status of women in public life.²²³

Lady Galway possessed the virtues her husband lacked. Yet after fifty-four years of bachelorhood he was too set in his ways to profit from her example. While it is clear from his despatches that he believed he was doing well, his conduct in South Australia inexorably paved the way for his being retired from the colonial service. Why did London take so long to act?

His patron was one of the first to see that while Galway had been satisfactory as a more-or-less-benevolent despot in Crown Colony situations, he was out of his element in a State possessing responsible government.²²⁴ Harcourt had a chance to remedy his error when Galway, in the sixth month of the war, sought leave to volunteer for military service. In March 1915 the Colonial Office's permanent head recommended approval of this request,²²⁵ and Lady Galway begged Harcourt to consent. She wrote: 'Keen and active as he is, hearing that his old Regiment has done well but has lost so many officers, it would be impossible that he should feel otherwise.'²²⁶ It was a golden opportunity for Harcourt to save face, but he let it pass. Being strongly dedicated to the idea of a multi-racial Empire, and therefore critical of Australia's immigration laws, he shrank from letting Galway go to the front because 'it would be thought in South Australia that I had removed him because of his speech on coloured labour'.²²⁷ Thus Galway was safe until Asquith removed Harcourt from the Colonial Secretaryship in June 1915.

Galway was distressed to learn of his friend's translation to the Office of Works,²²⁸ but events proved that he had nothing to fear from Harcourt's immediate successors. The first, Andrew Bonar Law, was an opportunist man of trade. Thus when Galway's tirade against the striking ironworkers led the permanent Under-Secretary to recommend recall, Law minuted: 'An idiotic speech to make but I should wait and see if it blows over.'²²⁹ For Law, Galway's repeated defiance of instructions and his breaches of constitutional propriety were much less significant than the steady stream of press reports asserting that he was the most effective voluntary recruiting agent in Australasia. Indeed, it was his achievements in that role which, more than any other factor, enabled him to continue in office now that Harcourt no longer controlled his destiny.

When the ordinary Australian's initial enthusiasm for the war began to wane in

the second half of 1915, recruiting began in earnest. Galway's success in persuading large numbers of men to enlist made him the man of the hour, and he was much in demand to address similar 'monster' recruiting rallies in other states. His instructions permitted him to be absent from South Australia for only one month in twelve. Bonar Law gladly authorized him to spend a further month each year interstate, because the Imperial government was anxious to secure every available man.²³⁰ It was Galway's custom to ask the press not to report what he said at these meetings,²³¹ which is rather tantalizing. However they probably contained much of the patriotic fervour and Blimpish rhetoric about the beastliness of the Germans which suffused his war-time despatches. While the Labor press asserted that 'this gubernatorial Bumpkin makes himself not only obnoxious, but ridiculous as well',²³² most newspapers regarded him as a Good Thing. In the opinion of Adelaide's best-selling daily, the *Advertiser*, which plumb the depths of Jingoism in those years, Galway could do no wrong. It defended his controversial political utterances on the ground that the issues he raised were primarily questions of federal, not state politics. The *Advertiser* insisted that the King's representative within the state was entitled to say whatever he liked on federal issues, no matter how delicate or contentious. It even hailed his 'joyful day for Germany' address of 28 December 1917, after the voters' second rejection of conscription (this was also the effusion in which he first voiced his belief that Australia was suffering an epidemic of moral influenza), as 'an inspiring speech'.²³³ Galway's pro-conscription stance was equally acceptable to Bonar Law, who had been personally responsible for the passage of the Imperial government's Compulsory Military Service Bill in January 1916.

In 1917 Law was moved to 11 Downing Street on becoming Chancellor of the Exchequer. A country gentleman, W. H. Long, replaced him at Number 15. Long was mentally lazy and little interested in the outposts of Empire. He behaved as if he believed that problems would go away if one did nothing about them. His tenure of the Colonial Secretaryship coincided with the period in which the permanent staff became alarmed about Galway's determination to play a more active role in government — to protect the public from arbitrary, irregular and immoral ministerial conduct. Yet in those twenty-two months Long applied his mind to South Australian matters only twice, and on each occasion he ignored his staff's advice. One concerned the presentation of the necklace to Lady Galway, the other the length of Galway's term. When Harcourt had offered him promotion in 1913, Galway was given the usual option of selecting appointment for five or six years. He chose the former, in the expectation of gaining another posting at the end of it.²³⁴ His conduct in 1915 convinced the Colonial Office staff that he could have no future in the service, and that conviction grew more resolute as the years passed. Galway knew nothing of that. By October 1918, he was becoming worried because he had not been advised about his next post and began to suspect that he was not to have one. He cabled Long urging recognition of his entitlement to further employment and declaring 'I would accept a second class Crown Colony rather than having to retire'. In another cable he pleaded: 'If I am not to be appointed to another governorship after leaving South Australia I request respectfully that I may be permitted to remain here at least until I attain the age of sixty.' Long's advisers were not disposed to grant this concession, even though all other five-year

men had been allowed an extra year if they requested it. However, Long gave Galway the year's extension, probably thinking that this was the way to get rid of him with the minimum of fuss.²³⁵

In January 1919 Long was replaced by Viscount Milner, the first really competent administrator appointed Colonial Secretary since Joseph Chamberlain's retirement in 1908. As the extension of Galway's term had been announced in South Australia, Milner did not revoke it. However as he learnt more about the Governor he fully concurred in the criticisms the permanent staff had been making. Galway became engaged in a controversy with the Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd over the sale of iron ore from deposits he had invested in at Mt Bessemer. The press breathed not a word about this quarrel, but it prompted Milner to insist on strict compliance with the regulations requiring governors to sever all commercial connexions.²³⁶ Then in April 1919 Galway resumed recognizing foreign consuls before consulting the Commonwealth. Milner administered two stinging rebukes for this fresh use of a forbidden procedure 'which in the past has led to embarrassment to His Majesty's Govt'.²³⁷

From that point Galway grew as contemptuous about the Colonial Office as he had been about Australian politicians, and in letters to friends he denounced its 'hidebound...Tin Gods', its 'automatons' with 'bigotted minds' and a love of 'very red tape interpretations' of the regulations.²³⁸ Ronald Hyam has shown that in the opening decades of the present century, ill-feeling between Downing Street and its governors was rampant. The Colonial Office was run by a formidable élite. More than a dozen of its senior officials had graduated from Oxford with first-class honours. Others had firsts from Cambridge or Edinburgh. Many had won double firsts, and all had been tested in the fire of the Home and Indian Civil Service examinations (the identical examinations Lady Galway had praised as models Australia could well copy), in which many of them had passed 'head of the list for their year'. But while the United Kingdom and Indian civil services had been professionalized, the growth of the colonial Empire had provided many new openings for the exercise of patronage. Governorships were in the gift of the politician who was Secretary of State, and most politicians tended to reward influence rather than talent. Thus the governors who had been to a university were generally hunting-shooting-fishing types who had either gained third or fourth class degrees plus sporting blues, or else (like some of the Secretaries of State, including Walter Long) left without a degree at all. These and most of the others owed their appointments to the old school or regimental tie, or equivalent connexions. While the bureaucrats were snobbishly contemptuous of the governors' mental capacities, the governors in turn had a nicely Burkean contempt for men of theory: they regarded their superiors as 'desk tyrants whom they despised for their lack of practical experience'.²³⁹ Galway was thus not the only governor who could write: 'I am sick of the C.O. mandarins and their ways',²⁴⁰ but he was unusual in taking the next step of telling that to the mandarins themselves.

He had some grounds for doing so. In April 1919 he asked if he could take leave on half-pay for the last four months of his term, that is, from 4 December 1919. The Peake government (whose counsel merited some consideration because it paid Galway's salary), supported the request because it believed he deserved a holiday; Parliament would not be sitting, and nothing of political consequence happened

in South Australia in the summer.²⁴¹ At the beginning of the century Chamberlain, holding that the Imperial government should maintain an almost continuous presence in each Australian capital, had ruled that Australian governors should no longer be entitled to take long leave. However the rule was waived in every case until Milner became Secretary of State. As late as December 1918, Governor Stanley of Victoria had been authorized to spend the last six months of his term on leave, and when the time came he did so. Thus in August 1919 Galway was stunned to receive advice from Milner that 'The Governors of the Australian States are not as of right entitled to leave, but I am prepared to approve your taking two months' leave on half pay, should your Ministers see no objection'.²⁴² Galway asked for a reconsideration of his case. He reduced his request to one for three months' leave, and again relayed his minister's approval. He indicated that he was keen to sail home via Panama, so he could visit New Zealand on the way, which would mean spending seven weeks of his leave on the voyage. However, Milner cabled back: 'Regret I cannot alter decision'.²⁴³ It was tactless of the Colonial Office not to explain that Galway was not being singled out for severe treatment. It was almost as if London considered he might condemn himself for good and all if given the opportunity. The Governor of Queensland, Sir Hamilton Goold-Adams, whose term was due to end soon after Galway's, was told he too could take only two months' leave,²⁴⁴ but Galway only knew that Stanley had recently commenced six months' leave. On 24 September he cabled Milner:

Whilst utterly failing to fathom the justice of a system under which my special request for three months leave is refused whilst the Governor of Victoria is granted six months leave of absence I...have accordingly secured passage in a steamship sailing in February next.²⁴⁵

Milner did not reply. He agreed with his staff's view: 'Galway deserves a rebuke for this impertinence, but that is better left till his return'.²⁴⁶ In a despatch also dated 24 September, Galway argued his case once more, pointing out that Stanley had served the Crown for only five and a half years, whereas he was nearing the end of his forty-second year of continuous service. He added:

I must confess to a feeling that I was not unreasonably entitled to a little consideration, and that I would at least have been granted a few weeks' leave over and above the period occupied in the passage home, especially as my Ministers were quite agreeable that such privilege should be granted me.²⁴⁷

The Colonial Office regarded this as a further display of insolence, and Milner again decided there was 'no need to answer'.²⁴⁸

A week before Christmas 1919, Galway was surprised to receive a cable from Milner advising that he would consent to three months' leave after all, if the Governor would agree to a further four-month prolongation of his term. Milner again kept his cards unreasonably close to his chest. The only reason mentioned was that this would suit the convenience of Galway's successor. Milner added that he would 'not press' agreement 'should it be inconvenient for you to comply'. By that stage Galway had finalized his travel arrangements and had just shipped 'all my gear (pictures, silver, etc.) home, and so Govt House is now a barn inside'.²⁴⁹ He was in no mood to oblige Milner, and replied 'regretting I am unable to meet your wishes'.²⁵⁰ Soon afterwards he learnt the real reason for the request: the Prince

of Wales was to tour Australia, and Milner had hoped South Australia would not be without a governor during the royal visit. Galway realized that if he had agreed to stay he would have received a second order of knighthood. 'I am sorry', he lamented. 'The K.C.V.O. is a handsome ornament of dress!'²⁵¹

In December 1919, Milner also authorized Galway to inform his Premier confidentially that Sir Archibald Weigall had been chosen to succeed him. In the course of the next five weeks Galway repeatedly relayed messages from his ministers asking Milner to authorize him to announce the appointment in South Australia. London ignored these telegrams.²⁵² In the event, news of Weigall's appointment was published in the London papers and copied by the Adelaide ones two days before Milner cabled Galway the requested authorization. Galway and the State Cabinet were furious. The Governor complained to Milner that 'The cryptic attitude adopted by the Colonial Office...is not always proof against leakage.' He reported that his private secretary knew 'a member of the Adelaide Club' who had heard the news by a letter 'written late in October or early in November'. In these circumstances, Galway asserted, Milner's conduct in binding him to secrecy had placed him in an 'anomalous' position.²⁵³

Meanwhile, a further grievance — and this was one Galway had long been nursing — finally prompted him to cross the Rubicon. Since the 1850s, if not earlier, the governors had been required to write a secret despatch each quarter reporting generally on local affairs. We have seen that the Colonial Office staff thought that Galway's comments were of little value because of his strong prejudices. After Harcourt's departure from Downing Street, not one of Galway's quarterly reports had been acknowledged, 'except on the "Schedule of despatches received"'. The Governor resented this. He believed that much of what he had had to say was clever and perceptive, and, craving recognition of this, he had kept repeating many of his *bon mots* (about Australia's 'coolies', Adelaide's desperate need for Zeppelin raids etc.) in the hope that they might draw some response. In October 1919 he gave up, and advised Milner that as he 'seriously doubted' if his secret despatches had ever reached the Secretary of State, 'I do not propose to continue reporting on general affairs each quarter'. The Colonial Office staff considered: 'This is not a despatch which the Gov should have written.' Milner replied peremptorily: 'You should continue to comply with the instructions to report regularly on affairs in the State so long as you hold office as Governor.'²⁵⁴ Galway felt it was now his turn to ignore Milner, and so the last two quarterly reports the regulations required him to produce were never written. He must have known that this final act of defiance meant the end of his overseas career, but he had no regrets. After calling at the Colonial Office on his return to England he wrote: 'You can't rub anything into the thick hides of those Mandarins! I'm glad to have done with them.'²⁵⁵

In retirement Galway settled in London, with pensions of £100 from the Army, £340 from the government of Nigeria, and £660 from the Treasury for his seventeen years' service as a governor.²⁵⁶ To supplement their pensions, most former governors managed to secure directorships in a number of public companies. Galway tried desperately to do likewise, but apparently had no success.²⁵⁷ However, he did become Chairman of the Big Brother Committee, which ran an emigration scheme to settle British youths as farm labourers in Australia. He also became a

Vice-Chairman of the British and Foreign Bible Society. He died in London in his ninetieth year — on 17 June 1949 — suffering from nephritis, an enlarged prostate, and arteriosclerosis.

Meanwhile his wife had remained as busy as ever. On her return to London in 1919 she had resumed her work as Chairman of the Advisory Parliamentary Council. After several women became Members of Parliament, she later wrote, 'there seemed no justification for our further existence and we faded away'.²⁵⁸ By then she had taken on other duties. She became Chairman of the Consultation Committee of Women's Organizations, and of the Mothercraft Training Society, serving in both positions for more than twenty years. She was Chairman of the Women's Committee of the Wembley Exhibition, and the Privy Council's nominee on the Nursing Council. She long sat on the Boards of Management of St Mary's Hospital, the Great Ormond Street Hospital, and other charitable foundations. At the same time she maintained her intellectual interests. She was a member of the Consultative Committee of the Board of Education, and of the Delegacy of King's College, and she enjoyed the successes of her protégés, Masie Ward and Douglas Woodruff.²⁵⁹ Before her death, on 29 June 1963, she expressed a wish that her funeral be a private one. Nevertheless, it was an occasion to remember, because representatives of the organizations she had served, plus southern England's Catholic intelligentsia, made their way to Farm Street for the Requiem Mass celebrated by the Rev. Thomas Corbishley.²⁶⁰

Galway was a God-fearing man who was so convinced that his intentions and objectives were honourable that he did not pause to reflect on the ethics of the means he employed. That has been a common error with the heroes of the Gordian knot. Likewise there can be no denying his zeal in championing what he believed to be Britain's causes. He may have boosted South Australia's war effort, but it is likely that his rhetoric appealed chiefly to those who already shared his outlook to at least some extent, and his wife's contribution was considerably more effective. On the other hand, by doing so much which brought the governorship into disrepute in the eyes of Labor leaders, and which created working-class bitterness towards the Mother Country, he did Britain and South Australia great disservice. No other state governor in Australia has had anything like so pernicious an influence in these respects. His appointment to South Australia illustrates the danger of giving a single politician unfettered powers of patronage.

In the wider world, Galway was reasonably well-equipped for his tasks in St Helena and the Gambia, but because of his conduct in Nigeria he must rank with the villains in the story of British imperial practice. That is, he was one of those Englishmen who paved the way for the eventual destruction of the Empire, because they undermined the efforts of those who sought to give it a moral purpose. The British Empire was established and developed for many reasons, but strategic and commercial motives were uppermost in the minds of those who made the crucial decisions, and very many accessions of territory came as a result of wars with other nations. However, from the 1830s, the materialism of the United Kingdom's plutocrats was, with increasing frequency, spiced with touches of philanthropy. Even more importantly, under the influence of educators like Arnold of Rugby and Jowett of Balliol, a high proportion of those who accepted posts in the colonial service, together with the missionaries and schoolmasters, and many of the doctors,

nurses and engineers who went out to work in the colonies, believed they were the bearers of the best that European civilization had to offer. Their impact was so significant that at times it almost appeared as if the Empire really did have a moral basis. Sadly, their attempts to give it one were all too easily defeated by the stupidity, duplicity, ruthless ambition or callousness of a few individuals. Galway was one of the few.

Notes and references

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2. C.O. 13/121/234-5 and 123/74 (Public Record Office, London).
3. Howell, pp. 19-20.
4. For typical comments on Kintore's mining speculations see *Quiz and the Lantern*, 21 July 1893 and 29 September 1893. After the end of his term, Kintore became Chairman of Directors of the Sulphide Corporation, formed in 1895 to purchase the Central Mine at Broken Hill and to build the large smelting works at Cockle Creek, Newcastle, New South Wales. G. Blainey, *The rise of Broken Hill* (Melbourne, 1968), pp. 66, 139. *Quiz and the Lantern* sniped at Kintore in most of its numbers published between October 1890 and August 1894. Its criticisms must be read circumspectly, as the editor once admitted that they were 'directed at the office, and not the man' and explained: 'I am a Republican.' 29 September 1893. On Buxton, see Howell, pp. 27-35.
5. *Register*, 24 January 1920.
6. Quoted, with permission, from S. Cockburn & D. Ellyard, *Olipphant* (Adelaide, 1981), p. 305.
7. *Evening Standard* (London), 28 January 1920.
8. Galway to Newdigate-Newdegate, 4 December 1921, CR 746/231/2/5 (Newdegate of Arbury records, Warwick County Record Office). I am indebted to Mr F. H. M. FitzRoy Newdegate, of Temple House, Arbury, Warwickshire, for permission to use and quote from the correspondence of Sir Francis Newdigate-Newdegate, Governor of Tasmania 1917-20.
9. *Ibid.* C.O. 418/184/11-12 and 39 (Public Record Office). *Register*, 22 December 1923. I must also acknowledge the assistance I have received from Mr C. Legh Winser, private secretary to the governors of South Australia, 1915-40, and Mr Ernest Veniard, who as a young man was a footman in the Weigall household. Save for a short break, Mr Veniard was butler at Government House, Adelaide, between 1953 and 1977, and it is very much to be hoped that he will publish his memoirs.
10. *Register*, 20 April 1914.
11. C.O. 418/138/125.
12. *Id.*, 149/381 and 384. He repeated the claim about rule by 'the coolies' twelve months later. *Id.*, 161/283.
13. *Id.*, 126/118-20.
14. *Id.*, 126/85, 138/4-7, 71, 88-9. Blainey, pp. 77-9. B. Kennedy, *Silver, sin, and sixpenny ale* (Melbourne, 1978), pp. 128-9.
15. C.O. 418/126/114, 119. He returned to this theme at *id.*, 138/67.
16. E.g., *Register*, 16 April 1918. For Just's minute, C.O. 418/126/112.
17. R. Ward, *Australia* (Sydney, 1965), p. 101. C.O. 418/172/83.
18. C.O. 418/138/125.
19. *Id.*, 149/262-3 and 293.
20. *Id.*, 161/198.

21. *Id.*, 161/203 and 223. After these pronouncements, and similar ones about the calamities that would ensue if Labor ever came to power again at the state level, it is curious that Galway could declare: 'Under the present system of appointment there is no possibility of a Governor showing political bias.' *Id.*, 180/160-1.
22. *Id.*, 149/386, 161/189-90, 180/13. *Register*, 17 May 1916.
23. *Id.*, 180/77.
24. *Id.*, 161/219.
25. *Id.*, 180/7.
26. *Id.*, 149/382-3, 180/173.
27. *Id.*, 149/379-80.
28. *Id.*, 161/230-1.
29. *Id.*, 180/10-11. The 'sic' in this quotation is Galway's.
30. *Id.*, 138/65 and 72-3.
31. *Id.*, 149/297 and 301.
32. *Id.*, 161/211-13.
33. *Id.*, 138/3 and 9, 149/385.
34. E.g., *id.*, 161/218 and 276.
35. C. Bryan, *Archbishop Mannix* (Melbourne, 1918), pp. 68-72, 232-5.
36. C.O. 418/161/200 and 205.
37. *Id.*, 161/276 and 284.
38. [G.] T. Bridges, *Alarms and excursions* (London, 1938), p. 342.
39. E.g., *Register*, 1 August 1914, 6 April 1915, 27 January and 23 May 1916, 20 and 24 January 1920. *Daily Herald*, 15 February 1915. See also Galway to Harcourt, 21 May 1914. MS. Harcourt, dep. 483, ff. 19-26 (Bodleian Library, Oxford).
40. J. Barrett, *Falling in* (Sydney, 1979).
41. L. C. Jauncey, *The story of conscription in Australia* (London, 1935), pp. 53-8.
42. *Register*, 20 April 1914.
43. *Id.*, 19 and 26 December 1914, 27 January 1915.
44. *Id.*, 29 December 1914, 12 August 1918.
45. *Id.*, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 February 1915. *Daily Herald*, 15, 16 and 17 February 1915. *Advertiser*, 15, 16, 17 and 18 February 1915.
46. *Register*, 1 December 1915. *Daily Herald*, 1, 3 and 8 December 1915.
47. *Daily Herald*, 4 December 1915. The speaker quoted was C. R. Baker, the delegate of the Australasian Society of Engineers. In 1916 he was elected President of the T.L.C.
48. *Ibid.* Galway's initial refusal to retract his remarks was communicated by letter from his Private Secretary (Winser) to the Secretary of the Adelaide T.L.C., 16 December 1915, published in the *Australian Worker*, 30 December 1916. The apology Galway issued after the Premier's intervention was reported in the same paper, 6 January 1916. The U.K. Hansard records no discussion of the matter, but the Colonial Office staff took notice of the *Australian Worker*'s response to the affair. C.O. 418/149/252-4.
49. *Register*, 31 August, 25 September, 6 and 23 October 1916, 24 May 1917.
50. C.O. 418/419/380-1.
51. *Daily Herald*, 29 December 1917. *Register*, 27 March 1918.
52. *Ballarat Echo*, 29 December 1917. *Daily Herald*, 31 December 1917.
53. *Daily Herald*, 3 January 1918. *Register*, 3 January 1918.
54. S.A.P.D., 1919, pp. 1000-8. C.O. 418/180/158-62.
55. MS. Harcourt, dep. 483, f. 28.
56. *Register*, 24 January 1920.
57. *Id.*, 6 February 1920.
58. *Australian Worker*, 30 December 1916. *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia: South Australian Branch* (hereafter PRGSSA), Vol. 18 (1916-17), p. 86.
59. Howell, p. 39.
60. C.O. 418/149/254.
61. *Id.*, 126/54.
62. *Id.*, 126/57.
63. *Id.*, 126/54.
64. *Id.*, 161/198-9, 180/54-8.
65. *Id.*, 149/264.

66. *Id.*, 138/263, 149/316-8 and 376-8, 161/190.
 67. *Lantern*, 5 April 1890.
 68. C.O. 418/149/316 and 376-7.
 69. M. Lake, *A divided society* (Melbourne, 1975), pp. 19-24, 52-5, 169-70. R. J. W. Selleck, "The trouble with my looking glass": a study of the attitude of Australians to Germans during the Great War, *Journal of Australian Studies*, No. 6 (1980), pp. 2-25.
 70. C.O. 418/138/12.
 71. *Cyclopaedia of South Australia*, ed. H. T. Burgess (Adelaide, 1907-9), Vol. I., pp. 248-9.
 72. *Id.*, p. 219.
 73. C.O. 418/138/11.
 74. *Id.*, 161/190.
 75. *Id.*, 161/283.
 76. Galway to Newdigate-Newdegate, 11 July 1920, CR 746/231/2.
 77. C.O. 418/172/12.
 78. *Id.*, 180/83.
 79. *Id.*, 172/13-14.
 80. *Id.*, 180/86-7.
 81. *Id.*, 172/88.
 82. *Id.*, 172/24.
 83. *Id.*, 180/161.
 84. *Id.*, 161/207, 209, 233-4 and 240. S.A.P.D., 1917, pp. 23-4.
 85. C.O. 418/180/65-70.
 86. *Id.*, 161/214 and 216, 172/18-24.
 87. *Id.*, 172/65.
 88. E.g., *id.*, 161/214-7, 267-70 and 320-7, 172/7 and 62-5.
 89. *Id.*, 161/254-5.
 90. *Id.*, 161/214-5.
 91. *Id.*, 161/320.
 92. *Id.*, 172/61-5.
 93. *Id.*, 161/214.
 94. For the entry on Galway in the forthcoming Vol. VIII of the *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, I gave his place of birth as 'Alverstoke, Hants' — taken from the official record of his birth. The *Dictionary* staff have changed 'Hants' — the standard abbreviation for Hampshire — to 'Southampton', apparently because the latter appears in the record of Galway's marriage, presumably due to a slip of his tongue or a slip of the clerk's pen. I regret that I did not notice this until it was too late to correct the *A.D.B.* entry. There is only one built-up area named Alverstoke in Hampshire, but it is 27 km from Southampton.
 95. *Colonial Office List*, 1902, p. 462. *Who was who 1897-1915*, p. 265.
 96. Announced by advertisement in *The Times*, 10 November 1911.
 97. Card index of British Army Officers, Public Record Office. *Hart's New Army List*, 1882.
 98. *Who's Who*, 1946, p. 987.
 99. H. L. Galway, 'Pioneering in Nigeria' (henceforth 'Pioneering'), *PRGSSA*, Vol. 16 (1914-15), p. 78.
 100. *Register*, 1 August 1914.
 101. *Who was who, 1897-1915*, p. 265.
 102. 'Pioneering', p. 78.
 103. O. Ikime, *The fall of Nigeria* (London, 1977), pp. 7-44. M. Crowder, *The story of Nigeria*, 4th edn (London, 1978), pp. 161-2. A. Burns, *History of Nigeria*, 8th edn rev. (London, 1978), pp. 150-1, 171. 'Pioneering', p. 78.
 104. 'Pioneering', p. 78.
 105. *Id.*, p. 80.
 106. *Id.*, p. 98.
 107. *Id.*, p. 102.
 108. *Id.*, p. 100.
 109. *Id.*, p. 91.
 110. *Id.*, pp. 95, 104.
 111. *Id.*, p. 92.

112. *Id.*, p. 101.
 113. H. L. Gallwey, 'Journeys in the Benin country, West Africa' (henceforth, 'Journeys'), *Geographical Journal*, Vol. I (1893), p. 126.
 114. C. E. Owen Smyth, 'Some governors I have known', *Register*, 22 December 1923.
 115. 'Pioneering', pp. 101-2.
 116. *Army List*, 1901, pp. 344, 1812, 1819. Galway received a brevet majority in May 1897, for his part in the invasion of Benin discussed later in this paper. He did not become a full major until March 1899. *Id.*, p. 344. *Colonial Office List*, 1905, p. 510. *Who's Who*, 1946, p. 987.
 117. P. A. Howell, 'The Irish Exile and Freedom's Advocate', the 1978 Eldershaw Memorial Lecture, *Tas. Hist. Res. Assoc. Papers and Proceedings*, Vol. 26 (1979), p. 122. P.P. 1857-58 (2309), Vol. XXVI, pp. 1-298. P.P. 1860 (19), Vol. LXI, pp. 591-643.
 118. C.O. 418/175/313.
 119. *The Times*, 29 June 1918.
 120. C.O. 418/149/95.
 121. *Register*, 28 April 1915. C.O. 418/161/191, 172/12, 180/79.
 122. 'Pioneering', p. 104.
 123. Galway to Newdigate-Newdegate, 13 May 1920, CR 746/231/2.
 124. R. Niven, *Nigeria* (London, 1967), p. 27. Burns, p. 101. *Dictionary of National Biography 1912-1921* (Oxford, 1927), pp. 95-7.
 125. H. L. Roth, *Great Benin* (Halifax, 1903), p. 234. L. F. Pitt-Rivers, *Antique works of art from Benin* (London, 1900). C. H. Read and O. M. Dalton, *Antiquities from the city of Benin* (London, 1899), p. 16. P. J. C. Dark, *An introduction to Benin art and technology* (Oxford, 1973), pp. 12-27. J. S. Huxley, *Memories* (London, 1970-73), Vol. I, pp. 270, 273-4; Vol. II, p. 207.
 126. 'Pioneering', p. 94.
 127. Niven, pp. 22-3.
 128. O. Dapper, *Descriptions de l'Afrique* (Amsterdam, 1686), cited in 'Journeys', p. 130. Galway presumably read Dapper in John Ogibly's English version.
 129. Ikime, pp. 145-58.
 130. *Id.*, pp. 153-4. 'Pioneering', pp. 84-5, 102.
 131. 'Pioneering', pp. 80-1.
 132. *Register*, 15 July 1914. Ikime, p. 155.
 133. 'Pioneering', p. 88.
 134. *Ibid.*
 135. The full text of Galway's 'Treaty made with the king of Benin' was published in Roth, Appendix I, pp. i-ii.
 136. 'Pioneering', p. 85.
 137. 'Pioneering', pp. 82, 88-9. The two-metre long, intricately carved tusks the British confiscated in Benin in 1897 spoke eloquently of 'the pacific life elephants must have led in former times to have enabled them to live long enough to produce such splendid ivory'. Roth, p. 193.
 138. Ikime, p. 156. 'Pioneering', pp. 89-90.
 139. 'Journeys', pp. 128-30.
 140. Roth, pp. 103-4, cited accounts written by several earlier nineteenth century travellers. A more recent scholar's investigations confirmed that virtually all the victims were major criminals: R. Bradbury, *The Benin kingdom*, rev. edn (London, 1970), pp. 54-5.
 141. 'Journeys', p. 129.
 142. Roth, Appendix II, pp. ix-xii. A. Boisragon, *The Benin massacre* (London, 1898), p. 187.
 143. 'Journeys', p. 129.
 144. *Id.*, p. 127.
 145. Roth, pp. 104-5.
 146. *Id.*, Appendix I, p. ii.
 147. P.P. (U.K.) 1898 [C.8677], Vol. LX, pp. 357-8. *Id.*, [C.8775], Vol. LX, pp. 91-151.
 148. Crowder, p. 164. Burns, pp. 174-9.
 149. *Register*, 4 December 1914. With good reason. *Quiz and the Lantern* had frequently referred to Way as 'the Great Adulator'.
 Three months after Way paid Galway the compliment quoted above, the Governor

- recommended that he be given some superior order of knighthood, arguing that his services were sufficient justification for him to become entitled 'to show a star on his venerable chest during the declining years of his life'. Galway admitted that 'nothing short of a Grand Cross would satisfy him', and that the honour would have to be conferred 'without the recommendation originating with Ministers here'. Galway to Harcourt, 30 December 1914. On the Colonial Office docket accompanying this despatch, Sir Hartmann Just recounted how Way had declined a knighthood in 1881 because he wanted a K.C.M.G.; how he had declined a K.C.M.G. in 1898 because as a Privy Councillor and lieutenant-governor he was eligible for a G.C.M.G.; that he was recommended for a G.C.M.G. in 1899, but was given a baronetcy instead. 'This was because it avoided giving him a G.C.M.G. before he had received the K.C.M.G., and also because it avoided putting him above the Governor [Lord Tennyson] in the Order'. Just also noted that the South Australian 'Ministers would have to recommend' the new honour, and that it was still 'unusual to confer the G.C.M.G. straight off'. The Under-Secretary of State, Lord Islington, concluded: 'He has quite enough already. A pampered old gentleman'. So that was that. MS. Harcourt, dep. 483, folios 37-48.
150. Ikime, pp. 36-7, 155. At p. 160 Ikime cites three more-detailed studies by P. A. Igbase.
151. 'Pioneering', pp. 82, 85-8.
152. *Id.*, p. 89.
153. J. Quick and R. R. Garran, *The annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth* (Sydney, 1901), p. 984.
154. *Daily Herald*, 4 December 1915. See above, note 47.
155. 'Pioneering', pp. 90-1. By the time that paper was written, Galway had forgotten the precise date of his assumption of the government of the protectorate, only remembering it as 'about the 12th'. The correct date is recorded in one of the telegrams published in P.P. 1898 [C.8677], Vol. LX, p. 105.
156. Roth, Appendix IV, 'On the British loss of antique works of art from Benin', pp. xvii-xxi. Dark, pp. 78-81. As Dark shows, the only Benin antiquities ever to find a permanent home south of the Equator are those in the South Australian Museum. They were presented in 1899 by the merchant, politician and philanthropist, David Murray (1829-1907). They are particularly important pieces, but as their value has risen several thousandfold since the 'nineties, it is years since they were publicly displayed.
157. 'Pioneering', p. 96.
158. P.P. 1898 [C.8677], Vol. LX, pp. 98, 105. *Id.*, [C.8775], Vol. LX, p. 357. 'Pioneering', p. 90.
159. Harcourt had been baptised with the name of Reginald. Later in 1863 he had been rechristened 'Lewis' but from his infancy his father invariably called him 'LouLou', in writing as well as in speech, and everyone followed that example. A. G. Gardiner, *Life of Sir William Harcourt* (London, 1923), Vol. I, pp. 116-9, 387; Vol. II, pp. 241-2. The friendship with Galway grew so close that when LouLou Harcourt was removed from the Colonial Secretaryship in 1915, he took a number of Galway's private despatches home with him. These documents, with full Colonial Office docketing, the minutes of the permanent staff and drafts of Harcourt's official replies attached, are indubitably public records. There was no precedent for their removal, but that is why they are now in the Harcourt Papers in the Bodleian Library instead of the Public Record Office.
160. R. Hyam, *Britain's imperial century 1815-1914* (London, 1976), p. 141. H. M. Hyde, *The other love* (London, 1970), pp. 148, 201.
161. Gardiner, Vol. II, pp. 495-500, 502, 508-11, 515-7, 520-44. *Hart's Army List*, 1900, p. 278.
162. *Army List* [official], 1909, pp. 1992.
163. *Who's Who*, 1946, p. 987. Ikime, pp. 166-7. Burns, pp. 214, 343-4.
164. The relevant salaries are given in the *Colonial Office Lists* for the 1880s and 1910s.
165. C.O. 247/160-77 (Public Record Office).
166. E.g., P.P. 1907 [Cd 3285-13], Vol. LIV, pp. 250, 254.
167. P.P. 1906 [Cd 2684-32], Vol. LXXV, p. 222.
168. Lady Galway, *The past revisited* (London 1953), (henceforth *Past revisited*), pp. 208-9.
169. P. Gosse, *St Helena 1502-1938* (London, 1938), p. 341.

170. *The Times*, 10 November 1911.
171. *Dictionary of National Biography*, 1901-11 (London, 1912), p. 70. *The English Catholics 1850-1950*, ed. G. A. Beck (London, 1950), pp. 484-5, 462, 496, 503.
172. His obituarist claimed he regarded the Bible Society's work 'as of supreme importance'. *The Times*, 20 June 1949.
173. *Register*, 1 December 1914, 1 December 1915, 1 December 1919.
174. C.O. 418/194/3-4.
175. *Register*, 19 December 1914.
176. C.O. 87/189-191 and 193-4 (Public Record Office).
177. MS. Harcourt, dep. 483, f. 2-10, Galway to Harcourt, 14 March 1912.
178. *Id.*, f. 12. Harcourt to Galway, 2 April 1912.
179. *Id.*, f. 8. Galway to Harcourt, 14 March 1912.
180. *Id.*, f. 12. Harcourt to Galway, 2 April 1912.
181. Gardiner, Vol. II, p. 597.
182. R. Hyam, 'The Colonial Office mind, 1900-1914', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 8 (1979), p. 40.
183. *The Times*, 15 October 1913. As for 'Lord Lundy', he is generally supposed to have been based on the seventh Earl Beauchamp, who was sent to govern New South Wales in 1899, when he had just turned 27.
184. A. Lubbock, *People in glass houses* (Melbourne, 1977), pp. 99-100, 110. More recent authors who have made the same claim rely on Mrs Lubbock's book as their authority.
185. *Burke's Peerage*, 105th edn (London, 1970), pp. 281-2. *Who was who 1897-1916*, p. 69.
186. *Past revisited*, pp. 1-2.
187. *Burke's Peerage* (1970), p. 282. J. L. Altholz, *The Liberal Catholic movement in England* (London, 1962), pp. 132, 237-8. M. Ward, *The Wilfrid Wards and the transition* (London, 1934), pp. 245, 249.
188. *Past revisited*, p. 1.
189. *Letters of Lord Acton to Mary Gladstone*, ed. H. Paul (London, 1904), p. 44.
190. *Past revisited*, pp. 51-4.
191. *Id.*, pp. 166-7.
192. L. F. Barman, *Baron Friedrich von Hügel and the Modernist crisis in England* (Cambridge, 1972), p. 129.
193. M. Ward, *Gilbert Keith Chesterton* (Harmondsworth, 1958), p. 187.
194. *Past revisited*, pp. 1-6.
195. C.O. 418/161/190 and 172/8.
196. *Past revisited*, p. 222.
197. Many of his speeches contained flashes of wit, and this easy humour helped him to get away with remarks offensive to some of his listeners. E.g., *Register*, 18 April, 17 June and 1 December 1914. *Advertiser*, 1 December 1915.
198. *Past revisited*, p. 209.
199. *Id.*, p. 221.
200. *Register*, 5 January 1916.
201. *Id.*, 10 March 1915, 5 June 1915, 21 August 1916, 9 October 1917.
202. E.g., *id.*, 7 November 1916, 31 May and 13 June 1917.
203. *Id.*, 8 June 1917.
204. Lady Galway, *The place of modern languages* (Adelaide, 1917), p. 22.
205. *Register*, 2 July 1918.
206. E.g., *id.*, 21 April, 8 and 11 May, and 23-24 November 1914.
207. MS. Harcourt, dep. 483, ff. 58-9.
208. Lubbock, p. 100.
209. MS. Harcourt, dep. 483, ff. 27-8.
210. *Register*, 12 June 1915.
211. *Id.*, 15 August 1914.
212. Sir Dominick Daly was the only Catholic to serve as Governor of South Australia, but his wife was an Anglican — which explains why they were separated in death: he was buried in the Catholic section of Adelaide's West Terrace Cemetery; her remains were interred 10 km away in the Anglican Cemetery at Brighton.

213. *E.g.*, *Register*, 1 June and 9 December 1914.
214. Mondays' papers always reported vice-regal participation in public worship. Lady Galway usually chose High Mass at St Francis Xavier's Cathedral. Her husband was equally faithful in his Sunday attendance at St Peter's Cathedral or Holy Trinity.
215. R. Schumann, "'Charity, work, loyalty': a history of the Catholic Women's League in South Australia 1914-1979', unpub. B.A. Hons dissertation, Flinders University of South Australia, 1979.
216. C.O. 418/168/289. In this as in so many chapters of the Australian story, New South Wales and its clergy were unrepresentative of the nation.
217. The son, Lieut. H. R. d'Erlanger, had not accompanied the Galways and his sister when they sailed for South Australia in March 1914 because he was bent on going to Cambridge. He won a place there but enlisted immediately war broke out. When he was prescribed a long convalescence in August 1916, he came out to South Australia for several months during which he served as one of his step-father's A.D.C.s. *Register*, 21 August and 13 September 1916. MS. Harcourt, dep. 483, f. 59.
218. C.O. 418/180/46.
219. Lubbock, p. 100.
220. *Register*, 8 January 1919.
221. C.O. 418/172/186.
222. *Id.*, 188.
223. *Register*, 13 January 1919.
224. C.O. 418/138/3.
225. MS. Harcourt, dep. 483., f. 50.
226. *Id.*, f. 59.
227. *Id.*, ff. 50 and 60.
228. *Id.*, ff. 66-71.
229. C.O. 418/149/254.
230. *Id.*, 138/108.
231. *E.g.*, *Register*, 5 January 1916.
232. *Australian Worker*, 6 January 1916.
233. *Advertiser*, 29 December 1917.
234. C.O. 418/180/121.
235. *Id.*, 125-7.
236. CR 746/231/2. C.O. 418/194/36-9.
237. C.O. 418/180/57-8.
238. *E.g.*, CR 746/231/2-3.
239. R. Hyam, 'The Colonial Office mind 1900-1914', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 8 (1979), pp. 30-55.
240. CR 746/231/2.
241. C.O. 418/180/61.
242. *Id.*, 63.
243. *Id.*, 112-13.
244. *Id.*, 60.
245. *Id.*, 123.
246. *Id.*, 121-2.
247. *Id.*, 142-5.
248. *Id.*, 141.
249. CR 746/231/2.
250. C.O. 418/180/449-50.
251. CR 746/231/2. Galway to Newdigate-Newdegate, 22 January 1920. Galway made a fetish of dress. In the war years all who could wore uniform, but he preferred his governor's uniform (with the feathered hat) to his military one, because he disliked being upstaged by the senior officers of South Australia Command. He even urged the Colonial Office to secure for all state governors the temporary rank of major general, to 'ensure them being [the] senior military officers in their respective states'. CR 746/231/2. Downing Street did not oblige. It probably recalled Lord Melbourne's

- response to the request of the Earl of Durham, after his term as Governor General in Canada, to be made Marquess of the St Lawrence: 'Scipio Africanus, eh? I don't think we've done enough to deserve that.'
252. C.O. 418/180/449 and 456, 194/9.
253. *Id.*, 194/13A and 17-18.
254. *Id.*, 180/148-151.
255. CR 746/231/2. Galway to Newdigate-Newdegate, 11 July 1920.
256. C.O. 418/180/5. CR 746/231/2. Galway to Newdigate-Newdegate, 20 August 1920.
257. CR 746/231/2.
258. *Past revisited*, p. 167.
259. Lady Galway's volume of memoirs is the most self-effacing autobiographical work the present writer has encountered. It consists mainly of recollections about other people. For information about her community service in Britain I am indebted to her publishers, the Harvill Press.
260. *The Times*, 1 and 16 July 1963.

CHARLES READE, 1880-1933: TOWN PLANNING MISSIONARY

JOHN TREGENZA

Too often historians write as if their purpose were to sanctify success. They commemorate the causes and movements that succeeded and overlook the causes that failed. Yet causes that failed, particularly those that failed because they were ahead of their time, can be more interesting and relevant to the present than those that succeeded. A good example can be found in the early Australian town planning movement which began tentatively in the 1880s and 90s, received a boost with the international competition for the design of Canberra in 1911 and became a strong national force during the First World War and its immediate aftermath — years which saw the first Australian Town Planning Conference, the appointment of the first State Town Planner in South Australia and the passage of the first Australian Town Planning Act by the South Australian Parliament.

It is a testimony to the strength of the movement at this time that its first Australia-wide conference took place at one of the darkest periods of the First World War from 17 to 24 October 1917, when the long, bitter, inconclusive battle of Passchendaele was drawing to its close. Australian troops were heavily committed to this desperate battle in the mud and suffered 38,000 casualties in eight weeks, more than in the whole Gallipoli campaign. Yet here in Adelaide, in the venerable Institute Building on Kintore Avenue, some 250 delegates from all parts of Australia gathered at this time to hear and discuss papers on town planning. This was not just a conference of private citizens with an interest in planning; it was under the patronage of every government in Australia, and the Mayors, or Lord Mayors, of Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, Brisbane and Perth. The Governor General was the chief patron, and nearly all the 250 delegates held official positions — as Ministers of the Crown, representatives of municipalities, members of statutory bodies or of professional associations. The moving spirit behind the conference was one of the two Honorary Organizing Directors, Charles C. Reade, the Government Town Planning Adviser for South Australia.

In his Foreword to the printed Proceedings of the Conference, issued the following year, Reade wrote with justifiable pride:

The first Australian Town Planning Conference and Exhibition may, with the flight of time, come to be numbered among historic gatherings which have left a definite impress upon the urban life of a continent. It was remarkable amidst the upheaval and tragedy of the war of the nations that a gathering of such magnitude and representation could be arranged and carried through to success.¹

Yet the general histories of Australia, which have a good deal to say about the war

JOHN TREGENZA

and even more about the conscription crisis, say little or nothing about the early town planning movement which produced this conference. They are probably silent because the town planning movement rapidly lost momentum from about the time Reade left Australia in 1920, his hopes dashed by the opposition of an undemocratically elected Upper House. Reade's Australian career not only illustrates how an immigrant with energy and new ideas can stimulate the intellectual life of an isolated country, but also how the very energy and pugnacity of such an individual can arouse a latent conservatism which cripples his campaign by exploiting the obstructive potential of an antiquated Constitution — at least in the short term.

It was often assumed in Australia that Charles Reade was an Englishman, but in fact he was born in New Zealand on 4 May 1880 at Invercargill, a town in the South Island of which his father, a lawyer, would soon be mayor.² There was at that time a good deal of coming and going across the Tasman sea (well illustrated in Henry Lawson's stories) and the Reades for some years lived in Hobart and Sydney where Charles's father was Commissioner, in succession, of the Supreme Courts of Tasmania and New South Wales. At the age of sixteen Reade spent one year at Wellington Grammar School in New Zealand. The next ten years are a blank. Then, in 1906, he re-appears in London as a member of the staff of what he calls 'an ambitious society journal.' Family connections must have helped in this phase of his career, for the Reades of Ipsden House had been influential in the county of Oxford for centuries,³ a great uncle and namesake had written the celebrated novel *The Cloister and the Hearth* and an uncle, Winwood Reade, had only recently published with great success *The Martyrdom of Man*, a study of the malign influence of religious superstition through history. Such a background, and the contacts it facilitated with such people as Sidney Webb, the Fabian, and T. C. Horsfall, author of *The Improvement of the Dwellings and Surroundings of the People*, enabled him to write perceptive articles for the *Sydney Morning Herald* and three New Zealand newspapers, later to be expanded and published in book form as *The Revelation of Britain* (1909).

Reade described the series as written by a colonial for fellow colonials. Like all his generation of native Australians and New Zealanders he had grown up with an image of the Mother Country based on cabled news snippets and the speeches of visiting British statesmen. The contrast between this image and the reality confronting him as a visitor had prompted the title of his book. It is an agreeable change from all those books by nineteenth century English travellers reporting loftily on their visits to the colonies.

Reade's account of a visit to Sheffield reveals his point of view and also his characteristically colourful style. He approaches the city in a train:

A bank of brown luminous cloud hovers on the horizon. The sunlight vanishes. Trees that a few minutes ago were radiant with splendour turn dim and strange. A faint mist blurs the landscape. The bank of brown cloud remains stationary in the distance. Only the mist thickens until the country has the appearance of being affected by some neighbouring bush fire. It is literally smothered in smoke — fields, villages, woods and hills.⁴

He makes his way through the smoke that reminds him of a colonial bush fire down into the back streets of the inner city with a person he calls a 'slummer' for guide:

We wandered down lane after lane, narrow and dirty, and dominated by that

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overwhelming sense of disorder; children in droves, unwashed women gossiping on the doorsteps, and grimy workmen grouped by the veritable 'shanty' that did duty for an hotel.⁵

He enquires about rents and learns that the landlord 'provides the light, power and furniture, for which workmen pay a rent that absorbs one-fourth to one-third of their earnings.' He enquires about the death rate in this city of nearly 400,000 and learns that 'out of a total of 7,475 deaths in 1906, 3,129 were children under the age of five years. Two-thirds of these children died before attaining their first year.'⁶

He visits the great steel and engineering works and is appalled by the enormous amount of energy and talent being thrown into armaments: 'All Europe seems to be convulsed with a Titanic thought of war. The minds of the nations run to "Dreadnoughts"'. The 'long black halls of labour', he writes,

are full of shouts and voices, and shadows moving restlessly against the furnace fires. There is neither disorder nor waiting. It is simply organised labour brought to the maximum of production. The men are grimy and sweating, but they do not stop. They pass with gleaming eyes and matted hair....From daylight to dark, round the twenty-four hours of the clock, it is the same.⁷

At dawn he watches the army of night shift workers making off to their 'huddled, dirty homes' and asks:

Is it not incongruous that all this marvellous process of production they are concerned with, these huge activities that make for national wealth, and build fine homes on the outskirts of the cities and rear palaces in London, can do for them no more than this? There is surely something inhuman in the anomaly.⁸

Although he claims in his introduction to be unattached to any political party, it is plain enough that he believes in the improvement of urban life by means of state and municipal planning, and was already dedicated to the eradication of slums.

On the positive side Reade pays tribute to William Lever's well-known industrial housing estate, Port Sunlight, and approvingly quotes his remark that 'the firm gets a return from the money invested in the better health and consequent increased industrial efficiency of the workers.' Port Sunlight, adds Reade,

proves that men and women working eight hours a day can turn out more and better work than those labouring ten or eleven hours in other concerns and living under poor housing conditions.⁹

But Port Sunlight was only a single estate laid out by a benevolent proprietor, not a model for the planning of whole cities. The country to which Australians and New Zealanders should be looking for a guide in the matter of town planning in 1909 was Germany, the nation against which Britain was so vigorously arming.

It is an undoubted, if unpalatable fact, that the town planning movements in both Britain and Australasia in the first two decades of the 20th century indirectly drew a good deal of support from this fierce neo-Darwinian rivalry between the so-called British and German 'races'. Many traditional supporters of laissez-faire were at this time prepared to countenance interference with property rights and the liberties of industrialists and merchants in the name of greater national efficiency. The long-drawn out Boer war had not only suggested gross inefficiency in the army, but by demonstrating the physical unfitness of such a high proportion of the recruits, had raised grave doubts about the future of the British 'race'. Lord Rosebery's remark, 'you cannot breed an Imperial race within the slums',¹⁰ was

quoted over and again by town planning enthusiasts, anxious to convert hard-headed 'practical' men to their cause. Reade himself hated the thought of war between Britain and Germany, but being an excellent publicist, was aware of the appeal of the Rosebery argument. In the last chapter of his book he quotes T. C. Horsfall's observation that in all the German towns known to him 'the very poorest parents, in whatever part of the town they live, have far pleasanter places near their homes in which they can seek fresh air and beautiful surroundings for themselves, and space for the exercise of their children, than the richest people who live in any part of Manchester'. Horsfall then continues:

If we take the physical conditions of the inhabitants of a town as an index to the efficiency of the system of municipal government in the case of Germany, then we shall certainly be compelled to say that the German system is far superior to ours. For the inhabitants of the large German towns are far more robust in appearance, and are, on the average, taller and broader than are the inhabitants of our large towns.¹¹

To those concerned for imperial efficiency, remarks like these were no betrayal. Germany was the rival, and where she was superior, the causes of the superiority should be frankly investigated and if necessary emulated or improved on. At the same time, Horsfall's statement could appeal to humanitarians who were primarily concerned, like Reade, to make the lives of people healthier and happier and more productive.

For Reade, German cities which had expanded rapidly in the last decades of the 19th century were particularly apt models for Australasian cities, whose main problems, in his view, were caused by unregulated subdivision in mushrooming outer suburbs, and the failure of municipalities to purchase land and thus keep down the price:

Under legal edict and accepted belief it is considered necessary that every city should have an abundant amount of land of its own. German municipalities have, beside English communities, secured wide areas for every conceivable public purpose, including the erection of large numbers of dwellings. The municipal house is quite a feature of German life. A great deal of support, however, is given to building societies to provide residential quarters in preference to the municipality.¹²

Apart from purchasing land and building houses, German cities, according to Reade, normally drew up elaborate plans for the development of new suburbs of the sort that we are now becoming accustomed to in Australia. Land owners and commercial interests would be consulted, but once the plan was confirmed the city could only develop in that area according to the plan:

The method of cutting up private lands for speculative purposes by individuals familiar to the colonies is not permitted. It is, in fact, held to be a first cause of the evils that accumulate as the city expands.¹³

Reade does not explain these developments by reference to the activity of avowed socialists, but rather, quoting an Albert Shaw, ascribes them to 'the municipal ideals of a thrifty burgher collectivism' plus the German readiness to place power in the hands of the trained expert. He refers with approval to the practice of electing a salaried mayor and several salaried councillors from applicants 'distinguished by professional attainments in municipal science.' It is a shortcoming of his article, though, that he does not go into details about the suffrage. A quotation implies that it was normally restricted to 'the educated and the thrifty classes.' Nor does he say

anything about the quality of individual homes — a point on which he was later taken to task by the *Garden Cities and Town Planning Magazine*.¹⁴ Nevertheless, the general principles he was advocating for Australasian cities were indeed farsighted, and have been reiterated in recent years by Hugh Stretton, who writes in his influential *Ideas for Australian Cities*:

Of all the uses of private capital in the freehold cities, land speculation is probably the most worthless. It usually prevents coherent planning. It helps nobody except its profiteers.¹⁵

Reade's book was published in Auckland by Gordon and Gotch and it is likely that the author had returned there by the time of publication in 1909. I can discover nothing of his career in this year or in 1910, but assume that he was employed as a journalist in Auckland. There can be no doubt, however, that he was keenly watching town planning developments overseas, for 1909 saw the passing of John Burns's Housing and Town Planning Act in the U.K., and in N.S.W. the publication of the Report of the Royal Commission on 'The Improvement of the City of Sydney and Suburbs' — a report in which, to quote Denis Winston, 'Nearly every subsequent improvement to the central area of Sydney ... was suggested and clearly explained...'.¹⁶

Reade comes into view again in 1911 as editor of the *Weekly Graphic and New Zealand Mail*, a journal published in Auckland which specialized in articles on subjects of current importance generously illustrated by photographs, plans and drawings. The Reade style is unmistakably stamped on the headlines which appeared in the issue of 8 March:

The Ideal City and How to Plan it. What to Avoid and What to Emulate. Mr. A. M. Myers points the Way.

The article continues:

An epoch-making event was the conference held in Auckland last week, when, at the invitation of the Mayor of the city, delegates of all the local bodies on the isthmus met to consider the question of town planning. The feature of the gathering was a statesmanlike address by Mr. A. M. Myers, in explaining the provisions of "The Auckland Town Planning Bill", which he hopes to introduce next session of parliament.

Arthur Mielziner Myers had been born in Ballarat, Victoria, in 1867 and had migrated to N.Z. with his father. He had gone to work in an uncle's brewery at the age of 16 and seems to have inherited the firm in 1897. He had rapidly become a leading businessman in Auckland and for four years, from about 1906-10, had been mayor of the city, during which time he had worked for the 'greater Auckland movement'. In 1910 he had been elected M.P. for Auckland.¹⁷ It is highly likely that he had read and been influenced by Reade's book *The Revelation of Britain*, and had borne its ideas in mind when he travelled overseas himself in 1910.

Myers could hardly have found a better ally and publicist than Charles Reade, who not only printed his speech in full, including his analysis of the Bill clause by clause, but provided ten illustrations — views of slums in England and in Auckland, and a view of a newly planned area in Rheims, a plan of Hampstead Garden Suburb and examples of its housing, an architect's drawing of buildings which the Auckland Council could erect near the new Auckland Town Hall to house offices and a market — and so on. To keep the pot on the boil, succeeding

issues of his newspaper ran illustrated articles on a new Government housing scheme in New Zealand, and on workers' housing in Germany. Then he himself took to the platform to expose the slums of Auckland and Wellington in what would later be a standard opening gambit on his visits to Australian cities. Naturally he was assured of sympathetic treatment in his own *Weekly Graphic* which not only reported him in full, but provided page upon page of photographs of decayed wooden slum houses in Auckland and Wellington, all identified by street, and all ticketed with their current rental. The message was simple but arresting: if you think God's own country lacks slums, what do you make of these? According to the *Weekly Graphic*, scores were turned away from his lecture in Auckland. Here, of course, he was on home ground, but it was much the same story when he lectured in the New Zealand capital, Wellington, where the local *Evening Post* reported his lecture in very similar terms, referring to his 'numerous capital limelight pictures' shown to a crowded and attentive audience which included the Chief Justice, the Minister for Public Health, Mr Myers, and various members of the City Council.

Reade had a good case, because both Wellington and Auckland were growing rapidly, and people were settling faster than houses could be built to contain them. The population of greater Auckland actually trebled between 1896 and 1916, and those who were poor were being packed into the old decaying inner suburbs, while those who were better off were accepting new, but often poorly-built houses, in unplanned subdivisions on the periphery. No-one knew better than Reade how to shock people into a new, sharply-focussed awareness of such development.

The combination of Myers and Reade was potent enough to encourage a member of the New Zealand cabinet, G. Fowlds, the Minister for Public Health, to sponsor a Town Planning Bill to apply to the whole of New Zealand. It was a weaker Bill than Myers's, for it was permissive like the U.K. Act of 1909, and it did not give specific encouragement to planning schemes that embraced more than one local government area. Nor did it allow for the employment of expert advisers. But it seems to have been the first Town Planning Bill actually introduced to an Australasian parliament. Why this Bill did not become the first town planning Act in Australasia is not clear. In an article on 'Town Planning in Australasia' published in the *Town Planning Review* for April 1912, Reade himself simply reports: 'Unfortunately a constitutional issue quite apart from the measure itself arose and led to its being dropped.'

Reade probably wrote this article on 'Town Planning in Australasia' while on his way to England by ship after visiting several Australian cities, including Adelaide. It may well be that he had hoped to be New Zealand's first Town Planner, and that, disappointed in the failure of Fowlds's Bill, and determined to become more of a professional in the field, he had set off for England. He may well, at this stage, have set his sights on returning to Australasia as a government-sponsored town planning missionary, for he writes in the same 1912 article:

There is not the slightest doubt that Australasian towns and cities stand in need of expert and up-to-date information on modern Town Planning in Europe today, and the proposal of the Garden Cities and Town Planning Association to equip and send out an emissary to Australia and New Zealand to deliver comprehensive lantern lectures would not only be a powerful stimulus, but would be warmly welcomed by the numerous municipal and government officers, architects, engineers, and others whose thoughts are setting keenly towards such places as Letchworth and Hampstead Garden Suburb.

By the end of the year, Reade had been appointed organizer of just such a tour and in 1914 would return as just such an emissary. Indeed it is quite likely that he suggested the whole idea to the Garden Cities and Town Planning Association in the first place.

In London, Reade rapidly became a prominent figure in the town planning movement. In January 1913 the *Garden Cities and Town Planning Magazine* announced that 'During the absence of Mr. Ewart G. Culpin in America Mr. Charles C. Reade will be Acting Editor of this magazine and Acting Secretary of the Garden Cities and Town Planning Association.' In April and June he attracted national attention by his opposition to the building of a proposed spur railway line designed to carry large tonnages of coal, on a high embankment, just past the edge of the Hampstead Garden Suburb. His long letter to *The Times* of 5 June 1913 is vintage Reade, accompanied as it is by a large map of the whole area showing clearly at every point how the proposed railway would affect suburbs and countryside. He also wrote a longer article for the *Town Planning Review*, delivered lectures and engaged a team of lawyers. Although the railway had all the influence of the Great Northern Company behind it, the proposal was vetoed by Parliament and much of the credit for this was given to Reade.¹⁸

In preparing for the proposed visit of a town planning emissary to Australia, Reade was indefatigable. He brought off a major coup in June 1913 when he organized an 'Australasians Day' at the Hampstead Garden Suburb, attended by no less than 200 Australians and New Zealanders including a former Australian Prime Minister, Sir George Reid, and two former Premiers of South Australia, Sir John Cockburn and J. G. Jenkins. Naturally they were asked to make donations towards the coming tour.¹⁹ When Professor R. F. Irvine was sent overseas by the N.S.W. Government in 1913 to study workmen's housing 'he visited Letchworth and many garden suburbs under the guidance of the Garden Cities Association.'²⁰ The Premier of Victoria, W. A. Watt, made similar visits and announced that he would shortly lay a Greater Melbourne Council Bill on the table of the House.²¹ An Adelaide correspondent wrote to thank the Association for sending a large supply of literature, and to report that Adelaide was thinking of a garden suburb.²² Reade himself wrote two illustrated articles about the Dacey Garden Suburb which the N.S.W. Labor Government had just launched near Botany Bay in Sydney — the first suburb of its kind in Australia, designed to provide good workmen's houses at economical rents.²³ He also wrote of Walter Burley Griffin's plans for the new city of Canberra.²⁴ Town Planning was 'in' and eminently respectable. From Adelaide came a letter from the Mayor, J. Lavington Bonython:

With regard to the City of which I have the honour to be Chief Magistrate, I am of opinion that the time is especially ripe for such a visit as is proposed. The local press has recently given some attention to Town Planning and the provision of open spaces in the suburbs, and several enthusiastic gentlemen have formed a committee and given addresses on the matter.²⁵

In Sydney a Town Planning Association was formed. No wonder that the chairman of the Garden Cities and Town Planning Association remarked that the town planning movement was 'beginning to assume an Imperial aspect.'

War broke out in August 1914 on the very day that the last European delegates to the first International Town Planning Congress crossed the channel. The congress had been sponsored jointly by the German and English Garden Cities Associations

and the outbreak of war seemed 'almost unbelievable' to the editor of the *Garden Cities and Town Planning Magazine*.²⁶ Within the British Empire, however, the movement now had too much momentum to be stopped. Indeed, if anything, the war gave it a new urgency, for as the scale of destruction and casualties mounted, people came increasingly, for their own peace of mind, to dwell on the new, and hopefully better society that would emerge.

The war certainly failed to stop Reade, who came out to Australia in 1914 ahead of his fellow lecturer W. R. Davidge, to prepare the programme of scores of lectures which they would give, sometimes together and sometimes separately, from August through to December. Reade, reported the *Garden Cities and Town Planning Magazine*, has 'secured for Australasia a set of lantern slides which is not approached elsewhere'.²⁷

Reade's method of rousing interest in the question of town planning when he came to Adelaide in October 1914²⁸ was the one he had used years before in New Zealand. The title of a lantern slide public lecture was announced in advance: 'Garden cities v. Adelaide slums and suburbs'. The effect of such a title was predictably electric. Under the headline, 'No Slums in Adelaide' the *Register* reported the indignant response of the acting Mayor of Adelaide, Alderman Cohen, at a meeting of the City Council:

When I gave my vote for the free use of the Town Hall to a gentleman by the name of Mr. Reade, who was supposed to visit Adelaide only for the purpose of enlightening us in regard to garden cities in England, and prominent cities in Europe, I did not anticipate that one of the lectures was to be headed "Garden cities v. Adelaide slums and suburbs." ... We have long held the reputation of being the garden city of Australia and every sitting member of the Council will agree with me that we are determined to live up to this reputation ... I defy Mr. Reade or anyone to point out the existence of any slums in our city.²⁹

In the *Advertiser* of the following day Cohen was reported as saying:

What I would like to know is exactly how much Mr. Reade really knows about Adelaide. I have been given to understand that he has not yet visited this city, and if that is correct he can know nothing about Adelaide and its suburbs. I fear that there is too great a disposition nowadays to send people from different parts of Europe to teach Australians what they are better able to impart themselves.

Alderman Cohen was then aged 65, nearly twice Reade's age — a dignified and portly man of property, leader of the Jewish community and prominent in the Oddfellows, Foresters, Druids, Freemasons and the Australian Natives Association. His wealth and hospitality were legendary. In 1892, at the end of his second term as Mayor, he is said to have given the largest ball 'ever held in the Southern Hemisphere' — no fewer than 3,600 guests accepting his invitation to dance in the new Exhibition Building on North Terrace. The citizens in turn had given him a ball and presented the Mayoress with a 'suite of diamonds', while he gave them a full-length portrait of himself to hang in the Town Hall.³⁰ Since then he had served several more terms as Mayor of Adelaide. For such a man, criticism of the city was tantamount to a personal insult. In claiming that Adelaide was the Garden City, he was probably thinking of Ebenezer Howard's tribute to the city's plan in his book *Tomorrow*, published in 1898. Howard, who had gone on to found Letchworth as a model Garden City in 1903, had actually reproduced Light's plan in his pioneering book in order to illustrate the importance of park belts for new cities. Ironically,

Cohen himself had been praised by Charles Reade in his 1912 article on 'Town Planning in Australasia' for his spirited and successful leadership in a campaign to stop the Commonwealth Government building a large military barracks in Adelaide's park lands.³¹


The city planned by Colonel Light in 1837, however, was very different from the 1914 city of Alderman Cohen. Light's original square acres had been subdivided and resubdivided, and a network of narrow lanes and courts had been created between the broad original streets to provide access for thousands of small terrace houses. The resident population of the city within the parklands was then 40,000, the most it has ever been, and almost three times what it is today. Many of the houses were old, badly maintained and unsanitary. Each year, from 1912 to 1918, the Adelaide corporation's Medical Officer of Health condemned an average of twenty houses as 'unfit for human habitation' and ordered no less than 950 to be 'cleaned, ventilated and repaired' and 696 water closets and urinals to be 'removed or cleansed and repaired'.³² Reade knew this unsavoury aspect of the city well. When a reporter confronted him with Cohen's statements he responded tactfully but firmly:

This is the fifth occasion on which I have visited Adelaide, and anyone with personal knowledge of various cities in different parts of the world will take pleasure, as I have done before this, in recognizing the wealth of park lands and open spaces which this city obtained, thanks to the foresight of its pioneers. ... It is the very fact that a number of people are convinced that 'Adelaide is the garden city of Australia, and that it is one of the cleanest cities in the world,' which compels missionaries like myself in favor of better housing and living conditions to deal with Adelaide as it is in order to convince people that there are opportunities for improvement here just as there are in Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane.³³

In the course of this interview Reade said that he had personally spent several days inspecting Adelaide housing conditions and had taken about thirty photographs. Four of these, showing sordid backyards and lanes near Whitmore Square, had already been published in the Adelaide weekly *Critic* together with contrasting photographs of recently planned Garden Suburbs on the outskirts of London.³⁴ Most of the distinctive features of these early Garden Suburbs are still regarded today as desirable — curved streets, with grass and trees on their margins, detached or semi-detached houses designed by professional architects to harmonize with their neighbours, each house with its own garden, and generous provision for children's playgrounds, sports fields and other community facilities — convincing proof that Reade was not an impractical visionary. In the next issue, following Cohen's attack, the *Critic* published two more views of 'slum' backyards, this time identified as properties near Waymouth Street in the heart of Adelaide. In an accompanying article headed 'Town Planning and Adelaide Slums', no doubt based on an interview with Reade, the *Critic* thought that his lecture title was 'probably a little unfortunate' in that those acquainted with the 'infinite squalor and degradation' of London slums might be led to discount his thesis entirely. In the *Critic's* view this would be a pity, for Adelaide certainly had its 'quota of undesirable dwellings and congested corners' which were undermining the health of their inhabitants, and thus the efficiency of the nation and Empire. In this sphere, the well-being of the whole community should 'prevail against the shortsightedness of private speculation and greed'.³⁵



An example of Reade's missionary technique: photographs published in the *Critic* on 30 September 1914, a week before his first Adelaide lecture. (Courtesy State Library of S.A.)



Photographs accompanying an interview with Reade published in the *Critic* on the eve of his first Adelaide lecture. They bore the caption: 'Back Yards off Young Street, Near Waymouth Street, One of Adelaide's Principal Streets.' (Courtesy State Library of S.A.)

On the morning of Reade's first lecture, an editorial in the relatively conservative *Register* lent support to his main claims and attacked the 'existing haphazard no-system' under which 'Greater Adelaide is growing up anyhow, without regard to beauty or utility.' The paper also printed a spirited letter in Reade's defence from the Rev. C. S. Hornabrook. Hornabrook was the founder of the St Peter's College Mission associated with the Anglican church of St Mary Magdalene in the South East corner of the city, and had only recently submitted an interesting paper on 'Town Planning in South Australia' to an Imperial Health Conference held in London in May 1914 under the auspices of the Victoria League.³⁶ In all probability he had already accompanied Reade round the back streets as an expert 'slummer'.³⁷ Reade, he protested, was *not* an Englishman. 'Is it possible,' he asked, 'that one several times Mayor of the city, and therefore interested in municipal matters, has not heard of Mr. Reade before — has his New Zealand work, which attracted general interest about the time I believe Mr. Cohen filled the mayoral chair, been unknown to him?' Then came the crushing patriotic argument:

... off our squares and terraces, off our wider streets are places and courts with blocked ends which create the very conditions Light strove to avoid. The percentage of rejects for military training in one district in this city, in comparison with other cities, as lately set forth, ought to make the City Council seriously ask the reason.³⁸

For Reade, all this controversy provided excellent publicity, attracting to his first lecture a 'large and fashionable audience' presided over by a rather uncomfortable Governor, but not including Alderman Cohen. Judging his audience correctly, Reade followed his slides of slum conditions with an astute beating of the patriotic drum:

Building regulations should be stricter; the medical officials should have more power; and they should all realize that by having good housing conditions they would make good, wholesome, strong citizens of the Empire.³⁹

Altogether Reade gave three lectures in the Adelaide Town Hall. The second, which lasted two hours and involved the showing of 100 lantern slides, dealt with 'Town Planning for Adelaide' and the third with 'Cities of the Future.' Two further lectures were delivered in the Norwood and Unley town halls.⁴⁰ Despite the war, he

drew illustrations from Germany, particularly from the city of Ulm, which had purchased agricultural land round about in large quantities for future housing. Adelaide, he argued, should follow suit, but avoid the German practice of housing families in multi-storey apartment blocks. Rather, it should introduce uniform tram fares to discourage housing congestion in inner areas. What Adelaide wanted, in his view, was a combination of German town planning laws, and the housing policies recommended by the English Garden Cities and Town Planning Association. His slogan was 'One family, one house, one home, one garden,' and he was able to cite, no doubt with illustrations, the development of Dacey Garden Suburb on the outskirts of Sydney.

Sometime in 1914, probably while he was in Adelaide in October, Reade offered to assist the South Australian Government of the day in preparing a Town Planning Bill for S.A. The Peake Liberal Government did not take up the offer, but soon after the Vaughan Labor Government took office in April 1915 the new Attorney General wrote to Reade accepting his offer.⁴¹ In June the Vaughan Government purchased the Mortlock Park Estate which would later become Colonel Light Gardens and in November formally offered Reade 'an engagement for a term of four months at a salary of £150 to advise the Government'. In April 1916 Reade set to work under this arrangement to draft South Australia's first Town Planning legislation.

The Town Planning and Housing Bill drafted by Reade in 1916 went well beyond John Burns's 1909 English Act in that it allowed planning for built-up as well as new suburban areas, and provided for co-operation with the State Bank to finance low cost housing for 'persons of small means' — a function very like that of the modern Housing Trust. There was to be a Town Planning Commission of three experts (a town planner, an engineer or architect and an economist) responsible for initiating and preparing town planning schemes in co-operation with local councils within the metropolitan area and for preparing model by-laws for areas outside the metropolitan area. The Commission, acting in its own right or through the Government, could override local objections, and arbitrate between conflicting authorities. Advocates of the Bill argued that it would enable serious planning of the whole metropolitan area during the expected post-war boom, provide new homes in garden suburbs for returning soldiers and wage earners and facilitate the up-grading of older housing in the inner city.

Later, perhaps with the advantage of hindsight, Reade would describe this 1916 Town Planning and Housing Bill as a 'propaganda measure' which he always realized would never get through the Upper House. It certainly aroused fierce opposition from the Adelaide City Council. There were many accusations that this opposition was mainly concerned with protecting the interests of the landlords. The Labor *Daily Herald* commented:

The City Council apparently does not want to learn. It seems to want the slumowners to be left untouched so that the landlords may reap their harvest of gold, while the poor of the city reap their harvest of suffering, disease, and other ills associated with bad housing.⁴²

It could be argued that the Corporation's opposition stemmed less from Reade's policies than from his style as a town planning missionary. The title of his first lecture, 'Garden cities v. Adelaide slums and suburbs', undoubtedly left an

enduring resentment which later more conciliatory statements did not erase. In explaining the refusal of the Mayor of Adelaide, Isaac Isaacs, to attend a lecture by Reade on the Town Planning and Housing Bill, or even to discuss it, a Member of the Legislative Council remarked:

When a visitor to your home calls your oil paintings oleographs, your silver spoons brass, and your dog a mongrel, he is hardly the man you would desire to meet again.

The hostility of the City Fathers was certainly couched in personal terms. In a City Council debate on the Bill, Councillor Gunn, later to be a Labor Premier, sought to speak in its defence. When explaining that there was to be a Commission of three experts, he was interrupted:


Ald. Moulden — Consisting of men like C. C. Reade.

Cr. Gunn — Yes, and a good man, too.

Ald. Moulden — This seems to be a Bill for the benefit of C. C. Reade.

Cr. Gunn — Let the man alone and stick to the Bill.

Ald. Cohen — That's the man who called Adelaide a city of slums.



Lewis Cohen as seen by J. H. Chinner.
Caricature in the *Saturday Journal* of 11
August 1923.
(Courtesy Mr. H. W. Chinner)

John Gunn as seen by J. H. Chinner.
Caricature in the *Saturday Journal* of 1
September 1923.
(Courtesy Mr. H. W. Chinner)

Cr. Gunn — So far as I know Mr. Reade has never called Adelaide a city of slums.

Ald. Cohen — Yes, he did.

The Mayor — When a member of the Council says a certain thing it is customary to take his word for it.

Ald. Cohen — His lecture was entitled, 'The Slums of Adelaide'.

Cr. Gunn — That is different.

Ald. Cohen — A distinction without a difference (Laughter).

Cr. Gunn — Well, as I was saying before I was interrupted, there is to be a commission of experts —

Cr. Angas Johnson — A commission of faddists.⁴³

In defence of Reade, it must be recorded that all those contributing to this exchange, with the exception of Councillor Gunn, were multiple property owners in the city, with multiple votes for Council. The Mayor himself, Alderman Isaacs, a real estate agent, commanded a total of seven votes for Council and no less than thirty seven votes in any rate payers' ballot on a financial question.⁴⁴ With the rapid growth of the city's population in recent years unmatched by the construction of new dwellings, rents of inner city houses had soared, and overcrowding, especially for families with young children, had steadily worsened.⁴⁵ The city fathers must have known this perfectly well, and it was, of course, a matter to which the Labor Party, now in office for the second time, regularly drew attention. Reade's great offence was to come in as an international expert and elevate the campaign for government control of housing conditions above the level of party point scoring, and in doing so, win bi-partisan support from all three metropolitan dailies and the community at large. By attacking Reade personally, the city fathers were trying to divert attention from their vested interest in the status quo and avoid rational argument — a tactic which the *Advertiser* immediately perceived, commenting: 'It is far too late in the day to sneer at town planning as though it were a mere sentimental fad'.⁴⁶ In these circumstances, it may be questioned whether a more diplomatic approach at the beginning would really have advanced Reade's campaign for town planning to include built up areas as well as new sub-divisions. Sooner or later the existence of slum conditions would have to be publicized to justify the proposed legislation.

The 1916 bill sailed quickly through the Labor-dominated House of Assembly, only to enter the doldrums in the Legislative Council. Then, while it lay becalmed, the bitter national debate over conscription for overseas service divided the Labor Party and pushed town planning into the background. Reade, however, was never easily daunted, and while the nation debated conscription he was methodically laying the foundations for Australia's first Town Planning Conference and evolving his ideas for the future development of Adelaide's metropolitan area. In November, when a series of displays on the theme of 'Child Welfare' opened in Adelaide's Jubilee Exhibition Building, he seized the opportunity to deliver a seminal lecture on 'Playgrounds and Recreation in Garden Cities' illustrated by a 'fine series of lantern views'.⁴⁷

The fall of the Vaughan ministry in July 1917 did not affect Reade's honorary organization of the first Australian Town Planning Conference in October, assisted by Victor H. Ryan, the Director of the S.A. Tourist Bureau. It was from all accounts a brilliant personal success for Reade, who managed to bring together in Adelaide some 250 delegates from all parts of the Commonwealth. Even the Mayor




The South Australian Executive responsible for the Central Organization of the First Australian Town Planning Conference and Exhibition, Adelaide, 1917. Reade is in the centre front row, wearing a bow tie. On his left, wearing a light-coloured tweed suit, is the President of the S.A. Town Planning Association, H. W. Uffindell; on Reade's right is Victor H. Ryan, Director of the S.A. Tourist Bureau, and co-organizer, with Reade, of the Conference. (Reproduced from the Conference Proceedings, Courtesy State Library of S.A.)

of Adelaide, Alderman Isaacs, agreed to participate, no doubt afraid of ridicule if he boycotted a conference attended by the Mayors or Lord Mayors of Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth. Reade himself was clearly on top form. 'When one mentions to him the term town planning' wrote a *Mail* reporter, 'he begins to "kindle" and it is not long before he veritably glows.'⁴⁸ In addition to organizing the Conference he contributed to major displays in the Jubilee Exhibition Building, wrote the Foreword to the *Proceedings*, and drew up for inclusion therein two very interesting illustrations of his planning ideas. The first of these, printed as Plate 41, consisted of a map of Adelaide and its suburbs showing, amongst other concepts, an outer belt of parklands (then quite feasible) and a linear park along the Torrens (now approaching realization nearly seventy years later!). The second illustration, printed as Plate 42, showed a birds-eye view of the proposed Mitcham Garden Suburb exemplifying all the features he had been advocating for new residential subdivisions. Both illustrations accompanied the text of a paper he delivered to the Conference on 'The Metropolitan Organization of Municipal Town Planning.' It is also more than likely that he was the moving spirit behind the model Children's Playground which was set up by the South Australian Town Planning and Housing Association at the base of the steps behind the Exhibition Building on ground adjacent to the site of today's Mechanical Engineering Building of the University of Adelaide. Here, each day of the Conference, under the supervision of teachers, some 400 children made active use of the playing equipment provided.

The substantial *Proceedings* of this first Australian Town Conference, with 168 pages of text supplemented by 69 plates, still make impressive reading. The papers were well-researched and far-sighted, prepared by delegates with a keen grasp of the problems that were going to arise as the existing cities of Australia doubled in size over the next few decades, assuming, as everyone had to, that there would still be soldiers left to return from the Great War for Civilization. Indeed, the appalling casualty lists then being published can only have heightened the sense of urgency among the delegates and the community at large: amid the waste of war and the divisions engendered by the Conscription debate, the ideals of town planning were a source of hope and social healing.

The Liberal Premier of South Australia at the time of the Conference was Archibald Henry Peake, an astute and cautious politician of the centre. Although, during an earlier period as Premier, Peake had declined Reade's offer to advise his Government on Town Planning, he was now sufficiently impressed by the success of the Conference to innovate boldly: on 1 July 1918 Reade was promoted from Town Planning Adviser to 'Town Planner, First Class, Professional Division of the Public Service, at a salary of £500 p.a. for a period of two years' with responsibility for administering Australia's first Town Planning Department.

One of Reade's first enterprises in his new position was to design a large children's playground at Port Pirie, opposite the chief State school. Originally intended to be two acres in extent, it grew to cover 10 acres of municipal land.⁴⁹ Inspired by the gospel of town planning and the desire to create a practical symbol of hope for a better post-war life, the playground project drew generous support from both the citizens of the town and its main industry, the Broken Hill Associated Smelters Pty Ltd, which agreed to provide all materials and playground equipment free of cost, and allowed its employees to use the facilities in its works to



Adelaide and Suburbs showing some of Reade's tentative 1917 ideas for co-ordinated planning of the metropolitan area. Note his proposed belt of outer parklands and his linear park along the Torrens. This bears the caption: 'River Foreshores Reserved for Public or other purposes.' The map was printed in both the 1917 Conference *Proceedings* and Parl. Paper No. 63, 1919.

make up accessories like iron gates and garden seats in their own time. For six weeks, up to 400 men worked on the ground each day off shift, while on the Saturday before the opening, 2,000 men and 500 women completed the job which included a central building about the size of a six-roomed house, a refreshment kiosk and six shelter sheds in various parts of the ground.⁵⁰ A lantern slide in the archives of the Town Planning Department, probably made by Reade, records the remarkable sight of hundreds of shirt-sleeved, be-hatted men methodically going about their manifold tasks. Another slide shows a great crowd of men, women and children in their Sunday best attending the combined religious service on the following day which marked the opening of the playground.⁵¹

Another playground designed by Reade, in this case situated on Adelaide's West Terrace, drew forth a similar community involvement. Sponsored by the South Australian Town Planning and Housing Association, it was designed for the children of the thickly populated south-west quarter of the city.⁵² Support also came from Isaac Isaacs' successor as Mayor of Adelaide, Alderman C. R. J. Glover, who not only recommended Council's financial support for the playground on West Terrace, but went on to equip three more playgrounds in the city's Park Lands at his own expense, the first, in 1918, by devoting to this purpose the money he would normally have spent on the customary mayoral ball — a function which he considered 'singularly inappropriate' while the war was 'still taking heavy toll of so many of the best of our younger citizens'.⁵³ The Education Department's contribution was to provide playground supervisors at appropriate times. Sixty years later these Adelaide playgrounds continue in active use, quietly testifying to the vitality of the early town-planning impulse, the generosity of Glover, and the missionary role of Charles Reade.

The second Australian Town Planning Conference and Exhibition was held in Brisbane from 30 July to 6 August 1918. In his new capacity as Australia's only Government Town Planner, Reade delivered a major address entitled 'Practical Town Planning: A discussion of Cardinal Features and Basic Principles of Existing Legislation and Town Planning Practice Overseas and their Adaptation to Australian States.' His paper revealed a change in tactics resulting from extensive discussions with people in local government: abandoning his controversial Commission of three experts with over-riding powers, he now gave the initiative in preparing town planning schemes to Municipal and District Councils. Nevertheless, aware that strategic planning in metropolitan areas would be impossible if individual Councils could 'plan irrespective of one another', he urged the adoption of legislation which would compel co-operation between Councils, the Government Town Planner and public authorities throughout the planning process. This would be far better than 'anarchy of individual action' by Councils unfamiliar with town planning technique or practice and by government and statutory authorities concerned solely with their own new tram routes, gas pipes, railways, wharves or sewers. In practice, he stressed, the art of town planning 'is dependent upon co-operation, and a temperate spirit of administration'.⁵⁴

With the ending of the war, the pressure for planning legislation in South Australia steadily mounted. A Control of Subdivision Act had been passed in 1917, but in Reade's view this was 'one of those temporary expedients which, while removing some of the glaring anomalies of the Surveyor-General's position, cannot provide for the proper planning of town extensions (including arterial

roads, open spaces, factory areas, limiting the number of houses to the acre, etc.) merely by increasing the powers of an executive officer to refuse his sanction to plans for the subdivision of a particular block of land.⁵⁵ At last, on 30 September 1919, the Attorney General and Minister in control of Town Planning, Henry Barwell, introduced into the House of Assembly a Town Planning and Development Bill prepared by Reade.⁵⁶ Apart from giving to the Town Planner wide powers with regard to the planning of new towns and subdivisions, subject to ministerial approval, the Bill enabled all Municipal and District Councils, with the exception of the Municipality of the City of Adelaide, to appoint their own Town Planning Committees and draw up By-laws on the advice of such Committees with regard to a remarkably comprehensive range of matters set out in a detailed First Schedule. These matters included new or existing private or public roads, widening of streets, building lines, parks and open spaces, public buildings, rivers and creeks, acquisition and reservation of land, uses of land, 'reclamation, improvement, and control of insanitary or low-lying land, or overcrowded and unhygienic areas', buildings generally, including their disfigurement by advertising, noxious trades or manufactures, conservation and development of natural beauties and amenities, repatriation and housing of discharged soldiers or sailors, reservation of land for housing of persons generally, and the 'preservation of historic buildings, and objects of historical or scientific interest.' Although initiatives were primarily given to the Councils themselves, the Government Town Planner was still required to report to the Minister on any proposed Town Planning By-law before it could be proclaimed, and there were powers under which the Minister could force inactive Councils to consider planning schemes drawn up for their areas by the Government Town Planner or by neighbouring Councils, and, if such Councils refused to co-operate, impose By-laws on them. Councils could also be constrained by the Minister to consult 'public bodies' involved in any proposed planning scheme. In short, the proposed Bill very largely embodied the principles outlined by Reade at the Brisbane conference.

Reade had prepared the way for this second Town Planning Bill with characteristic thoroughness. At the Brisbane Conference, as Barwell now reminded the Assembly, his paper on town planning principles had been subject to the 'fullest discussions' before the delegates had given it their unanimous endorsement. In Adelaide, after drafting a new Bill, he had painstakingly gone through it clause by clause with members of a committee representing all 21 of the Municipal and District Councils in the Metropolitan area — with the conspicuous exception of the Council of the Municipality of the City of Adelaide — and had won their support.⁵⁷ He had also prepared for members of Parliament a 48 page illustrated Report on the *Planning and Development of Towns and Cities* with a section expounding the main provisions of the Bill.⁵⁸ This was laid on the table of the Assembly and ordered to be printed a few days before the second reading.

Although there was no serious opposition to the Bill in the House of Assembly, it failed to reach the Legislative Council before the prorogation of Parliament in December and had to be reintroduced by Barwell when Parliament resumed in August 1920. Barwell was now Premier as well as Attorney General, having succeeded to the former office on Peake's death in April. He was still a strong advocate of the Bill: indeed he was even prepared to accept the argument of the



Henry Barwell as seen by J. H. Chinner.
Caricature in the *Saturday Journal* of 4
August 1923. (Courtesy Mr. H. W. Chinner)

Labor Opposition Leader, John Gunn, that the clause excepting the City of Adelaide from the scope of the Bill should be struck out, remarking:

The time has gone by when we can afford to say Australia has no slums. Our towns and cities are challenged with overcrowding, epidemic disease, and unwholesome conditions of living. A Town Planning and Development Act is now indispensable if only to prevent any further decline in the high standard of our citizenship.⁵⁹


The fate of the Bill in the Legislative Council was a very different story. Almost immediately after it was introduced the Council received a petition from 108 licensed land brokers, surveyors and architects asking that the whole of the responsibilities of the Town Planner should be transferred to a mixed Board of professional men and civil servants. Hard on its heels came a second type-written petition accompanied by a printed Urgent Memorial from the South Australian

Town Planning and Housing Association 'strongly opposing' the representations made 'by numerous persons dealing in land and building operations, who, in recent years, have been the principal agency for the wholesale subdivision and cutting up of suburban areas in both town and country, as well as precipitating overbuilding and other conditions, which Town Planning legislation now seeks to remedy.' (Underlining as in the printed Memorial). The Legislative Council was urged instead to 'pass the details and clauses of the whole Bill as (a.) approved by the Government (b.) passed by the House of Assembly, and (c.) endorsed by Municipal Corporations, District Councils and numerous public bodies throughout the State of South Australia.'⁶⁰


In judging the role of the Legislative Council in this debate it is essential to appreciate that this Urgent Memorial not only bore the names of 19 members of the Town Planning and Housing Association, but also those of the Mayors of nine metropolitan and nine country corporations, the chairmen of eight metropolitan and eight country District Councils and 17 individuals representing an amazingly wide spectrum of organizations: the S.A. Returned Sailors and Soldiers Imperial League, the Advisory Board for Soldiers' Dependents, the British Medical Association, the Municipal Tramways Trust, the S.A. Wattle Day League, the Good Roads Association, the University of Adelaide, the Health Inspectors' Society, the Suburban Area Municipal Association, the Local Government Officers' Association, the Council of Churches, the Social Service and Reform Bureau, and the Rose Park Improvement Association. Other bodies listed at the head of the Memorial as affiliates of the Town Planning and Housing Association were the British Science Guild, the S.A. School of Mines and Industries, the League of Loyal Women of Australia, the Kindergarten Union and the School for Mothers (later to become the Mothers and Babies Health Association).

Despite mounting public indignation at their delay the Legislative Councillors decided to set up a Select Committee to hear evidence from a variety of witnesses, including Reade and the honorary secretary of the South Australian Institute of Surveyors. In the end, with the prorogation of Parliament imminent, they sent the Bill back to the Assembly minus clauses 15-75, that is, all those dealing with the making of Town Planning By-laws, but with the clause excepting the City of Adelaide re-instated. Well might John Gunn remark: 'I do not suppose a Bill has ever been treated like this.' The Act which finally emerged did place the Government Town Planner and his small Department on a permanent basis, and it did give him a positive role to play in the field of new subdivisions, but there was no scope for that creative co-operation between local government, Town Planner and public bodies which Reade had long been advocating.⁶¹

On 23 December 1920, a few days after his mutilated Bill had received the assent of the Upper House, Reade left Adelaide with a year's leave of absence in order to take up an appointment as Town Planning Adviser in the Federated Malay States at a salary rate three times that which South Australia had been paying him, together with expenses.⁶² It was not a final cutting of the painter — he had taken a year's leave of absence and left behind a new house which he had built, probably to his own design, at 2 Elm Street, Brighton — but as his ship passed Torres Straits on the way north his mind was already focussing on the region awaiting his new missionary enterprise. He had acquired a copy of Lothrop Stoddard's controversial



*Contrasting new suburban roads in the United States (top) and Adelaide, illustrated in Reade's 1919 parliamentary report on the **Planning and Development of Towns and Cities**. Only recently the Council of the City of Adelaide has been improving the amenity of many wide, straight residential streets by adopting policies recommended by Reade sixty years earlier — undergrounding electric light wires, reducing paved surfaces and planting trees and lawn on median strips and footpath margins.*



book *The Rising Tide of Colour*, and in a circular letter to his Australian friends he speculated on the future relations of West and East:

Does this far East with its teeming millions and its rising tide of color portend a renaissance of conquest and slaughter, or will it slowly merge towards political freedom and racial independence on the principle of living and letting live? The riddle is for the future to unfold. The East appears to be a veritable crucible for groping human passions. Everywhere on this ship amongst those who make these tropic lands their home and ride to affluence on the backs of the swarming millions, there is the constantly recurring note of war in all serious conversation. The shadow of a Japanese American conflict hangs heavily upon the minds of those in high places.⁶³

In the event, Reade was destined to make his future career in Malaya, Borneo, the Philippines and Africa⁶⁴ and there would be no adding to the limited permanent legacy he was now leaving behind in South Australia — a legacy consisting mainly of plans for the northern section of Colonel Light Gardens (now appropriately named Reade Park), parts of Barmera (his original plan was amended after his departure), the suburban subdivisions of Kurralta Park and Novar Gardens, some children's playgrounds and his various publications on town planning.⁶⁵

In her valuable book *Cities for Sale*, Leonie Sandercock speculates on the effect of Reade's departure:

Given the extent of Reade's influence in 1914-20, it may seem logical to conclude that his departure was the major cause of the decline and fall of town planning in the 1920s. But the individual is rarely the sole mainspring of history, and to focus on the individual is to ignore the social forces at work around him.⁶⁶

It has not been the purpose of this article to present Reade as the sole mainspring of the town planning initiatives in South Australia over the years 1914-20: clearly such initiatives as took place here (and in the other Australian states) were part of a world-wide movement which was itself markedly influenced by the Great War. Moreover, there were active champions of town planning in South Australia before Reade arrived and after he left. Yet there can be little doubt that he was one of the most effective town planning missionaries in the world at this time, and that he had a remarkable power to inspire and direct others, not only by means of lantern slide lectures, illustrated articles and exhibition displays but also by spending long hours going through the details of proposed legislation with those likely to be affected by it. He was, moreover, widely respected as a scholar of his subject who was as concerned to research the career of Colonel Light and the history of Parkbelts in Australia and New Zealand⁶⁷ as he was to maintain an up to date knowledge of planning developments throughout the world by subscribing year after year to a London press cuttings agency.⁶⁸

It was not so much 'social forces' as constitutional structures inherited from an earlier, less democratic, age that determined the fate of the town planning movement in South Australia. It was a remarkable feat on Reade's part to convert first a Labor and then a Liberal Government to his views and to win the enormous tide of community support which he enjoyed at the end of 1919, but he could not change the plural voting arrangements of the Municipality of Adelaide, nor could he amend the constitution of the State which allowed a Legislative Council, basically elected on a property franchise, to defy a Liberal Government and a virtually unanimous House of Assembly in defence of the property and professional interests of a small minority of South Australians.

One can hardly blame Reade and his allies for losing heart when, after six years of campaigning and careful drafting, they saw their Bill returned from the Legislative Council minus 60 of its clauses and once again excepting the City of Adelaide from such scope as it had left. Their sense of futility is perfectly expressed in Barwell's weary interjection when John Gunn began yet another attack on landlordism: 'Don't go over that again. We have had all this before.'

Footnotes

1. *Proceedings of the First Australian Town Planning and Housing Conference and Exhibition. Adelaide (South Australia) October 17th to 24th, 1917* (Adelaide, 1918).
2. Fred Johns, *Who's Who in the Commonwealth of Australia* (Sydney, 1922).
3. Arthur Charles Fox-Davies, *Armorial Families. A Directory of Gentlemen of Coat-Armour*, 7th edn (London, 1929-30), Vol. 2, p. 1629.
4. Charles Reade, *The Revelation of Britain: A Book for Colonials* (Auckland, 1909), p. 14. Copy held in the State Library of New South Wales.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 60.
10. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 17 Nov. 1913. Report of the first exhibition of the Town Planning Association of Australia.
11. *The Revelation of Britain*, p. 79.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 80.
14. *Garden Cities and Town Planning Magazine*, Vol. 1, Sept. 1911, p. 183. Hence cited as GC&TPM. Set held by Fisher Library, University of Sydney.
15. Hugh Stretton, *Ideas for Australian Cities* (North Adelaide, 1970), pp. 94-5.
16. Denis Winston, *Sydney's Great Experiment: The Progress of the Cumberland County Plan* (Sydney, 1957), p. 26.
17. G. H. Scholefield, *A Dictionary of New Zealand Biography* (Wellington, 1940).
18. The campaign is referred to in an account of Reade's career in the *Adelaide Mail*, 4 Sept. 1920. See also cuttings in GRG 73/18/1, S.A. Archives. A tribute to Reade's 'untiring efforts' is recorded in the Minutes of GC&TP Assoc. of 4 July 1913.
19. GC&TPM, Vol. 3, July 1913, pp. 186-7. A similar visit to Letchworth Garden City in April 1913 is reported in the *Melbourne Age*, 27 May 1913. One of the visitors on this earlier occasion was W. A. Holman who would shortly become Premier of N.S.W.
20. GC&TPM, Vol. 3, Nov. 1913, p. 287.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 288.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, Nov. 1912, pp. 255-7; Vol. 4, Jan. 1914, pp. 17-21.
24. *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, Dec. 1912, pp. 271-82.
25. *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, Aug. 1913, pp. 214-15.
26. *Ibid.*, Vol. 4, Aug. 1914, editorial.
27. *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, Nov. 1914, p. 242.
28. F. S. Henry, in his MS 'The Garden Suburb', mistakenly gives the year as 1915, an error taken over by J. B. Hirst in *Adelaide and the Country, 1870-1917* (Melbourne, 1973), p. 61.
29. *Register*, 6 Oct. 1914.
30. J. J. Pascoe (ed.), *History of Adelaide and Vicinity* (Adelaide, 1901), p. 411.
31. *Town Planning Review*, April 1912. Barracks were built the following year just beyond Adelaide's South Park Lands in the suburb of Keswick where they still stand.

32. City of Adelaide Annual Reports, held in the Town Hall. Striking corroboration of Reade's claims may be found in the 1940 Reports of the Building Act Enquiry Committee (*Parl. Papers*, S.A., 1940, Nos. 30, 32 & 34), especially in the many photographs reproduced in the second Report.
33. *Advertiser*, 9 Oct. 1914.
34. *Critic*, 30 Sept. 1914. This well-illustrated journal was primarily concerned with the theatre, literature and the arts. Its readership would have been relatively well to do.
35. *Ibid.*, 7 Oct. 1914.
36. Canon Hornabrook's paper was read in his absence and printed in the Report of the Conference. Hornabrook had trained as an architect before taking Holy Orders. See obituary by F. Slaney Poole, *Advertiser*, 29 Sept. 1922.
37. A *Register* editorial of 26 Sept. 1922, commenting on his untimely death, refers to Hornabrook's well-known interest in 'the improvement of housing conditions for manual labourers and their dependants....'
38. *Register*, 8 Oct. 1914.
39. *Ibid.*, 9 Oct. 1914.
40. *Advertiser*, 10 Oct. 1914.
41. *Daily Herald*, 10 Oct. 1914.
42. *Ibid.*, 12 Sept. 1916.
43. *Register*, 12 Sept. 1916.
44. Properties owned by members of the 1916 City Council are recorded in the electoral rolls. I am grateful to Messrs Ian Radbone, Peter Crush and David Porteous for supplying me with relevant details.
45. Report of an interview with Miss Annie Hornabrook of the School For Mothers, Wright St, Adelaide, *Register*, 17 Sept. 1913. The School later evolved into the Mothers and Babies Health Association. Miss Hornabrook was a sister of Canon C. S. Hornabrook (see note 36 above).
46. *Advertiser*, 14 Sept. 1916.
47. *Ibid.*, 4 Nov. 1916.
48. *Mail*, 3 Nov. 1917.
49. *Register*, 17 Aug. 1918.
50. B. F. G. Apps, *Children's Playgrounds* (Dept of Health, Canberra, 1945), p. 80. Apps knew of no other playground in Australia constructed in this way.
51. S.A. Archives, GRG 73/19 a.
52. Report of the General Purposes Committee of the City of Adelaide, 19 Dec. 1917; *Advertiser*, 23 Sept. 1919.
53. City of Adelaide. Report of Markets & Parks Committee of 16 Sept. 1918; Minutes of City Council Meetings on 3 Nov. 1919 and 28 Sept. 1925.
54. *Proceedings of the Second Australian Town Planning and Housing Conference and Exhibition*, Brisbane, South Australian Section. Reade's paper was also issued separately as a pamphlet.
55. *Daily Herald*, 14 Nov. 1917.
56. Bill No. 38 of 1919.
57. Answers by Reade to Questions 52 and 53 in Report of a Select Committee of the Legislative Council on the Town Planning and Development Bill 1920, *Parl. Papers*, S.A., 1920, No. 69.
58. *Parl. Papers*, S.A., 1919, No. 63.
59. *Parl. Debates*, S.A., 1919, p. 979.
60. Petition No. 29, requesting amendment of the Bill, was presented on 29 September 1920; Petition No. 31, to which was attached the printed Urgent Memorial, on 20 October. Petition No. 31 was actually signed by H. W. Uffindell as Chairman of the South Australian Town Planning and Housing Association; W. H. Langham as Mayor of the City of Unley; J. A. Harper as Chairman of the District Council of Burnside; A. Fearby as Representative of the Returned Sailors and Soldiers Imperial League, South Australian Branch; and Harry Watson as Chairman of the Conference of Metropolitan Corporations and District Councils dealing with Town Planning and Building legislation.
61. See Charles C. Reade, 'Town Planning Legislation in South Australia — A Retrospect', *Town Planning Review*, Vol. 9, No. 3, Dec. 1921, pp. 157-61.

62. Reade's acceptance of the temporary position in Malaya was announced by the *Mail* of 4 September 1920 under the heading 'A Princely Offer.' The Acting Government Town Planner in South Australia during Reade's absence was W. J. Earle, a returned soldier with excellent formal qualifications as a Civil Engineer, Surveyor, Architect and Town Planner. See Dept of Lands & Survey, Docket 8214/1921.
63. I am indebted to Commissioner Strom Buttrose for making available a copy of Reade's letter which was sent to her grandmother, Mrs E. W. Van Senden, a Brighton neighbour of the Reades. The letter is dated 5 Jan. 1921.
64. Glimpses of Reade's later career can be found in issues of the *Garden Cities and Town Planning Magazine* and in obituary notices in *The Times* (London), 30 October 1933, and the *Cape Times* (Cape Town) of the same date. Hopefully, thorough studies of his later career will be written by those with access to the relevant primary sources.
65. See S.A. Archives, GRG 73.
66. Leonie Sandercock, *Cities for Sale: Property, Politics and Urban Planning in Australia* (Melbourne, 1975), p. 47. Readers wishing to obtain a wider view of the Australian town planning movement and detailed critical assessments of planning legislation are recommended to consult this book, which appeared after research for the present article was largely completed.
67. See report of a lecture by Reade to the Institute of Civil Engineers in London on 'Parkbelts in Australia and New Zealand: The Example of Pioneer Town-Planners', *GC&TPM*, Vol. 16, No. 1, Jan. 1926, pp. 8-11. In a letter to A. Grenfell Price dated 'Kuala Lumpur, 3 December 1926', Reade refers to his personal study of Light's town planning ideas when he was in Adelaide, in the course of which he had had long discussions with his friend B. S. Roach of the Education Department and the late Tom Gill. S.A. Archives, A732 (B2).
68. Three thick cuttings books in the S.A. Archives (GRG 73/18/1-3) appear to have been compiled largely by Reade and then left behind when he went to Malaya. The earliest dates from 1912.

R. G. CASEY'S CONTRIBUTION TO AUSTRALIAN WAR POLICY, 1939 TO 1942: SOME MYTHS *

CARL BRIDGE

R. G. Casey's contribution to Australian war policy, 1939 to 1942, is obscured by a number of old but pervasive myths¹ associated with the first Menzies government. He was not directly concerned with the 'Pig Iron Bob' and 'Brisbane Line' myths, both of which are very well-known, but many people will be familiar with these others.

1. The Menzies government despatched Australian troops to the European war in January 1940 out of loyalty to Britain with insufficient regard for the risk they ran in exposing Australia to Japanese attack.
2. In March 1940 Menzies appointed Casey as Australia's first minister to Washington for selfish reasons; that is, to remove a rival.
3. The Menzies government believed foolishly in the invulnerability of the Singapore Naval Base and the British promise to send a fleet there to parry any Japanese southward thrust.
4. The Curtin government in December 1941 made a new and radical departure in policy when it announced that Australia would 'look to America' to protect her in the Pacific 'free of any pangs as to our traditional links ... with the United Kingdom.'
5. Churchill and Roosevelt decided in secret well before Pearl Harbor, and without informing the Australian government, upon a policy of 'Beat Hitler First' and of 'defensive war' in the Pacific. Casey, in Washington, did not discover this. Hence Curtin's Minister for External Affairs, H. V. Evatt, was flabbergasted to learn of it in London as late as May 1942.

In general all of these myths (which probably have their origins in Labor election propaganda for the 1943 election)² show the conservative Menzies government putting British interests before Australia, fighting among themselves, and failing to woo the United States as a potential ally. Most myths have a basis in reality; these ones have very little and are largely misleading.

It is my purpose in this paper to review some of my detailed research on the career of Richard Gardiner (later Lord) Casey in the early years of the second world war and in so doing overturn the myths. Casey's contribution to Australian war policy was fundamental. He served first as Minister for Supply, going to London from October to December 1939 to assess Australia's potential contribution to the European war, not only in war materials, munitions and weaponry, but also in men. That is, he had to advise whether Australian troops should go to the western

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front. In March 1940 Casey arrived in Washington, as Australia's first minister there, to help persuade the American government to assist the British Empire war effort in Europe and to check potential Japanese aggression in the Pacific. In March 1942, after the Americans had entered both wars, Casey left Washington to become British Minister Resident in the Middle East, and incidentally, the only Australian to serve as a member of the British war cabinet in his own right.

Casey's Background

Born in 1890, in Brisbane, Casey was the son of Richard Gardiner Casey (senior) who owned substantial pastoral properties in Victoria and Western Queensland, had interests in Mount Morgan Mines, and was a Queensland M.L.A.³ After Melbourne Grammar, Casey attended Melbourne University for two years, then took an engineering degree at Cambridge. He graduated in 1913, spent about a year in the family businesses, then enlisted in the A.I.F. in September 1914. He made his mark as an assistant to General Bridges at ANZAC, won a D.S.O. in France in 1917, and rose to the rank of General Staff Officer.

The war gave Casey a taste for public service and diplomacy and in 1924 he competed for and won the new and coveted position as Australian Liaison Officer in the British cabinet secretariat — Prime Minister Stanley Melbourne Bruce's 'eyes and ears' in Whitehall. There he became familiar with the Singapore strategy and blue water thinking of the Committee of Imperial Defence.⁴

After continuing in London briefly under Scullin, Casey returned to Australia in 1931 and entered federal politics as U.A.P. member for Corio. His promotion was rapid. In 1933 he was appointed Assistant Treasurer, in 1935 Treasurer, and in 1939 Minister for Supply and Development with the task of preparing the country for war. He was Lyons' favourite as successor, but in April 1939, when Lyons died, Casey stepped aside publicly and advocated Bruce's return to head the government. When Bruce refused Menzies was able to win the leadership much to the disapproval of Earle Page and some of the Country Party who favoured Casey.⁵ Casey coveted the U.A.P. leadership and the prime ministership at least for the next three years.⁶

Casey's gifts were that he was a good listener, a loyal assistant, well-travelled and read, and an officer and a gentleman in the old sense of those words. His critics accused him of vanity and a lack of personal political determination, which came perhaps from his rise to the top via cultivating patrons (like Bruce and Lyons) rather than engaging deeply in the hurly burly of politics. He sometimes exhibited too a certain narrowness of vision; a desire to carry out orders well, as a good staff officer and diplomat should, rather than to initiate new policy.⁷

Casey's Mission to London, October to December 1939

Although Britain's declaration of war on Germany in September 1939 put Australia automatically at war too, it took until the early months of 1940 to settle the details of Australia's actual participation in the distant European war. The main reason for this long delay was not organisational; it rested upon a strategic dilemma. The much vaunted Singapore naval base was completed in 1938, but Britain had no spare capital ships to station there. The problem was that she needed all her strength to counter potential threats in the Atlantic and Mediterranean; this

assuming that the U.S.A. was neutral and that Russia and Italy were potential enemies. At a pinch, Britain might have spared a small force of, say, four capital ships, but these would only be sent to Singapore if there were a real need, and it would take at least ninety days. Japan, the likely enemy, had nine capital ships and overwhelming air superiority. She was waging a war in China and threatening British interests in the Far East. Given this situation, the Australian government was reluctant to send forces west of Singapore without more explicit guarantees about Japanese friendliness and capital ships for Singapore.⁸

At the outbreak of war Britain bought the Australian wool clip for the duration of hostilities, signed favourable meat, sugar, dairy and metal agreements, and anticipated a wheat deal, though she could not buy it all as there was a world-wide glut. It was also requested that 180 Beaufort bombers be made in Australia, various munitions supplied, and that a person of cabinet rank proceed to London for talks over other supply and strategic matters.⁹

On 17 October, Casey left for London. His instructions were that he was to acquaint the British government with Australian strategic thinking, negotiate matters of supply, and solicit from the Committee of Imperial Defence an appreciation of the likely threats to Australia and the defence requirements to counter them.¹⁰

In London Casey lost no time in seeing the Committee of Imperial Defence and in briefing Churchill at the Admiralty over the Singapore guarantee. If Britain wanted one or two Australian divisions in Europe, she would need to assure the Australian government that the British embassy in Japan were certain of Japanese goodwill, or at least neutrality, and not at all likely to move south, and to reaffirm the British pledge to send a substantial force of capital ships to Singapore should this situation deteriorate.¹¹ Before he received a reply, Casey learnt that the Germans had a possible 160 divisions massed along the French and Belgian borders with only 114 French and 5 British divisions to counter them. Australia's division would be more than useful.¹²

After two weeks of constant badgering, Casey had his two replies. The danger from Japan was adjudged 'remote' and in hand diplomatically. If the Japanese moved south the fleet would abandon the Mediterranean and proceed 'to relief of Singapore and Australia'.¹³ On 23 November Casey cabled Menzies:

I believe the greatest menace to Australia is the possibility of Britain being beaten in Europe.... I think the British Government's statements regarding ensuring the safety of Australia and of Singapore are satisfactory.... [T]he wisest conclusion ... is to send special division at the earliest.¹⁴

Casey's logic was that regardless of all else the Pacific defence situation depended upon the survival of Britain and her fleet, thus by defending Britain the Australian division would be indirectly defending Australia. The Australian government, however, still tarried a little. Menzies was suspicious that Britain could find ships for Australian troops but not her wheat. But this was soon sorted out and it was decided to despatch one division (the 6th) to the Middle East in January. The 7th division, which was being raised, would be earmarked for the time being for Australian defence.¹⁵

It is nonsense then, to say that Australian troops were sent to Europe out of loyalty to Britain regardless of threats to Australia and that the Singapore promise

was swallowed without question. Casey in London, and the cabinet in Australia, appraised the situation as best they could and despatched troops in Australia's ultimate interests and only after explicit guarantees about Japanese and British intentions. Even then, they kept the 7th division up their sleeve, the five Australian destroyers in the Mediterranean were to come home as soon as any threat materialised, and so too would Australian troops and airmen.¹⁶

The Decision to Send Casey to Washington

It has often been said that Menzies appointed Casey as Australia's first minister to Washington in February 1940 in order to remove a possible rival from the domestic political stage.¹⁷ In later life Menzies was much irked by this story. His most candid refutation of it comes in a posthumously published interview with Sydney journalist David McNicoll. In Menzies' words,

If ever a man had his tongue hanging out to be sent to America it was Casey. But Casey of course is a very selfish fellow. I have no respect for Dick. None whatever. When I was leaving England in '41 — having been there and having seen a lot of Winston [Churchill] I went to say goodbye to him and he said, 'Why did you get rid of Casey, was it because you, like the Turk, want no brother near the throne?' I said, 'Sorry Winston, pull yourself together. If ever a man wanted this post, it was Casey....'

He went on to say that Casey had planted the false idea in Churchill's head.¹⁸

Menzies' account has a germ of truth, though it creates quite a false impression. While on his mission to London, Casey discussed the Washington post with Bruce, High Commissioner in London and the man to whom Menzies had first offered the Washington job. It was only after Bruce had refused that Menzies had thought of Casey.¹⁹ Casey's explanation of his position to his old patron and confidant shows



Turks around the throne. The first meeting of the Australian War Cabinet, 27 September 1939. L to R: George McLeay, Sir Henry Gullett, R. G. Casey, R. G. Menzies, G. A. Street, and F. G. Sheddon (secretary).

that Casey did, indeed, aspire to the throne. He said he 'was by no means decided in his own mind that he would go to America' as his 'departure from the political arena would leave no alternative if the Prime Minister, Menzies, came to grief.'²⁰ But was Menzies in trouble and anxious to remove Casey?

A few days before Casey's talk with Bruce, Casey had received a troubled cable from his Prime Minister:

... we have some newspaper critics — notably Murdoch — while Page and Cameron are conducting [a] specially poisonous public campaign. Result is I may be challenged when [the] House meets....²¹

The full import of this message becomes clear when it is remembered that Page and Cameron led the Country Party, Menzies had refused to have Country Party men in his cabinet, Menzies depended upon Country Party support for his majority, and Casey had been the Country Party's preferred leader over Menzies in the leadership struggle after Lyons' death. At the same time Menzies pressed Casey,

we are in grave difficulties in the House ... Labor has challenged us and there is much Country Party and Corner support for the challenge. I have indicated that we will not give way, and unless something is done we will be defeated next week. Only way out may be to take several Country Party members into Cabinet. Would be glad to know definitely if I can consider this an assumption that after your return you will take up Washington appointment. Reply Urgent.²²

Casey would not be drawn. He replied 'my judgement is that I could render more valuable service in Australia.'²³ At this critical moment Casey did not wish to lessen Menzies' problem or remove himself from leadership contention.

The crisis Menzies faced was over two issues: soldiers' pay and wheat. He acted quickly to defuse the first by increasing militia pay from 5/- to 8/- a day.²⁴ The second was more difficult. The 1938/9 wheat harvest was an Australian record — 210 million bushels. One hundred and ninety five million bushels of this had to be bought by the Government's newly-created Wheat Board. They had offered 1/9d a bushel immediately, plus a shilling extra in February, which was below production cost. The Country Party demanded 2/6d first payment. On 29 November Menzies overcame the crisis by agreeing to buy it at 2/10½d a bushel.²⁵ He bought political survival as well.

Casey, who returned from London in mid-December, found that his moment had passed. Only then did he agree to go to Washington. In March the Country Party entered cabinet filling vacancies created in part by Casey's departure. It is an interesting postscript that in October 1941, when Menzies did fall, Casey tried hard but unsuccessfully to return to Australia.²⁶ One wonders if a Casey ministry might have resulted, and, if so, whether it would have lasted any longer than Fadden's did.

What of the myth? It is certainly true that Menzies removed a rival when he sent Casey to Washington. However, as we have seen, Casey had already been defeated and Menzies no longer had the compelling reason to remove him that he had had a month earlier. Casey, moreover, was now quite happy to go. Menzies' final motive in making the appointment, therefore, was that Casey was the best man for the job, though his original motives had had more than a little self-interest in them. Anyway, Casey was to do very well in Washington.

Casey in Washington

When he arrived in Washington in March 1940 to open Australia's first legation there Casey had two important tasks. Firstly he had to put Australia on the map for Americans. Secondly he had to do his best to encourage the American government, at this time isolationist and neutral, to take a more active role in world politics by helping Britain fight Hitler, and by assuming a share in the defence of British and Dutch territory in the Far East, South-East Asia and the Western Pacific. In 1937 and 1939 first Lyons, and then Bruce, had failed to elicit a guarantee from President Roosevelt that the American government would act to preserve peace in the Pacific, which was a polite way of asking for assistance should the Japanese move south.²⁷

Casey succeeded brilliantly in his role as propagandist. His dashing double-breasted suits and clipped moustache made him quite photogenic and earned him the title 'The Anthony Eden of Australia'; his habit of flying his private aeroplane — a Fairchild 24 — to engagements across the country led to his being dubbed 'The Flying Diplomat'.²⁸ He gave tens of speeches all over the United States, each with the message that Australians were freedom-loving, pioneering folk like the Americans, deserving of help. Australia was not a colony of Britain's, but a partner in the Commonwealth. So successful was he that the British Foreign Office recommended Casey's speeches as the ideal model for use by all their speakers.²⁹

The other task proved more intractable. Roosevelt was coming up for re-election in November 1940 and he was determined to preserve a neutral stance at least till then. Hence in July 1940 Britain was forced to appease the Japanese in China by closing the Burma Road for three months because the Americans would not support them in stronger action. The situation darkened further in September 1940 when the Japanese, Germans and Italians signed the Tripartite Non-Aggression Pact. But there were also some good signs. In July 1940 the United States placed a restriction on the export of strategic materials to Japan, and in September, the United States offered Britain 50 destroyers in exchange for naval bases in the West Indies.

We know now that collaboration had begun at a much more secret level, as well. In August 1940 the brilliant American code-breaker William Friedman cracked the supposedly unbreakable Japanese naval and diplomatic codes — codes Red and Purple which yielded Magic in American terminology. Earlier in 1940 the British had broken the German Enigma cypher — code-named Ultra. In October 1940 top-secret liaison meetings were held in London where these secrets were exchanged.³⁰ If the Japanese decided to strike south these cypher breakthroughs would give the British and Americans an excellent idea of when it was to be.

After the elections Roosevelt moved publicly to indicate his growing support for the British cause. In December plans were made for American cruisers to visit the east coast of Australia; a diplomatic triumph for Casey as it indicated American interest in Australia to the Japanese. In February 1941 the lend-lease scheme started.

At a secret level British and American service chiefs met in Washington to discuss grand strategy should the United States enter the European war and should a Pacific War break out as a result of Japanese aggression southwards. At these talks, at which we now know Australia had observers,³¹ it was decided that a 'Beat Hitler First' strategy would be adopted and a 'holding war' fought in the Pacific. Hong

Kong would fall, but it was hoped Singapore and the Philippines would be held. The British failed to get an American assurance that American ships would move from Pearl Harbor to Manila or Singapore to deter the Japanese.³² These plans were made in the full knowledge — obtained through Magic intercepts — that Japanese plans did not include the conquest of Australia.³³ This policy, reaffirmed in December 1941 and January 1942, remained Allied policy throughout the war.³⁴

In May 1942, Evatt denied knowledge of 'Beat Hitler First'.³⁵ This implied that Casey, whom Evatt had earlier labelled a 'swine' in a talk reported by a high American official, had not discovered it.³⁶ Why should Evatt have been so dishonest? Most likely he was engaging in a political move designed to achieve his immediate purpose at the time which was to embarrass Britain and the United States into earmarking more supplies for the Pacific theatre. Sir Paul Hasluck has commented recently on Evatt's cast of mind which was to look for a 'good issue on which to have a fight' rather than examine the full logic of the evidence in any given situation.³⁷ In any case, all the evidence shows that Casey did his job in 1941.

As 1941 went on, the British and Americans kept Casey, and through him the Australian government, fully informed of developments.

In early August, after the Japanese had moved through Indo-China with Vichy French approval and threatened Thailand, Casey and Lord Halifax (British Ambassador in Washington) pressed Sumner Welles (United States Under-Secretary of State) for a guarantee that the Americans would act if Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies were attacked. Welles for the first time revealed a chink in the armour of American neutrality. If Japan moves into Thailand, he said, 'sooner or later [the] Japanese Government would find themselves at war with America'.³⁸

In the first volume of his war history, Hasluck accused Casey and Evatt, who became Minister of External Affairs in October 1941, of 'irrelevant' diplomacy in November and December 1941.³⁹ This was because they were still seeking United States guarantees against Japan and still trying to appease Japan by offering that should Australia step in as an intermediary in the talks between the United States and Japan, when the British and Americans knew (through code-breaking) that Japanese troops were on the move for strikes southwards on 7 December. This is selling Casey and Evatt short. In fact they had the decyphered information from the Americans and were acting with it in mind.⁴⁰ Given this, Casey and Evatt's offer in early December to act as an intermediary was most likely designed to emphasise to the United States that they had not as yet guaranteed British and Dutch territory. It is significant that Roosevelt did this next day — before Pearl Harbor.⁴¹ Australia's diplomacy was not carried out in the dark at all.

Labor Prime Minister John Curtin's famous 'Australia looks to America' message of 27 December 1941 was not a signal for a larger-scale shift in Australian diplomacy as has often been supposed.⁴² Casey's whole mission in the United States, as indeed that of Lords Lothian and Halifax for Britain, had been based on a 'look to America' since 1939. Roosevelt's guarantee of 1 December 1941 marked the culmination of that policy. Curtin's statement angered Roosevelt and Churchill and embarrassed Casey not because it was a radical departure from previous policy with respect to the United States but because it implied unfairly that Britain had forsaken Australia.⁴³ This implication was counter-productive as for the Americans negotiations with Australia were seen as intimately related to those with

Britain. The source of Curtin's rudeness was the shock suffered over the sinking of the two British capital ships, *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, off Malaya by Japanese air attack on 10 December: in one blow the 'fleet to Singapore' was on the bottom of the South China Sea. But was this Churchill or Menzies or Casey or Bruce's fault?

Recent research on this episode has questioned the earlier orthodoxy that the fleet was totally inadequate, a token effort. It is now evident that had Sir Tom Phillips, the British admiral in charge of the *Prince of Wales* mission, called upon air cover earlier than he did and managed his ships slightly differently, and had the British aircraft carrier *Indomitable* not run aground in the West Indies on her way to Singapore, then the 'fleet to Singapore' strategy might well have worked.⁴⁴ Churchill's decision to send the *Prince of Wales*, *Repulse* and *Indomitable* was not the *folie de grandeur* it later seemed.

Curtin's December outburst is excusable in the heat of the moment, but it must not be allowed to cloud our judgement, which must be that the success of Casey and Halifax's diplomacy in the United States before Pearl Harbor made the 'look to America' a *fait accompli*.

In March 1942 Casey decided to accept an invitation from Churchill to resign his Washington post and become British Minister Resident in the Middle East. His decision was prompted by three considerations. First, and most important, was a conviction that his Washington mission was complete now the United States was in both wars. The second was a desire to get closer to the fighting, and especially the Middle East where there were Australian troops. Third was his difficulty in working with Evatt which came to a head when Evatt visited Washington in March and virtually ignored Casey.⁴⁵ Evatt harboured an unjustified suspicion of Casey as pro-British and, therefore, somehow unAustralian. It is a great pity that this was so, as both men served Australia to the best of their capacity during the war.



Out in the cold. L to R: Evatt, Sumner Welles and Casey, Washington, March 1942.

Conclusions

Political myths die hard. Perhaps it was a sub-conscious need to find scapegoats for the Singapore and Pearl Harbor tragedies which led to the making of these myths; or maybe it was a cynical political opportunism on the part of Australia's Labor leaders in 1942 and 1943. Whatever the cause, it is wrong to believe that the Menzies government and its emissary and diplomat, R. G. Casey, committed Australian troops to Europe in early 1940 thoughtlessly, or believed in the Singapore strategy foolishly; that Menzies appointed Casey to Washington for selfish motives alone; that Casey failed to report the 'Beat Hitler First' policy; or that Curtin's 'look to America' in December 1941 was a radical step. It may not accord with our national persecution complex to think of Casey, Menzies, Bruce and Churchill acting sincerely in Australia's and Britain's mutual interest, but it is true. Co-operation in adversity rather than high-handedness and suspicion was more characteristic of Anglo-Australian relations with the United States and with each other from 1939 to 1941. R. G. Casey's frank and gentlemanly diplomacy worked; and the historical record is bearing this out.

Footnotes

1. These myths in strong and weak forms still occur in many of the general history books, e.g. Tony Griffiths, *Contemporary Australia* (London, 1977), ch. 1; Eric Andrews, *A History of Australian Foreign Policy* (Melbourne, 1979), ch. 5; Russel Ward, *A Nation for a Continent* (Melbourne, 1977), ch. 8. The standard specialist works — Paul Hasluck, *The Government and the People, 1939-41* (Sydney, 1952) and Alan Watt, *Australian Foreign Policy, 1939-65* (Cambridge, 1967) — are much more judicious, as indeed are the more recent monographs, John McCarthy, *Australia and Imperial Defence, 1918-39* (Brisbane, 1976) and Roger Bell, *Unequal Allies: Australian-American Relations in the Pacific War* (Melbourne, 1978).
2. See e.g. Alan Chester's hagiographic account, *John Curtin* (Sydney, April 1943), which was timed for the election. Lloyd Ross, *John Curtin* (Melbourne, 1977), pp. 323-9.
3. Casey tells his family history in *Australian Father and Son* (London, 1966).
4. See *My Dear P.M.: R. G. Casey's Letters to S. M. Bruce, 1924-29* (ed. W. J. Hudson and Jane North) soon to be published by the Australian Government Publishing Service.
5. The best account is still G. Fairbanks, 'Menzies Becomes Prime Minister, 1939', *Australian Quarterly*, 40, 2 (1968), pp. 245-55.
6. S. M. Bruce's Notes of talks with Anthony Eden, 7 Nov. 1939, and Casey, 8 Nov. 1939 and 11 Dec. 1942, Bruce Papers, CRS M100, item 3 and Dec. 1942, Australian Archives (hereafter AA), Canberra. Don Whitington, *Strive to be Fair* (Canberra, 1977), p. 79.
7. See e.g. Bruce's notes of a talk with Mr T. Hole (a Sydney journalist) on 19 Jan. 1940. 'I gathered he [Hole] liked Casey and thinks he is very competent on all detailed questions but lacks breadth of vision. If I am correct in this summing up of Hole's attitude it shows a certain shrewdness on his part.' Also Bruce's note of his talk with Casey, 11 Dec. 1942, Bruce Papers M100/5 and Dec. 1942.
8. 'Australian Co-operation in Empire Defence', War Cabinet Agendum, 26 Sept. 1939, CRS A2671/14/1939, AA. For 1939 naval strengths see J. N. Westwood, *Fighting Ships of World War II* (London, 1975), pp. 18-19.

9. Bruce to Prime Minister [PM], 19 Sept. 1939 [unless otherwise indicated all correspondence cited hereafter is by cable], Bruce Papers, M100/Sept. 1939, and Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs [SSDA] to PM, 21 Sept. 1939, CP 290/6/67, AA. For the commodities deals see S. J. Butlin, *War Economy, 1939-1942* (Canberra, 1955), ch. 3.
10. Menzies to Casey, 17 Oct. 1939, CP290/6/bundle 2.
11. Bruce's notes on a lunch attended by Casey, Eden (SSDA), Churchill (Admiralty), Hore Belisha (War) and Hankey (Cabinet secretary), 3 Nov. 1939, Bruce Papers, M100/3, Casey to PM, 5 Nov. 1939, CP 290/6/bundle 2.
12. Casey to PM, 5 Nov. 1939, *ibid.*
13. Casey to PM, 5 and 17 Nov. 1939, *ibid.*
14. Casey to PM, 23 Nov. 1939, *ibid.*
15. For the wheat factor see I. Hamill, 'An Expeditionary Force Mentality? The Despatch of Australian Troops to the Middle East, 1939-40', *Australian Outlook*, 31, 2 (1977), pp. 324-5.
16. See Menzies' statement, 29 Nov. 1939, *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates*, 162, pp. 1698-9.
17. E.g. Don Whitington, *The House Will Divide* (Melbourne, 1954), p. 72; R. Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 241.
18. D. McNicoll, *Luck's a Fortune* (Sydney, 1979), p. 219.
19. The decision can be followed in the cable exchanges between Bruce and Menzies, Sept.-Nov. 1939, Bruce Papers, M100/Sept., Oct., Nov., 1939.
20. Bruce's notes of a talk with Casey, 8 Nov. 1939, Bruce Papers, M100/3.
21. PM to Bruce, 27 Oct. 1939, *ibid.*, Oct. 1939.
22. PM to Casey, n.d., circa 1 Nov. 1939, CP 290/6/item 1.
23. Casey to Menzies, 1 Nov. 1939, *ibid.*
24. *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates*, 162, 16, 21 and 22 Nov. 1939.
25. *Ibid.*, 29 Nov. 1939.
26. Don Whitington, *Strive to be Fair*, p. 79.
27. These events can be followed in *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy* vol. I, 1937-8, and vol. II, 1939 (eds. R. G. Neale, P. G. Edwards, H. Kenway and H. Stokes).
28. *New York Times*, 25 Dec. 1939, p. 1; Alan Watt, *Australian Foreign Policy*, p. 33.
29. For the texts of some of Casey's speeches see file A981/Australia 221, AA. For the British reaction see FO 371/24239 of 1940 and FO 371/355 of 1941, Public Record Office, London.
30. The code-breaking story is well told in R. W. Clark, *The Man Who Broke Purple* (London, 1977), F. W. Winterbotham, *The Ultra Secret* (London, 1974), and R. Lewin, *Ultra Goes to War* (London, 1978).
31. Hasluck, *The Government and the People*, p. 353; Andrews, *Australian Foreign Policy*, p. 97; and Alan Watt, *Australian Diplomat* (Sydney, 1972), p. 39, all say Australia was not adequately informed of the decisions. In fact Sir Frederick Sheddell, Secretary to the Australian federal cabinet, took the verbatim report of the discussions with him from Washington to Canberra in April 1941 and war cabinet approved the conclusions of the report on 15 May 1941, see Casey to External Affairs, 17 March 1941, and Agendum 135/1941, Sheddell Papers, MP 1217/567, AA.
32. United States-British Staff Conversations Report, March 1941, Sheddell Papers, MP1217/567.
33. See R. Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Los Angeles, 1963), pp. 346-7. Ross, *Curtin*, pp. 227-8.
34. It seems that in December 1941-January 1942 Casey was not quite as well-informed about the Churchill-Roosevelt talks as he could have been. But there is no doubt that the Australian government knew the main lines of policy. In July and November 1941 Roosevelt had reaffirmed the decisions of the previous March and in December 1941 both Page, who was in London, and Eden (SSDA) informed Curtin that it was still 'Beat Hitler First' as did Churchill himself in January 1942, SSDA to PM, 18 July 1941, 25 Nov. 1941, 11 Dec. 1941, Page to PM, 21 Dec. 1941, Churchill to Curtin, 4 Jan. 1942, Sheddell Papers, MP1217/471/567, and 571.
35. Bell, *Unequal Allies*, p. 77.

36. See P. G. Edwards, *Australia Through American Eyes* (Brisbane, 1979), p. 69.
37. Hasluck, *Diplomatic Witness* (Melbourne, 1980), p. 29.
38. Welles' memorandum of a conversation with Casey and Halifax, 4 August 1941, cited Bell, *Unequal Allies*, p. 22. For Casey's version see Casey to External Affairs, 4 August 1941, A3300/98.
39. Hasluck, *The Government and the People*, pp. 545-6.
40. Casey to External Affairs, 23 Nov. 1941 and 5 Dec. 1941, A3300/100, and Casey to Chief of Naval Staff, 28 Nov. 1941 and SSDA to PM, 29 Nov. 1941, A816/304/431, AA. This was confirmed by Sir Alan Watt (Casey's First Secretary in Washington in 1941) in an interview with the author in Canberra, 25 May 1979. For a discussion of the general position regarding secret information see D. H. Wilde, 'Ultra and Magic in Australia'. *Flinders Journal of Politics and History*, 6(1980), pp. 53-9.
41. Casey to External Affairs, 1 Dec. 1941, PM to Casey, 2 Dec. 1941, A3300/100, AA.
42. For a useful discussion see P. G. Edwards, '1941: A Turning Point in Foreign Policy?', *Teaching History*, 9, 2(1975), pp. 18-26.
43. C. Thorne, *Allies of a Kind* (Oxford, 1978), ch. 9, esp. p. 257. Bell, *Unequal Allies*, pp. 47-8. Ross, *Curtin*, pp. 246-7.
44. M. Middlebrook and P. Mahoney, *Battleship: The Loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse* (London, 1977), passim.
45. Casey to PM, 23 March 1942, PREM3/305/2, Public Record Office, London. Lord Casey, *Personal Experience* (London, 1962), pp. 94-7. Watt, *Australian Diplomat*, pp. 44-52.

AT WAR WITH THE NATIVES: FROM THE COORONG TO THE RUFUS, 1841

ROBERT CLYNE

The punitive expedition led by Major T. S. O'Halloran, the first Police Commissioner of the South Australian Police Force,¹ against the Milmenrura natives of the Coorong in August 1840 established the response of the settler to outbreaks of Aboriginal violence against the European. Surprisingly it came at a time when the colonists were concerning themselves with the condition and treatment of the indigenous race. In the colonial press a great deal of coverage was given to this subject and the problems being encountered in dealing with the natives as equal British subjects in respect to the administration of justice, as well as bringing them to Christian civilisation. Within a few years of the official settlement of the colony, these difficulties had become known as the Aboriginal 'problem'.

The Coorong expedition in August 1840 had been successful in subduing troublesome natives who were regarded by the settlers to be outside the reach of ordinary British law. The lesson which O'Halloran imparted was that the European would not be trifled with. The expedition also succeeded in stimulating the fervent and bitter divisive debate among the settlers as to the proper treatment of the native race. It did little, however, to change the settlers' response to outbreaks of native violence against the European.

With a frontier expanding out from the settled districts around Adelaide, and parties of Europeans journeying overland to the colony from New South Wales, violence between settler and native became inevitable. The inevitability of this violence came from the determination of the insecure settler population to establish their pastoral interests in the country. Scant regard was paid to the displacement of the natives during this exercise, or to the over-turn of their traditional food gathering life-style and respect for their customs. The overland parties further aggravated these problems by demanding the use of native women to gratify their sexual needs, ignoring reciprocity agreements yet tantalising the natives with a ready supply of food in the large numbers of livestock which they brought with them. As the number of overland parties increased, the relations between native and European deteriorated to such an extent that what would be best described as open warfare between the two erupted.

The potential for violence between European and Aboriginal in Australia had long been foreshadowed. It was hoped that in South Australia, a colony established on such high ideals and settled by selected British emigrants, model race relations would be established and its history remain unsullied by deeds of violence

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against the indigenous race. However, except perhaps by degree, the South Australian experience was to be little different to that of the other Australian colonies. Not only did violence exist between black and white in South Australia, but manifested itself in a series of expeditions which were launched either by, or on behalf of the colonists against the natives. These confrontations were, in the main, punitive police expeditions, sanctioned or authorised by the colonial government. They were, moreover, deliberately provocative, and from 1840 to the end of 1841, and into 1842, the settlers were at war with those natives whom they considered to be outside the reach of ordinary law.

O'Halloran is a dominant personality during this period. With his military background, he was more familiar with the military nature of an armed and disciplined contingent of men, and he frequently displayed an inability to appreciate the civil function of the police department. It would appear from his subsequent actions as Commissioner of Police that he was a frustrated soldier. The expeditions which he either led, organised or proposed, were military campaigns against a known enemy. Martial belligerency during his administration of the police force was often tempered or disguised, but was nevertheless apparent in his dealings with troublesome natives. O'Halloran's deputy, Alexander Tolmer, who was himself to become Commissioner of Police, shared similar views, during this period at least.

The sense of war prevalent in the colony during 1840-42 was the result of a number of contributing factors. Dominant among these was the settlers' own feelings of insecurity. Settler insecurity had first focussed upon the presence of supposed illegitimates² in the colony. Fear of the illegitimate was the justification for establishing a police force in 1838 and which had quickly led to a cordon of police stations to protect the Adelaide populace. However, as the colony grew and the threat from the illegitimate abated, the settlers soon drew focus upon the more obvious, although often less substantiated, evidence of native crime and violence.

It was always the difficult duty of the police department to first allay the settlers' fears from whatever quarter they might arise, and then convince them to place their confidence in the police force. But for this to be done the police needed to show a proven capability that they could deal effectively with *all* criminal activity, as well as afford the colonists with adequate 'protection'. While O'Halloran had been successful in subduing the Coorong natives, settlers away from Adelaide who were either without police protection or without confidence in the police force evinced a strong determination that they were prepared to take matters into their own hands when dealing with instances of native lawlessness. Hence the dilemma for the police and colonial government.


In the period under review, there were five different expeditions which were either launched by or on behalf of the colonists against the natives.

1. January 1841 — The Alford expedition to the Hutt and Wakefield Rivers.
2. April 1841 — The O'Halloran expedition to the Murray River.
3. May 1841 — The private volunteer expedition to the Rufus River.
4. May 1841 — The O'Halloran-Moorhouse expedition to the Rufus River.
5. July 1841 — The Moorhouse-Shaw expedition to the Rufus River.


To curb 'troublesome natives', four of these expeditions were despatched to a destination which was outside the colony itself. When action was taken against the

natives near the Rufus River and Lake Victoria in New South Wales, it was done so without reference to territorial and jurisdictional niceties. These excursions by armed contingents of South Australian settlers and police into the colony of New South Wales were inherently illegal.

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Major Thomas Shuldham O'Halloran C.M.G., Commissioner of Police 1840-43.



Captain Alexander Tolmer, Inspector of Mounted Police under O'Halloran and later Commissioner of Police 1852-53.



Alexander Tolmer

Principal land-holders who established their pastoral interests in the sparsely settled districts away from Adelaide were frequently able to exert sufficient pressure on the colonial government to request, and receive, police protection from troublesome natives. To prevent the settlers from taking the law into their own hands, it was obviously important that they should develop confidence in the police to deal with native 'lawlessness'. Of major concern to the pastoralists was the native habit of burning the grass, pilfering supplies and spearing livestock. To help defray costs to the police department, they were willing to provide the visiting police with rations and accommodation.

The police department did not at this time have sufficient strength to establish permanent out-posts on individual properties on request. The earliest evidence of this practice appears in September 1840 when O'Halloran ordered one sergeant and three mounted constables to visit the properties of Gleeson and Morphett in the mid-north of the colony.³ Gleeson's property was situated on the Hutt River and Morphett's on the Wakefield. These locations are near the present day sites of Clare and Auburn respectively. The police party was sent to investigate reports that natives had been spearing sheep and cattle.

The results of the police expedition of September 1840, barely a month after O'Halloran's punitive excursion to the Coorong, are not known. It would appear that the police were not successful in subduing the natives around the two properties, for a few months later in January 1841 O'Halloran despatched another police party to the same district. This time, however, the sergeant in charge, Alford, received specific official instructions from his Commissioner which detailed the police role and purpose for the visit. These instructions stated that the principal duty of the police party was

by strict vigilance to prevent the Natives from injuring the Sheep or Cattle ... but if they become troublesome and commit depredations in the presence of yourself or party in that case they must be made prisoners if possible, but with as little violence as may be. Should any of the party be attacked and therefore endangered they will of course in Self Defence repel force by force. It is very important that any natives detected in Killing or Spearing Sheep should be secured in which case they must be carefully guarded and allowed no chance of escape. Such prisoners to be immediately brought into Town for Trial accompanied by the proper Witnesses. A prisoner escaping must not be fired upon, but whilst in custody should he offer violent resistance and endeavour by desperate means to release himself in that case the party must repel force by force even to the measures of Extremity.⁴

This was only the second occasion that a police party had been sent to provide 'police protection' for isolated settlers against reported acts of native lawlessness. It was the first time that O'Halloran as Police Commissioner had issued specific instructions which detailed both the role and duties of the police on such an undertaking. Alford's expedition was the first major police exercise against the natives since O'Halloran's expedition to the Coorong the previous year. The instructions which Alford received need careful examination.

Alford's expedition was far more than a simple exercise in preventative policing. Its objective was two-fold. First, it was to win the confidence of the settlers, convincing them that the police was the proper agency for dealing with native lawlessness. Second, to achieve the purpose of the first, it was provocative, for its intent was to force a confrontation with the natives which would then enable

positive police action to be taken as set out in the instructions. Settler confidence would be won and the natives subdued. It is difficult to believe, as no matter how ignorant the natives might have been of the European, that they would readily commit so-called depredations in the presence of an armed contingent of mounted uniform police. Alford's instructions were a licence to take firm measures to win settler confidence.

The expedition then was more martial than civil. If successful, the natives around the Hutt and Wakefield Rivers would learn a series of important lessons relative to the power of the white man and his civilisation. The principal lesson was the same as that which O'Halloran had ruthlessly instilled upon the Milmenrura people: the white man would not be trifled with.

The departure of Alford's police party from Adelaide was unheralded in the colonial press. The Protector of Aborigines, as was the case in the Coorong expedition, was not included. Nor was a native interpreter. Their exclusion, whether deliberate or unintentional, adds further weight to the belief that the purpose of the exercise was provocative. Considerations for the establishment of friendly relations between black and white appear of little importance.

The result of the expedition is not known. That there are no existing reports available relative to this expedition, particularly police reports, and that the press made no mention of events as well indicates that perhaps the police party did not succeed in either provoking a confrontation with the natives, or in apprehending any native suspects. Dr Matthew Moorhouse, the Protector of Aborigines, visited this district in October to meet with the Aboriginal inhabitants and inspect the Special Surveys. He records no adverse comments on the police or complaints from the natives.⁵ Settler confidence in the police force had still to be won.

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In the criminal sessions of the Supreme Court held in Adelaide during March 1841, it became evident that crime in the colony was steadily increasing. So too was the population, but of alarm and concern to the colonists was the observation passed by the presiding judge. He commented that he was unable to impute the major portion of blame for the rising crime rate upon the illegitimate class. Indeed, of the thirty-one cases tried at this session, the emigrants learnt to their embarrassment the following criminal statistics which were broken down into class categories:

Persons arriving overland	10
Sailors	6
Emigrants	14
Natives	1

The emigrant was shown to be as adept at committing crime as was the illegitimate. The sole native who had been charged with an offence considered serious enough to warrant his appearance before the Supreme Court appeared to answer an allegation of theft. His crime was to steal a piece of mutton from a butcher's shop.⁶

But while the natives were generally quiet in and around Adelaide, it was along the overland route from New South Wales which followed the Murray River that serious disturbances were arising between native and European. Conflict had been

simmering in this area since the first overland parties had ventured to the colony. Here it was that the native race was most populous due to the abundant supply of food and water. Abuse of these tribes by the overlanders, and the temptation which a small party of Europeans escorting large droves of sheep and cattle through their territory provided, soon made conflict unavoidable.

In April 1841, news reached Adelaide that an overland party, led by the sacked Police Superintendent, Henry Inman, and Mr Field, RN, had been attacked by natives along the Murray. From the reports reaching the settlement it was believed that one or more of the party had been severely wounded, and the large number of sheep being brought to the colony dispersed.

This attack made on an overland party bringing livestock to the colony was of a far different nature to the murder by natives of the survivors of the hapless brig *Maria*. Threatened now was the commercial viability of the colony itself, as well as the safety of Europeans to traverse the country at will. Their consequent response was spurred on more through insecure outrage than reasoned argument. To the colonists, it was an unprovoked act of aggression by the natives.

Rumours arising from news of the incident spread quickly through the settlement to such an extent that the *Register*, which had first published the report, found itself compelled to comment that

the further it travelled the more alarming it became — for the common principle that the correctness of a report diminishes in a ratio corresponding to the distance is frequently illustrated in Adelaide.⁷

A member of the overland party had in fact been killed, Inman speared, and the five thousand sheep being brought to the colony dispersed. The colonists regarded this as an act of war and their response was predictable. They despatched the belligerent O'Halloran in charge of a strong contingent of mounted police to the scene.

Gawler instructed his Police Commissioner that he should endeavour to recover the sheep and capture some of the natives responsible for the attack. While Gawler counselled against the use of undue violence, O'Halloran was left very much to his own devices and was unhindered by the Protector of Aborigines, or natives who could act as interpreters in any contact between the police and Aborigines at the scene of the attack.

Officially at least, O'Halloran had not been sent to administer summary punishment upon suspected natives as had been the case in the *Maria* Affair. But there can be little doubt that, like Sergeant Alford's recent expedition to the mid-north, O'Halloran set out to provoke a confrontation with the Murray tribes. He would act in a similar manner to the way he had earlier instructed Alford who accompanied him. O'Halloran embarked to answer belligerence with belligerence.

Such had been the excited response to news of the native attack that the exact location of the affray and the fact that it had occurred not in the colony, but inside New South Wales, was not considered. Perhaps this fact was not known, but any actions which O'Halloran's party took against natives at the scene of the attack would be without jurisdiction. The South Australian police force had been sent to confront the native residents of New South Wales.

O'Halloran did not in fact reach the scene of the attack, confront the natives, capture suspects, or even recover any of the overlanders' sheep. On 30 April when within fifty miles of the scene, he was suddenly recalled by Gawler.⁸ Gawler's orders

were met with shock and dismay by the party but nevertheless obeyed. O'Halloran wrote in his diary:

I have no alternative, as an old soldier, than to obey his Excellency's orders, who, of course, has his own just reasons for ordering me back, and which it is my duty not to question, but to obey.⁹

Returning to Adelaide, the party learnt that Gawler had been replaced by Captain George Grey as Governor of the colony.

The sudden recall of the police party when so close to their objective was met with angry indignation by the colonists in Adelaide. That the settlers would take matters into their own hands should they lose confidence in the police to deal with native lawlessness now became an obvious fact. They sent out a private expedition of their own to accomplish what the police had failed to achieve. This volunteer force of dilettanti left Adelaide on 7 May 1841 and the *Register* reported:

A party of private gentlemen, sufficiently disgusted at so glaring a disregard of the most important interests of the colony, resolved to make an attempt to recover the sheep, and about fourteen of them, well armed, proceeded to the Murray.¹⁰

There could be no mistaking the mood of the colonists. Open warfare between settler and native became a grim reality.

No move was made to prevent this group assuming the role of the police and embarking against the Murray natives. They were without any authority, martial or civil, no matter how contentious should they succeed in provoking a confrontation with the hostile tribes. In any subsequent conflict they could only resort to 'self defence', a spurious justification in the circumstances.

A confrontation between the volunteer force and hostile natives did arise near the scene of the attack on Inman and Field's overland party. This took place on the Rufus River near the south western corner of Lake Victoria in New South Wales. A group estimated to be in the vicinity of some five hundred natives were not intimidated by the fourteen Europeans and a battle ensued. The brother of Field was wounded, two horses killed and the party quickly retreated to return in haste to Adelaide.¹¹

While the volunteer expedition was unsuccessful in recovering any of the sheep, they certainly succeeded in exacerbating the crisis in the colony. Grey found himself Governor of a colony which was in a high state of agitation, and where private citizens were prepared to disregard the formal institutions of law and order to take matters into their own hands. Further, the colonists were at war with the native inhabitants of the Murray and in this latest encounter, it was reported that the volunteer force had killed at least five natives.¹² The figure was probably higher.

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Not only did Grey find the financial affairs of the colony in disarray, but the residents themselves evincing an alarming lack of confidence in the government, the courts and the police to deal with acts of native 'lawlessness'. He found himself confronted with a crisis of some magnitude. He would not, however, be intimidated or influenced by insecure angry settlers to adopt extreme measures to deal with the crisis, as had his predecessor in dealing with the *Maria* Affair. Grey was in control of the colony, not the settlers. Of this fact he soon left little doubt.

As in moments of earlier crises which had beset the colony since proclamation with some regularity, the colonists convened a public meeting to consider what was to be done. The meeting was held on 24 May 1841. This meeting resulted in the participants presenting Grey with a memorial which called upon him to

take the promptest measures to protect parties now on their way with stock to this colony against the assaults of the natives, and offering a volunteer force to aid the authorities on this expedition, so vitally needed to punish the outrages committed upon our countrymen, and restore unto them their property.¹³

The native tribes along the Murray and Rufus Rivers had been tried and found guilty by the colonists of South Australia. Only Grey questioned the wisdom of the overland parties passing through such hostile territory before the proper authorities had an opportunity to resolve the crisis. More overland parties would only lead to further hostilities, more bloodshed and even a greater level of excitement and agitation in the model colony. But the colonists demanded retribution.

The memorialists called upon Grey to provide police assistance to another volunteer force against the natives along the Murray. That is, they were not offering their assistance to the police but rather demanding police assistance for their volunteer force. This was a blatant challenge to the authority of the colonial government and its ability to administer law and order.

To these representations Grey responded with firmness that left little doubt as to who was in control of the colony. He was not to be easily influenced by excited and frightened settlers to allow actions to be adopted over which he could exercise little or no control. He replied to the memorialists:

If their intention is to act as special constables under the provisions of the statute, first and second William IV, Cap. 41, for such time and in such manner as shall seem fit and necessary for the preservation of the public peace, and for the protection of the inhabitants and the security of property in this province, his Excellency highly approves their zeal; and as the larger number of Europeans is, who proceed to the point where the late violent acts took place, the less probability there will be of further bloodshed, the magistrate under whose direction the parties are to act, will be directed to avail himself of the services of all such gentlemen as may think proper to accompany him.

And should any confusion still remain in the settler mind, Grey added:

it is possible that these gentlemen have volunteered their services under the idea that a military expedition against the natives would take place, his Excellency thinks it proper to state, that positive instructions have on several occasions been given by Her Majesty's Government to treat the natives of all parts of this continent as subjects of the Queen, within Her Majesty's allegiance, and that to regard them as aliens with whom a war can exist, and against whom Her Majesty's troops may exercise belligerent rights, is to deny that protection to which they derive the highest possible claim for sovereignty.

Grey quickly proved that he could keep a cool head in a crisis. Underlying his response to the memorialists was his basic belief that the native inhabitants were British subjects. A military expedition would not be unleashed upon them. He was determined to avoid rash and hasty responses to reported outbreaks of native violence.

The new Governor was especially critical of the overland parties who, he told the settlers,

attempt to drive such large herds of cattle and ... sheep through such extensive tracts of country, without taking care that they are much more efficiently guarded than they have hitherto been.

He warned that the present critical financial state of the colony

would never suffice to afford protection to all parties who might desire it ... they voluntarily encounter a risk from which they are bound to protect themselves.¹⁴

Grey did express some sympathy with the settlers' obvious concern, but he pointed out that his government had first to act in concert with that of New South Wales. That is, the proper authorities in New South Wales should be consulted and requisite arrangements made so that some level of protection for overland parties could be arranged, such as a military or police escort. Yet he too appears ignorant of the fact that the recent attacks on the overland parties had not taken place in South Australia but in New South Wales. When corresponding to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord John Russell, about troubles with the Murray natives, this territorial and jurisdictional fact was never mentioned.¹⁵

To deal with the crisis at hand which had engulfed the colony, Grey authorised Police Commissioner O'Halloran to mount another police expedition. Importantly, on this occasion, O'Halloran was to be accompanied by Moorhouse, the Protector of Aborigines, who was elevated to the position of magistrate for the occasion. Native interpreters would also accompany the party and act as guides. With Moorhouse and native interpreters, Grey hoped to establish friendly relations with the troublesome Murray tribes, enquire into the circumstances of the attacks and work towards a solution to the crisis.

Once more the stated objective of the mission was to recover the scattered sheep. Native suspects would be apprehended and brought to Adelaide, where they would be identified, if possible. They would at any rate act as hostages for the good behaviour of their people. Firearms would be sanctioned only in self defence. Of the Protector's role, Grey instructed Moorhouse that he was to

act as protector and counsel for the natives in any enquiry to be set up, and also to procure the release of one or more prisoners, making it evident that [you are] their powerful friend, and explaining the white man's intentions.¹⁶

On 31 May 1841 the official party left Adelaide. In all, it numbered sixty-eight men. There were fifteen volunteers, one of whom was Henry Inman. O'Halloran was carefully constrained by Grey's instructions as well as by the presence of Moorhouse. Consistent with his reply to the memorialists, it was not Grey's intention to despatch O'Halloran to provoke a confrontation with the natives. He wanted the crisis settled with as little bloodshed as possible.

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The objectives of the O'Halloran-Moorhouse expedition were not realised. The Murray tribes fled before them. No prisoners or hostages were taken. All that the party found were the remains of hundreds of dead sheep near Lake Victoria. They

also discovered the body of an overlander killed by natives near Langhorne's crossing place on the Rufus. A disappointed Moorhouse informed Grey:

I have really had no opportunity of inquiring from the natives themselves the real cause of the contest between the two populations.

The expedition did, however, meet with another overland party, under Langhorne, which had been attacked by natives near the Rufus. Four of the party of sixteen Europeans had been killed in the attack which lasted for about twenty minutes. It was apparent that the natives were willing to attack small overland parties which brought with them large herds of livestock, but were less willing to attack the large police contingent.

Moorhouse provided Grey with a detailed account of the entire expedition. In a despatch written 205 miles from Adelaide, he reported how he had endeavoured to establish friendly relations with those natives whom they came across. He learnt from them that several natives had recently been shot by Europeans on horse back. However, those natives with whom Moorhouse did meet would only accompany the party for a few miles, being too frightened to continue on into the territory of the tribes responsible for the overland attacks.¹⁷

During the course of the journey, Moorhouse was provided with his first real insight into the nature of the recent conflict. On one occasion, a less timid native asked Moorhouse whether he, or any of his party, desired the company of aboriginal women. This native told Moorhouse that

all the white people [he] had seen before had had [native] women brought for the purpose of sexual intercourse, and whom the Europeans gave them flour, animal food and clothing.

Moorhouse sensed that this was the cause of the native hostility towards the overland parties, which supported another incident which he then related to Grey:

Fourteen months ago the Reverend Mr Leichman and myself were inquiring of a Sydney native who had travelled the overland road twice in two years and he said it was becoming dangerous for Europeans to come overland. He said the Blacks were becoming enraged with the whites for the latter had used the women of the former and much abused them. The abuse he explained consisted in the Europeans promising the Aborigines food, clothing and tomahawks for the use of their females, but the Europeans did not fulfil their promises. After gratifying their passions the women were turned out late in the evening or in the night and instead of the men having their promised rewards, they were laughed at and ridiculed.

And to further support his suspicions, Moorhouse obtained a statement from a survivor of Langhorne's party. This survivor told Moorhouse that taking and using native women was a common practice of all overland parties. To support this contention, the survivor, a man called Millar, stated that he had worked on three overland parties to Adelaide from Sydney. During the first journey the Europeans had found the natives friendly and helpful. The natives neither stole from them, pilfered their supplies nor speared their livestock. On the second journey overland, however, the natives had become more bold and aggressive. Some sheep had been speared and overlanders shot at the natives. Millar's third and last overland journey speaks for itself of the deterioration in relations between black and white.

The Protector had little hesitation in apportioning blame for the native attacks upon the European overland parties. He submitted to Grey:

The overland parties have not acted judiciously in allowing the native women to be brought to their encampments. It was an intimacy that encouraged the natives at once to require something at the hand of the European. When he received food or clothing, he was acquiring a taste for food that could not be obtained in his savage state. There can be no wonder that when he sees it in the possession of others he should take it by force unless there should be sufficient strength to resist.

To Moorhouse, then, the cause for the native attacks lay with European indiscretion which led to false Aboriginal expectations, which were being satisfied by their use of force. Moorhouse failed to understand the more fundamental cause to the hostilities. That is, he failed to recognise the resentment which the Europeans caused the natives by abusing native women, ridiculing the men and ignoring ancient customs of reciprocity. The Murray tribes were much aggrieved.

With the failure of the expedition, Moorhouse left Grey with the following dilemma to ponder:

Indiscriminate shooting according to our present knowledge does not appear to deter the aborigines on the Rufus from attacking the drays containing provisions....It is the opinion of many colonists that this expedition, having refrained from shooting has tended to encourage rather than intimidate the aborigines in acts of aggression and outrage....As the natives have been victorious in the last three contests with Europeans, there appears at present no means of preventing further collision, but strong numerical force in overland parties; if their force be numerous they would be at once awed as they evidently were when the police force approached.¹⁸

The stage was being set for the final act with grim determination.

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Grey, no less than the other colonists, now began to feel a sense of frustration by the native attacks and by the latest lack of success on the part of Moorhouse and O'Halloran. The Murray tribes responsible for the attacks were unsubdued and had yet to be made amenable to British law.

There was growing pressure in the colony for a full scale military punitive expedition to be launched against the hostile natives along the overland route. O'Halloran and Gawler at least had been successful in subduing the Coorong natives, regardless of the legal and social niceties. But Grey would not be swayed. He was determined that

We should allow no circumstances whatever to excite in our breasts a desire for revenge....I can never ... sanction any mode of punishment, which may involve alike the innocent and guilty men, women and children in its consequences.¹⁹

Grey's frustration did not lie so much with the problem of how to deal with the troublesome Murray natives and make them amenable to British law. His frustration lay with the persistence of the overland parties in making the journeys to the colony knowing full well the dangers involved. It was their persistence which further aggravated the crisis before he could deal adequately with the problem. He found himself forced to act before being able to initiate measures other than an armed confrontation, which would only end in bloodshed and the probable wholesale slaughter of natives at the hand of the European.

Yet another overland party, this time under a man called Robinson, was on its way to the colony from Sydney. It had left in May. Strong representations were made to Grey, on Robinson's behalf, by John Ellis in Adelaide, for police assistance for safe passage through the troublesome region.²⁰ Robinson's party consisted of twenty-six men and several thousand sheep. Grey was compelled to act to prevent further violence.

Governor Grey requested his Police Commissioner to make ready the necessary men and equipment to go to Robinson's aid. This time, however, whether through frustration at his own lack of success in dealing with the Murray 'troubles', or in pique at the manner in which Grey had constrained his actions during the last expedition, as well as the cut backs which the governor had made in the police force, O'Halloran proved to be a good deal less than cooperative.

For O'Halloran, there was only one effective method of dealing with the present crisis. That was to launch a full scale military operation against the natives. He sent Grey a submission which advised against sending another expedition to the Murray due to the weather. It was winter. Rain, muddy roads and strong river currents could hamper any expedition sent to the Rufus and Darling Rivers. O'Halloran was not concerned with the safety of Robinson's party. What he envisaged was a well planned military campaign against a known enemy. He told Grey:

To ensure with certainty the success of an Expedition sent to punish or capture the Blacks, it will be absolutely necessary to send not only a couple of Whale Boats, but likewise two strong mounted parties on either side of the river.

O'Halloran suggested that October would be a more appropriate time to launch this campaign against the natives. He submitted that

preparation ought to be made for a Campaign of several months; for though both sides of the River can then be scoured, the natives have still innumerable creeks, lagoons, and scrub to hide in, and where it will require much time and patience to find them, unless they are willing to be seen.

Moreover, as though to further frustrate Grey's urgent request, O'Halloran declared his police department hard pressed and stated that

the greater part of the mounted police are required to attend as witnesses at the sessions early next month; and the greater number of the horses from lameness, bad feed and sore backs, are at present inefficient, and require rest to render them effective again.²¹

Grey had no intention of authorising any military campaign against the natives. Critical though he had been of Robinson's overland party, he still saw the urgent need to rescue them if possible and prevent further bloodshed. Not so O'Halloran, but Grey dismissed his suggestions and ordered him to make ready the necessary men and equipment. O'Halloran would not be baulked, and replied that it was

quite impossible in the present state of Town and Country, and upon the reduced strength to spare a man to send with the Volunteers about to proceed to the Murray to meet and protect Mr Robinson's overland sheep party.

It was apparent that if O'Halloran could not have his own way in dealing with the natives, then he would frustrate Grey and Moorhouse to the upmost, even at the cost of European lives. As if to emphasise this point, as well as his displeasure with

Grey's cut back of his department, O'Halloran suggested that those police who were about to be disbanded due to the cut backs complement Grey's intended rescue expedition. He would not make available his permanent men, their horses or equipment.

On 31 July 1841, a party consisting of twenty-nine Europeans and three natives left Adelaide to meet with Robinson's overland party. Sub-Inspector Shaw, one sergeant and ten foot police who were to have been disbanded from the police force were included in this number.²² The 'rescue' party was led by the Protector of Aborigines, again elevated to the position of magistrate for the occasion. For the first time, a major expedition against the natives was unaccompanied by O'Halloran. That this expedition was to achieve in accomplishing what the others had failed, and that it did not include the belligerent Police Commissioner and the *elite* mounted police is one of the ironic quirks of history.

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By 27 August Moorhouse's party was within five miles of Lake Victoria. They had crossed the border of South Australia and were in the penal colony of New South Wales. Being near the scene of the recent native attacks, the Protector of Aborigines assembled his group and repeated the official instructions which Grey had issued to him. Friendly relations were, if possible, to be established. This was not a punitive expedition, and the natives would only be fired upon in self defence at the express command of Sub-Inspector Shaw.

The objective of their mission was to afford Robinson's party safe passage through the hostile native territory. It was not their role to provoke a confrontation with the natives, as their operation was defensive, not offensive.

Following Moorhouse's speech the party resumed their march towards Langhorne's ferry on the Rufus, this being the usual crossing place of the overland parties as well as the scene of the attacks. Here they met Robinson's party on the other side of the river. Their combined force totalled fifty-five men.

Robinson told Moorhouse that on the previous day his party had been attacked by about three hundred natives. His party, however, was unscathed but they had killed at least five natives and wounded at least ten more. Grey's fears as to the outcome of an encounter between an adventurous band of overlanders and the Murray natives were realised. Robinson's adventurers had been well prepared for the inevitable native battle.

After the usual exchange of pleasantries, Moorhouse, Shaw and another rode ahead of the main party to Lake Victoria. Here they suddenly found themselves confronted by a large group of hostile natives who rushed at them brandishing their implements of war. The three Europeans beat a hasty retreat. Returning to the main party, Moorhouse prepared for the imminent attack upon his group. He gave control to Shaw, authorising him to issue such orders for their safety as he thought necessary.

Moorhouse did attempt to establish some communication with the hostile natives to prevent conflict. This he did by conversing with three natives who had accompanied him for some of the way. However, these natives could do little but confirm the determination of their countrymen to attack the white men, the consequences be what they may. The natives who had been successful in previous

encounters with overland parties were not this time intimidated by the large number of Europeans.

The Moorhouse-Shaw contingent was grouped on the western bank of the Rufus. On the eastern bank was Robinson's party. They faced a group of about one hundred and fifty natives. On Shaw's command, both European groups advanced together towards the natives and commenced firing. Of the subsequent battle, Moorhouse reported to Grey:

The firing commenced before a spear was thrown on account of the inequality in between the two parties; the natives at least were 150 strong, whilst the Europeans had only 36 that could be spared. Some natives had 2 or 3 spears each, every spear being equal to a musket if sufficiently near an object to be thrown and to have waited until the natives were within that distance would have been to expose the Europeans to certain defeat.

The engagement lasted for twenty minutes. When hostilities ceased, thirty natives lay dead. The only European to be wounded was Robinson, who was speared in the left arm. Four natives were captured. Two were women, one a boy, and the other a male adult.

Moorhouse justified the actions taken by the Europeans as being necessary and unavoidable for their own self defence and safety. He wrote:

My position as a Magistrate on this occasion, I conceived required the strictest impartiality in judging of this distressing scene and my conviction is, that the natives in this instance were in fault ... the contest could not have been avoided and though the result to the natives was so serious when compared to that of the Europeans, there was reason to believe that more leniency would have been attended ultimately with more slaughter, as they would have attacked again.

In Moorhouse's rationale, then, one significant encounter with the natives, which resulted in the death of many, was far better than a series of smaller battles. Unwittingly, Moorhouse had imparted the same lesson as had O'Halloran on the Coorong: the white man would not be trifled with.

The four prisoners were assembled in front of the Europeans the following day. Notwithstanding the fact that Moorhouse found their dialect totally different to that spoken by the Adelaide natives, he commenced to address them in the following manner:

You have been captured in retreating from a contest your own tribes were guilty of promoting. You were advised strongly and perseveringly advised ... not to rashly attempt what you had no probability of accomplishing....From the contest ... you may learn 2 lessons. First the immense superiority of the white-men over the black in his movements of defence; and second the destruction of life which took place was not to gratify a destructive propensity, as your lives would not have been spared; but to protect that property which the Blackman wished unlawfully to obtain. The white-man in this instance has shown as much leniency as could have been expected.

Such 'leniency' had resulted in awesome loss of life: the European was cruel to be kind. Now it was time for 'kindness' and for the Protector to prove to the natives that he was their powerful friend in accordance with his earlier instructions. He released two of the native prisoners, a woman and the boy, both of whom had been wounded during the battle. The other native woman, whose husband had been killed in the encounter, had expressed her wish to become the wife of an

accompanying Adelaide native. The remaining male

will be taken to Adelaide and kept there for awhile, and it will depend upon his tribe what treatment he receives. Should they again attack parties on their road from Sydney, he may possibly be put to death, but if they should be peaceful and quiet, he will be allowed to return.

A hostage had been taken as guarantee for native good behaviour. Moorhouse then promised the natives that

Should you at any future time meet with outrage or insult from Europeans I advise you as your Protector and friend, not to attempt your own defence. The Government has promised to listen to any charges you may have to prefer; and for all aggressions upon your rights, you are promised immediate satisfactory redress.²³

Whether the frightened captured natives could understand the elaborate address of Moorhouse is not known. How they might utilise his services is likewise not apparent. What was apparent, however, was their submission and compliance to the domination of the European. And what was also apparent, to both European and native, was the inability and ineffectualness of Moorhouse to honour the promises which he made —even before he had made them.

In the afternoon following the battle, Cooney, a shepherd accompanying Robinson's party, requested the betrothed Adelaide native the use of his woman. The previous husband of the woman had been killed by the Europeans only a few hours earlier. The disturbed Adelaide native sought the help of Moorhouse, the professed protector and friend of the aborigines. In his capacity as Protector of Aborigines, Moorhouse instructed Cooney that he would not permit such behaviour. Cooney, however, was unperturbed by either the native or Moorhouse. Twenty minutes later:

Cooney had taken the woman out of her hut much against her will and effected his purpose; another shepherd immediately after that had intercourse with her.

European abuse and degradation of the aboriginal knew no bounds.

Moorhouse, Protector of Aborigines and magistrate, was neither able to protect the Aborigines, nor control the Europeans. The above instance, which highlights Moorhouse's ineffectualness, was not an isolated incident. During the return journey to Adelaide, Moorhouse visited Robinson's shepherds while they were encamped. There he found three shepherds having sexual intercourse with native women in the presence of other Europeans. He told Grey:

I threatened them with punishment, but they said there was no law against such practices, and they should not regard any command from their employers to that effect. [They were] reprimanded but they still replied that they would do the same again as soon as opportunity presented itself.²⁴

The Protector also told Grey of his hopes of bringing several friendly natives from the Lake Bonney district to Adelaide. However, he complained that on account of the incessant demand by shepherds for the 'use' of native women, he doubted that the natives would continue to accompany the party. Endeavouring to curb this practice, Moorhouse posted a sentry in front of the native huts at night with strict orders to arrest all Europeans who visited them. The success of this move is not known, although no arrests are recorded by Moorhouse. This was a desperate

and futile gesture on Moorhouse's part as the shepherds were not breaching any criminal law by visiting native camps at night. Had a shepherd been apprehended by Moorhouse's sentry, the Adelaide courts would have witnessed some interesting litigation.

When the Moorhouse-Shaw expedition returned to Adelaide, an official enquiry was held to enquire into the circumstances surrounding the actions taken by Moorhouse and Shaw and the subsequent loss of life. O'Halloran, not having participated in the expedition, could content himself with sitting on the bench of magistrates. He was no doubt well pleased with the success of this most recent expedition, and at the conclusion of the testimonies moved the following resolution:

That the bench of magistrates, after a full and careful examination of all the evidence ... are unanimously of opinion ... that the conduct of Mr Moorhouse and his party was justifiable and indeed unavoidable in the circumstances.

In seconding the motion, Edward John Eyre acknowledged that the confrontation was unavoidable, but expressed his fears that perhaps the lesson imparted was not yet sufficient to prevent further attacks on Europeans.²⁵

To keep the Murray natives subdued, and make them amenable to British law, it was decided to establish a police station near the troublesome district. Eyre, vested with the powers of a police magistrate, was sent to Moorundee, about eighty miles from Adelaide on the River Murray. He left Adelaide on 28 September 1841, accompanied by Sub-Inspector Shaw and two mounted constables.²⁶ No doubt it was now impolitic to disband Shaw from the police department as had been planned. He could prove of great assistance to Eyre when dealing with troublesome natives.

The Moorhouse-Shaw expedition was the watershed in race relations in South Australia. Not only did it mark the end of concerted native attacks on overland parties, but also the bloody submission of the native race to the new European society. The task of 'civilising' them could now begin while colonial attention turned to focus on reported acts of native lawlessness to the west around Port Lincoln. It would soon be the turn of these tribes to learn the violent lesson that the white man would not be trifled with.

* * * * *

Stripped of the pious pronouncements of the government and the press, in practical terms the settlers of South Australia were at war with troublesome natives who they believed to be outside the reach of ordinary British law. Their response to native 'troubles' had first been established by Gawler and O'Halloran in their dealing with the *Maria* Affair in August 1840. What Gawler and O'Halloran established was the law of war.

O'Halloran was a frustrated soldier who was unable to reconcile the civil nature of the police department with his own military upbringing. At times he could barely disguise the martial belligerency of the methods he both advocated and used against troublesome natives. The expeditions which he either led, organised or proposed were essentially provocative. Their objective was to force a confrontation with the troublesome tribes which would then enable a swift and decisive lesson to be dealt.

In this early period of colonisation, the settlers' principal concern lay with the rumoured influx of an illegitimate class which threatened their colonising experiment. These were the reasons which justified the creation of a police department and which saw a cordon of police outposts established around Adelaide. By the end of 1840 this force numbered 110 men. It is interesting to note that this number protected a population of approximately 6,500 Europeans, but in 1844 it was reduced to 50, while the population had increased to some 19,000.

Native crime of a serious nature which warranted its inclusion in the crime statistics was small, even considering the small native population. However, it soon became the preoccupation of the police department, as well as a significant justification for its existence.

Violence, perpetuated by the settler against the Aboriginal, was anticipated, even expected. This was considered to be an inevitable fact of life.²⁷ The government and police did not set out to curb settler abuse and violence against the indigenous race. Rather, they set out to control stringently the natives and punish them in an effort to appease the settler and prevent settler retaliation against the natives. The dilemma of the government and police was to win settler confidence in their ability to deal effectively with native lawlessness. Until this was won, they knew that the settlers would take matters into their own hands and exact their own vengeance for grievances. The price was high. The effects of this policy are still being felt. The model colony which was to have model race relations was little more than a dream. Ironically the accolades for the final battle against the Murray natives do not go to the belligerent O'Halloran. They go instead to the person whose official title proclaims him friend and protector of the aborigines, foot police who were to be disbanded, volunteers and a party of overland adventurers.

There is also an important matter of jurisdiction to be considered. The attacks on the overland parties had taken place not in South Australia, but in New South Wales. It should clearly have been a matter for the New South Wales government, not that of South Australia, which could at best only make an offer of assistance or act in concert with them. It appears that this question of jurisdiction was simply not considered by the government or settlers of South Australia. Why this should be so — when the evidence that the attacks had taken place near the Rufus River and Lake Victoria was not in dispute, and when the boundaries of the colony were well known and jealously guarded — is not known. One answer could be that in the agitated state of the colony at the time, the insecure settler was more concerned with subduing hostile natives than with legal niceties. This fact at least had been well illustrated at the Coorong the year before. It must remain, however, a puzzlement of history and a question of conjecture.

The Protector of Aborigines, Matthew Moorhouse, was not in fact able to protect the Aboriginal from European abuse. Nor was he able, even with the powers of a magistrate, to control the Europeans who violated both aboriginal custom and British law. The 'rape' of the native widow only hours after the final battle is an example of his ineffectualness. While Moorhouse did pursue this issue, he was frustrated by the unwillingness of other European witnesses to testify, as well as the problems associated with the admissibility of native evidence in any subsequent court case. Moorhouse could do little more than watch over the demise of the native

race, endeavouring to instil them with European values as a preventative measure against their further abuse at the hands of the white man and their eventual extinction.

Footnotes

1. The police department was established in South Australia in April 1838 under the command of Henry Inman who initially held the rank of Inspector before being promoted to Superintendent in August 1838. Under the Police Act of 1839, four honorary Commissioners were appointed, viz. Gouger, Bernard, O'Halloran and Walker. This board was dissolved with the appointment of O'Halloran as Police Commissioner in June 1840.
2. This was a class distinction to distinguish those who had emigrated to the colony from those who arrived from the penal settlements. Illegitimates also included runaway sailors.
3. P.C.M.B. (Police Commissioner's Memorandum Book, 1840-1846), p. 21. Copy held by S.A. Police Historical Society.
4. *Ibid.*, 14 January 1841, p. 33.
5. P.A.O.B. (Protector of Aborigines Outletter Book). GRG52/7/1.
6. *Register*, 6 March 1841.
7. *Ibid.*, 24 April 1841.
8. *Ibid.*, 22 May 1841.
9. A Tolmer, *Reminiscences of an Adventurous and Chequered Career at Home and at the Antipodes* (London, 1882), Vol. 1, p. 222.
10. *Register*, 22 May 1841.
11. Tolmer, p. 224.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 225.
13. *Register*, 29 May 1841.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Grey to Russell, Despatch No. 16 (*Historical Records of Australia*).
16. Cited in K. Hassell, *The Relations Between the Settlers and Aborigines In South Australia 1836-1860*, p. 61. SAA.D8427(T)
17. P.A.O.B. Report dated 30 June 1841.
18. *Ibid.* Moorhouse continued his account of the expedition in a Report dated 12 July 1841.
19. Executive Council Minutes, 12 Aug. 1841.
20. Ellis to Grey, 28 July 1841, sub-enclosures 2-7 (*Historical Records of Australia*).
21. P.C.M.B., 19 July 1841, pp. 36-38.
22. *Ibid.*, 26 July 1841, p. 41.
23. P.A.O.B., 4 Sept. 1841.
24. *Ibid.* This is a continuing Report dated 13 Sept. 1841.
25. Tolmer, p. 238.
26. Police Commissioner's Order Book. GRG 5/607.
27. This had been foreshadowed by both Grey in his 'Suggestions' (*Register*, 18 April 1840) and O'Halloran in his Quarterly Report, 31 Dec. 1840 (GRG 25/1/1840/586a3).

JOHN MEDWAY DAY A SOUTH AUSTRALIAN WHO IN 1893 WENT EAST, NOT WEST

L. F. CRISP

The early 1890s were grim in Australia. The former long boom came down with a series of crashes in 1892 and 1893. In the remaining years of the century drought in significant areas of the continent took its toll and added to Australia's troubles. Some people, especially from heavily-stricken Victoria, left Australia altogether — for South Africa or elsewhere. There were, however, bright patches — notably the Western Australian Goldfields. From South Australia many men and families went West to Perth, Coolgardie and Kalgoorlie. One noteworthy South Australian moved against the tide — East, to Sydney. He was John Medway Day. It will be for someone in Adelaide to quarry for more knowledge of his South Australian years. Here in Eastern Australia we know more about his few years in New South Wales.

Day was born in Bedford, England, in 1838. He went to school there and had affiliations with youth activity at the John Bunyan Church. After his schooldays he became private secretary to the senior partner in a Bedford legal firm. This man of law held several local public offices and Day, from his work with him, gained useful insights and experience which developed in him also a life-long concern with public affairs. Day spent four years studying for the Baptist Ministry at Regent's Park College, London, left for Australia in 1866, and then spent nine years as a Baptist Minister first at Mt Gambier and then at Kapunda.

In 1875 Day joined the editorial and literary staff of the conservative Adelaide morning daily, the *South Australian Register*, serving it until March 1892. 'A difference of opinion on essential points led to his ultimate retirement, but he received many flattering testimonies of goodwill and respect from proprietors and staff.'¹ The *Adelaide Observer* said, at the time of his death: 'He was a conspicuously able writer, and his fidelity to principle, honesty of purpose, disregard of popularity, and industry, earned for him the abiding respect even of those from whom he strongly differed upon political and social matters.'² The *Bulletin*'s breezy obituary sums up the Adelaide years this way:

When he went out of the pulpit and onto the inky way in South Australia, he soon worked up to chief leader-writer, and was often acting-editor, of the *Register*. He nearly dragged that now virulent Tory print over to Radicalism; in fact he did drag it over for a while. The land-tax idea ran away with him sometimes; and when the *Register* could not hold him anymore he founded the *Voice* in Adelaide. But the *Voice* was never a paper — it was always a sermon; and it could not last....Undoubtedly he was, while he had a

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pulpit in the *Register* office, one of the principal forces in South Australia; and the Village Settlements, on the Murray and elsewhere, were largely of his making. When the frightened *Register* turned slowly in its tracks and cursed all the things it had barracked for, it blotted the one valuable period of its life out of its memory, and it now speaks of those settlements as it does of snakes.³

Day was an active member and servant of the Adelaide community. He was, for instance, from 1886 a Governor of the Public Library and in 1890-91 Chairman of its Board.

After leaving the *Register*, Mr Day lectured throughout the Colony on social and political questions and won renown. He also edited for a time the *Voice*, the local organ of the single-tax and land reform party.⁴

In 1893, at the South Australian general election, Day stood, without endorsement from either major party, for the seat of Gumeracha. In a field of five he came in third, behind the major party men: R. Homburg 987, W. R. Randell 580, J. M. Day 449, T. Hack 290, J. McEwin 234.

In the year 1893, he was offered and accepted the editorship of *The Worker* in Sydney and did good and reliable service. In Sydney, as in other places, he proved himself an earnest publicist and good speaker, not given to rhetoric, but able in the plainest and most forcible manner to get to the bedrock of any subject he was advocating, and especially in support of a liberal faith.⁵

Day took up duty in Sydney on 1 January 1894: 'the paper was under its first "professional" editor.'⁶ From then until the beginning of 1904 he was involved in journalism and other activities in 'the Eastern States.' The first editor of the *Australian* (not to be confused with the Queensland — or the short-lived Victorian) *Worker*, from 1880 had been Walter Head. His guiding hand was removed in 1893 and there was a short acting tenure of the editorial chair by Arthur Rae, M.L.A. (Murrumbidgee) before Day took over. There could have been no worse time to take over, for Day did so in the wake of the land and bank crashes. Some of the subsequent seasons were extremely poor. Prices for various rural products became very depressed indeed: Squatters were economising on staff and cutting wages. The unions concerned were hard-hit and much divided. The early N.S.W. Labour Party was full of factions, divided over Free Trade and Protection, riven over the issue of 'the pledge' and 'caucus solidarity.' The Victorian *Worker* had already 'folded up,' some £1000 in debt (a lot of money to a union in those days).

In early 1894 the *Australian Worker* was a weekly, printed and published 'over a bakehouse in [215] Palmer Street [Sydney], where cockroaches were much more plentiful than cash.' It was already working 'on a shoe-string' and teetering in and out of debt. Nothing loathe, its union controllers, at the shortest of short notice, decided to 'go daily' from 2 July, less than three weeks before the 1894 N.S.W. general elections, giving the paper no time to seek and bargain for the best terms for necessary services, or advertising contracts, or a 'fighting fund' to finance this revolutionary and expensive transformation. In some three or four weeks the *Worker* was nearly £2,000 in debt. All the economic circumstances of union and Colony were against its making up the ground. Membership of most of the union branches was ebbing. The short experiment with a daily paper came to an abrupt end, with the paper financially lamed.

In self-defence against the economic conditions and the employers'

determination to cut jobs and wages, 'in 1894 the Bush Unions agreed to amalgamate, and at the conference which opened at the Mechanics Institute, Albury, on 14 February 1895, the name of the "Australian Workers Union" was adopted for the combined organisation.' Those present were already well-known figures in the Australian Labour Movement and some were to become more so. The delegates to this 'founding conference' of the A.W.U. were given in the *Worker* of 23 February 1895, as: Adelaide (SA) J. A. Cook; Port Augusta (SA), A. Poynton, MP; Casterton (Vic.), J. Slattery; Creswick (Vic.), D. Temple; Bourke (NSW), Donald MacDonnell; Coonamble (NSW), C. Poynton; Goulburn (NSW), J. McInerney; Moree (NSW), L. D. Mouat; Scone (NSW), F. J. Gilbert; Wagga (NSW), A. Rae, MP; Young (NSW), J. M. Toomey and W. Anderson; Queensland, J. Meehan and M. Reid, MP; Queensland Australian Federation of Labour, A. Hinchcliffe. W. G. Spence was minute secretary. Also present was J. C. Watson, MP (later prime minister of Australia), who served for part of the 'Nineties as returning officer. The record shows that 'Medway Day made a lengthy statement to the Conference relative to his position as [the *Worker*] editor....Conference unanimously agreed to recommend the re-appointment of Mr Day for the current year.'

On Friday evening, 15 February — the second evening of this inaugural A.W.U. Congress — Day gave a public lecture: 'Slaves or Free Men; or, The True Labour Problem' at the Federal Hall, Albury, reports of which were carried in the Albury *Daily News* and (on 2 March) in the *Worker*. The shearers who heard that address must have recalled its title wryly over the next three years. As W. G. Spence wrote:

The years 1895-6-7 are the dark ones of the Union's history....Nevertheless by May [1895] the Pastoralists' Union offices in each city were crowded by men willing to accept the reduced rates....The one idea of hundreds was simply to get work....There was a drought, and consequently a great reduction in the amount of labour required....Members seemed to have lost heart and refused to pay up [union dues]....Membership fell off....In [February] 1897 the New South Wales edition of *The Worker* was taken over [financially] by the Bourke Branch and publication was suspended until shearing started in July. Casterton, Young and Moree Branches were closed in 1896. The 1896 year was the worst the Coonamble Branch ever had, as it secured only 783 members, and shearing rates had fallen 30 per cent.⁷

To the burden of these economic and financial conditions there was added, so far as Day was concerned, some dissension in the A.W.U. (notably in 1895-96), about his editorial line and his editorship generally. He was a Henry Georgeite, a liberal radical and a man firm and unrelenting in his opinions. We can gain, perhaps, some insight into his side of these troubles from a clearly heartfelt passage from the *Tasmanian Mail* obituary:

With socialists he held no affinity. A press critic, referring to Mr Day's special characteristics, wrote: "He is just one of those men who would find it extremely difficult to do what he knew was wrong, and who, having made up his mind that a certain course was right, would pursue it to the end, though the whole world bared its arm to oppose him. When Mr Day does a thing, or formulates an opinion, he is perfectly certain that he is right, even if all recognised authority can be quoted against him. In fact he has but little reverence for the accepted creeds of the past and brushes aside the great fathers of political economy with but scant ceremony, and just a suspicion of impatient egotism."⁸

Though he had been in Australia for thirty years, an Englishman with that sort of character and temperament, who found himself editing a bush-workers' union

paper in the darkest days of the 1890s, was unlikely to abide comfortably with some of the union's rank and file and many of its zealous ideologists. Day seems to have clashed with the A.W.U. president for part of his editorial term, Richard Sleath (M.L.A. Wilcannia, 1894-1904), who himself ran foul of the Labor Party in due course. W. A. Holman, then given to ardent socialist oratory, told the 1897 A.W.U. Congress that '*The Worker* has done no good and much harm, has not made a single convert, and the money spent on it might as well have been thrown in the sea.' Other union members and parliamentarians held quite different views.

Meanwhile the financial positions of both union and newspaper continued in poor shape — the condition of the branches of the one meant that the dues or necessary subventions to the other had mostly failed, or had at least fallen seriously behind. At the 1896 Congress, Day had rounded on his critics in his annual report:

Our office is inconvenient, unhealthy, and too far away from the business centre [to make much money from job-printing, etc., to help out]. We lack several essentials for carrying on the business effectively. And in these circumstances it is unreasonable to expect one man to discharge the duties of Editor, Sub-Editor, chief contributor and business manager.... There is one point, moreover, to which in justice to myself I must refer. At the time the *Daily Worker* was started [i.e. at the time of the 1894 election campaign], I was the only member of staff who did the extra work without additional pay. This was not the worst. From that time my salary has been constantly in arrears — frequently to a large amount. I have had to advance money for wages, etc., which have to be paid every week. This I am not prepared to do any longer, nor is it fair to expect it of me.⁹

Yet at that Congress, to help ease the financial embarrassments of union and paper, Day agreed to soldier on both as editor and manager. Not until the following May did Hector Lamond relieve him of the managerial burden.

There is confirmation of Day's claims to Congress (but a direct personal criticism, too) in an article — almost certainly written by Lamond — 'How the Union Made a Mouthpiece,' in the supplement of the *Worker: Special Commemoration Number*, 2 September 1905, published scarcely two months after Day's death. There the writer records his reactions on hearing of the second editor's recent passing:

I recalled the old times when, not once or twice only, he drew upon his own savings to pay wages the funds placed at our disposal were insufficient to meet and I felt it was good to work with one who so readily sacrificed his own interest to the general good. But he was not well-placed in the editorial chair and the increasing difficulties of the position did much to estrange him from those who might have eased his load.

In fact, prior to the 1897 Congress, a plebiscite of the A.W.U. branch memberships in New South Wales had voted in favour of Day's continuing as editor. And Day had apparently been elected general treasurer.

At the 1897 Congress, however, the differences came to a head, aggravated by the failure of the union to get the paper out of its financial impasse. Congress decided it could not afford (some delegates did not want) to employ Day any longer. It debated whether the amount of his severance honorarium should be £25 or £15 (from the *Worker* report it is not clear what the decision as to the amount was). In his editorial of 27 February 1897, Day wrote: 'It is obvious that, whether the paper is continued or not, my connection with it as editor will shortly cease. I retain it at considerable loss and personal inconvenience solely in their [i.e. the A.W.U. Branches']

interests.' After 27 February in fact, the *Worker* was in suspense until it reappeared in August 1897, under the editor-managership of Lamond.

Through all these frequently daunting experiences, involving a great deal of uncertainty, crises, disappointments and hardships for himself and his loyal, long-suffering wife — there were no children — Day seems to have sustained an unwavering self-confidence, an extraordinary capacity for selflessness and public-spiritedness, a determination to be his own man in the service of his social objectives and ideals.

When, on 8 July 1905, at the age of 67, Day died in Hobart of 'gastric catarrh,' after only a year and a half in his editorial chair at the *Tasmanian Mail*, he had already won the accolade from his Hobart team. They offered their hail and farewell to one they had found to be 'a conscientious journalist and a true gentleman,' in whom the less comfortable characteristics of which they had heard — apprehensively perhaps — before his advent, were actually dissipated: 'Time and experience had toned down any undue asperities. Like a true journalist, while here he fought for the flag he was under, and won respect and confidence.'¹⁰

For those who would sample Day's work, the columns of the *South Australian Register* between 1875 and 1892, the Adelaide *Voice* of 1892 and 1893, the *Australian Worker* from 1894 to 1897, and so ultimately to the *Tasmanian Mail* of 1904 and 1905, all carry the products of his mind and pen. There is a problem of positively identifying much of them. A little careful reading, however, will yield a good deal which is pretty certainly Day's work. There is no problem about identification of his pamphlets. The Mitchell Library, for instance, can offer three of these:

1. *Wages: A Paper Read Before the Society for the Study of Christian Sociology on July 7, 1892*. Adelaide 1892.
2. *Political Economy in a Nutshell — For Young Men and Women*. 'Reprinted from the Voice, weekly democratic paper published every Friday.' Adelaide 1893.
3. *Idlers in the Marketplace: Practical Suggestions Towards the Solution of the Unemployed Problem*. Worker Press, Sydney 1896. (1d. each; 2/6 a hundred).

My own favourite Medway Day reading is, however, a letter published under the heading 'Unification or Federation' in the Sydney *Daily Telegraph* on 15 January 1897. Marvellously, it was produced in the depths of his own final personal crisis over the *Worker* editorship. This letter was drawn from him in reaction to the *Telegraph's* review of Robert Garran's new book, *The Coming Commonwealth*. The letter is all the more remarkable as coming from a man who had spent half his life in a small Colony, South Australia, much of it writing leaders for the newspaper which was the favoured breakfast-reading of conservative and States'-Rights Federalists like Richard Baker, John Downer and Josiah Symon. One wonders how far the letter is inspired by an upbringing in and experience of unified Britain, and how far by reaction to the irrationalities and jealousies of life in a small conservative Colony apprehensively contemplating Federation? How far was it a response, on the other, to three years 'liberation' in the largest Colony, exposed to its more progressive elements in the Federation controversies? Stripped down to its essentials here, the letter reads:

Mr. Garran's work has left me a stronger believer than ever in unification as distinguished from federation.

Mr. Garran is at great pains to define what federation is ... based upon history and authority....It may be wiser and simpler to get beyond all these and ask what it is we want to accomplish ... the heart of the problem we are trying to solve.

I am disposed to think that if the proposal [for unification] were referred to the vote of electors there would be a strong majority in favour of it and the minority would be made up of those whose local and class interests would seem to be imperilled by the absorption of all the Colonies in one nation.

What are the State rights which it is said need to be carefully considered, and why should they be regarded as paramount? Is there any sense in assuming that the man who lives on one side of a river has State rights varying from those of the man who lives on the other side, or that the man who lives on one side of an imaginary dividing line must have varying State rights from those of the man who lives on the opposite side? In truth these interests do not vary as much as the interests of inhabitants of different parts of the same Colony. We cannot forget that the position has greatly altered since the United States was federated and even since Canadian federation was brought about. Distance is now practically annihilated. Sydney is nearer to Brisbane today than London was to New York when American independence was proclaimed.

What we want is uniformity in all legislation affecting our common interests, and practical uniformity in the administration of the legislation. Much of the administration of the general legislation and all the administration of purely local affairs could be entrusted to the local governing bodies....

The idea of different, and even antagonistic, interests is kept alive and fostered from the outset by the special representation of the States, and therefore of State rights, in the Senate. Does it not seem absurd that for legislative purposes the two Houses should be held to represent opposing interests. The Lower House is to work in the interests of union, and the Upper House in the interests of disintegration....

Surely all this is merely making work for the lawyers without securing any advantage to the citizens? It will even place them in a worse position of uncertainty than they are at present....This will mean increased delay and greater uncertainty....Delays and uncertainties always tell in favour of the rich man with the long purse and the doubtful cause....

Under a system of unification, as distinguished from federation, nearly all these difficulties would disappear. There would be one Parliament with one or two Houses, as might be decided....There would be one uniform system of judicature....The Parliament would be supreme over the whole continent to the same degree in which under our present system, our local parliaments are supreme....

It may be said, why not have federation as a step to unification? My reply is, that just as the Federal Council could never lead to federation, so federation will not prepare the way for unification but will raise fresh barriers to its accomplishment. The notion of State rights being perpetuated, we shall in a few years come to regard them as a fetish to be worshipped as of Divine origin, and the idea of unification will be scoffed as sacreligious.

The advocates of federation and the advocates of unification are at one on this: They wish to summon Australian nationality from the grave in which it has too long slumbered. But they differ in this: The federationist would bid it go forth with its grave clothes still encumbering it; whereas the advocate of unification says, "Loose him, and let him go."

Day's letter places him in the company of H. B. Higgins, A. B. Piddington, George Dibbs, W. M. Hughes, perhaps Tom Price, and other thoughtful Australian nationalists of the day, who were not prepared simply to swallow hook, line and sinker the complacently narrow dogma of the Griffith-Barton-Baker-Clark Federalists, but dared to insist on visions of a larger, deeper, broader, more self-confident national future freed of institutionalised provincialism. Would that there had been many more like-minded Australian sceptics about the facile 'States'-Rights Federation' of those days — or, for that matter, of these!

Footnotes

1. *Tasmanian Mail*, 15 July 1905.
2. *Observer*, 15 July 1905. The *Observer* was the *Register's* weekly affiliate.
3. *Bulletin* (Sydney), 17 Aug. 1905.
4. *Tasmanian Mail*, 15 July 1905.
5. *Ibid.*, 15 July 1905.
6. *Australian Worker*, 4 Feb. 1942.
7. W. G. Spence, *History of the A.W.U.* (1909), ch. VIII.
8. *Tasmanian Mail*, 15 July 1905.
9. *Worker*, 8 Feb. 1896.
10. *Tasmanian Mail*, 15 July 1905.

REX v. EDWARDS: COMMENTS

R. R. St. C. CHAMBERLAIN

The article on the Edwards case (*Journal*, no. 8) is completely misconceived and misleading. The plain implication is that Edwards's enemies conspired to ruin him with a false charge. Having been, as Crown Prosecutor, responsible for the conduct of the case from beginning to end, I can assure your readers that nothing could be further from the truth.

Dr Jennings states that it was 'never revealed' who had 'gone to the police and initiated the charge.' In fact, no-one did anything of the kind. What happened, as was known all along, was that the boy, Mundy, the victim of the crime, was in the hands of the police for an offence against a young boy, which he admitted, and excused by saying that it was Edwards's fault since he had done the same to him and taught him the practice when he was employed at Edwards's hotel. The police naturally took a full statement from him which became the basis of the charge. He was the principal witness at the trial, and he withstood the severest cross-examination that I ever heard in a long career in the courts, and was obviously accepted by the jury as a witness of truth.

The story about Doreen Haskett is another complete misrepresentation. She had been a maid at the Newmarket Hotel where the offence in question and many similar ones had been committed, and she knew all about Edwards's dealings with Mundy and other boys. She gave a full statement to the police which fully confirmed Edwards's guilt. The article states: 'For daring to suggest that Miss Kate Cocks, a well-known female police officer, had attributed remarks about Edwards to her which she never made, she was immediately charged with perjury and committed.' Miss Cocks was the founder and head of the Women Police Department, and a devoted and highly respected worker for charitable purposes. At my request she and another officer brought the girl Haskett to my office, where in answer to my questions she confirmed every word of what she had told Miss Cocks.

The next we heard of her was from her parents who reported to the police that two men had called at their home, a dairy farm at (I think) Myponga, and taken her away in a big black car. They did not know where she was and were anxious for her safety. The police accordingly had her photograph published with the title 'Missing Witness' and the request for anyone knowing her whereabouts to communicate either with them or her parents.

Edwards's name was originally suppressed, but at a quite early stage his counsel, Mr Villeneuve Smith, requested that it be published and given full publicity. In any case, no-one had any doubt as to the case in which the witness was 'missing,' and those of us associated with the case had no doubt as to why she was. Edwards and his

associates must have known that with this witness in the box his chances of escaping conviction were rather slender, and that something had to be done. What was done was that she was taken to 'premises' on West Terrace and kept out of sight until the preliminary hearing. When I called her she went back on everything she had told Miss Cocks and me, and flatly denied having said anything of the kind. She had obviously been carefully coached with a new story, and it was ordinary practice to prosecute her for perjury for her blatant and deliberate lies. If they had been able to get their hands on the boy Mundy in the same way the case would have collapsed, but we were able in this case to keep him safely out of their reach.

Another misrepresentation that calls for correction is the version of the proceedings when Edwards was sentenced. It is stated that Edwards was courageous and that he said, 'My enemies have succeeded: they have done so with loaded dice.' 'Murray,' the story continues, 'sixty-seven and a bachelor, who wore effortlessly his pomposity and self-righteousness, became agitated and harangued Edwards.' What actually happened was that Edwards was asked, in the usual form, whether he had anything to say as to sentence. This is the opportunity for defending counsel to make their plea in mitigation of sentence, but Mr Villeneuve Smith and Mr Rollison sat silent while Edwards read a type-written statement consisting of a vitriolic attack on the partiality of the Chief Justice, quite obviously by pre-arrangement with his legal advisers. There is no doubt that Sir George was shocked, and what he said was in effect that he had never heard anything of the kind before, and he hoped never to hear it again. The proceeding was a gross contempt of court.

In fact there never was a fairer or more dignified judge than Sir George Murray and he presided over Edwards's trial with complete impartiality, and Edwards was defended with great skill and force by the most brilliant advocate of the day. The statement that 'Mundy's evidence was not corroborated in any respect' is not correct. There was an item in Edwards's answer to the arresting police inspector which was accepted both by the Chief Justice and the State Full Court as corroboration. This was the main ground of appeal in the High Court, but it was not mentioned in the judgment as the effective majority agreed with the State Full Court that there had been no miscarriage of justice. More important was the fact that the jury saw Edwards under cross-examination and obviously disbelieved him. He swore that he was out of the State on the date of the offence, but it was fairly clear that he had faked the lodgers' book to support his alibi, and although we did not know about it at the time we later had reason to believe that there was a document in existence signed by him in Adelaide on the relevant date.

There was an interesting sequel to the High Court appeal. A spectator at the hearing, and a strong supporter of Edwards, was one J. J. Daly, Minister for the Navy in the then Federal Labor government. He was an Adelaide lawyer whose knowledge of naval affairs was non-existent, but he knew enough to procure a destroyer to take Edwards's counsel, Villeneuve Smith and Rollison, who were also his friends, for a consolation cruise to help them out of their distress at losing the case. I am informed that the destroyer captain was alive to the scandalous nature of this proceeding, and he wasted little time in finding rough enough water to ensure that his passengers spent most of the cruise with acute attacks of sea-sickness.

So far from there being any campaign by Edwards's enemies to support the

prosecution, there was a vigorous one by Edwards and his associates to condemn it, and to demoralise those associated with it. There were anonymous letters to me, and to the Attorney General, accusing me of various improprieties and a published threat of proceedings against the Attorney General, the Crown Solicitor, and myself for conspiracy. We welcomed this last effort since it gave us a good reason for briefing Mr Eric Millhouse to lead me in the prosecution. Finally we had no doubt that there would be determined efforts to get at the jury, which we countered as well as we could, and which failed, as I was later told by one in the know, by one vote.

Many of those who knew Edwards and his various associations and activities are dead, but I doubt if you will find many of the survivors who will subscribe to the eulogies of his personal qualities contained in the last paragraph of the article.

IN SEARCH OF SOUTH AUSTRALIAN MARITIME HISTORY A COMMENT

RONALD PARSONS

Dr Young's article on South Australian maritime history in your *Journal*, no. 8, contains numerous errors, some serious. For convenience I shall list them as they appear in the text, rather than in order of importance.

- (1) Page 31. 'Shipping firms like Dalgety's, Elders....' These firms were not 'shipping firms,' i.e. shipowners. They were stock and station agents and/or wool and produce brokers. To facilitate the handling of products in which they had a financial interest, they became, from time to time, representatives of some shipowners. Perhaps they could be termed 'Shipping Agents,' although this part of their business was quite minor in relation to their overall activities.
- (2) Page 33. '... the way you got from Adelaide to Wallaroo ... was ... by sailing ketch....' There was a regular steamship service between Port Adelaide and Wallaroo from at least 1865. See sailing notices in contemporary newspapers; Ronald Parsons, *The Adelaide Line* (1975), pp. 14 ff; Wright Papers, South Australian Archives, ref. 3150.
- (3) Page 35. 'Port Misery, they called it.' The people who actually used the original port did not use this term which was coined by an obscure visitor who was a partisan of a group intent, at the time, in having the main port of the colony transferred, for their convenience, to Boston Bay. The term 'Port Misery,' as I was at some pains to point out in my *Port Misery and the New Port* (1977), only came into general use quite recently, and is often misapplied to the current port.
- (4) Page 35. '... Port Adelaide as a point for the transhipment of whole products....' This claim is based on a dubious source, viz. a newspaper item of 1924. The usual point of shipment was the whaling station at Encounter Bay, etc., where, if it was going overseas, it was loaded into the ships. However, as none of those places was a Customs port, it was necessary for the laden ship to go to Adelaide to pass a clearance. Likewise, most — if not all — of the oil gathered in South Australia was shipped via Hobart Town. See W. J. Hosking, 'Whaling in South Australia 1837-1872' (B.A. Hons thesis, Flinders University, 1973).
- (5) Page 36. 'By 1850 ... interstate shipping had become important....' Intercolonial shipping had been important from the foundation of the colony. Regular 'packet' services were introduced no later than 1839 by Emanuel Solomon with the *Dorset* and *Emma*. See Wright Papers, S.A.A., and the contemporary press.
- (6) Page 37. 'The earliest Tasmanian-built ketch on record was the *Huon Pine*.' When enrolled for the first time, in 1866, as folio four of the Ship Register at

Hobart, she was, and continued to be, described as a 2 mast barge rigged sailing vessel.

- (7) Page 38. 'By 1857 the centreboard was being used in South Australia The South Australian trader was thus the product of evolution from a British hull-form fitted with an American device.' The pleasure yacht (not trading vessel) named *Coquette* was built to an American design and incorporated the American system of centreboard because it was built for an American, the photographer Townsend Duryea. What the newspaper cited did not say — because everyone interested already knew — was that the unusual thing about the yacht was that, contrary to local practice, it was being fitted with an American style centreboard, of the type first patented in 1811.

Trading craft, on the other hand, locally or colonial built, usually incorporated the 'drop keel' system first used by Captain Schank, RN, in 1774. People in 1857 were aware that Schank designed the famous vessel *Lady Nelson* on this system. This ship, which figures so prominently in early Australian history, was fitted with drop keels. See H. I. Chapelle, *History of American Sailing Ships* (New York, 1935), for a detailed explanation of both systems.

Incidentally, the *Coquette* was eventually transported to Lake Alexandrina not by land (footnote 31), but by sea.

- (8) Page 41. Details of the *Annie Watt* are wrong in a number of particulars. She was not built at Port Cygnet, but at Port Esperance, a considerable distance away. When first enrolled on the Ship Register at Hobart as folio nine of 1870, her builder said she was barge rigged, had been built in 1870 (not 1872), and measured 63 point 7 feet long (all measurements of feet were officially taken and recorded in feet and tenths of feet, not feet and inches). Moreover, 18 feet beam and 5 point six was the depth of hold, not the draught as stated. When enrolled at Hobart Town she was said to be the property of George Watt of that place. She was transferred to Port Adelaide upon sale in December 1873, and enrolled at Port Adelaide by William Fergusson and partners, as folio one of 1874.
- (9) Page 45. The paragraph dealing with the unions in Port Adelaide is very confused and misleading. The subject cannot be tidied up in a few words and anyone interested would be best advised to consult the contemporary newspapers.
- (10) Page 45. 'The carriage of passengers remained quite unregulated until 1880....' All British Ships — and in 1880 (as at present) all ships registered in Australia were legally British Ships — were subject to a large number of regulations and laws concerning the number of passengers that could be carried, etc. All that happened in South Australia in 1880 was that the local Marine Board introduced additional regulations and actually began to police them — something that had been almost totally ignored before.
- (11) Page 45. 'Passengers began to prefer steamers as soon as they became available, but to begin with they were unable to compete without government subsidies.' Steamships were operating between South Australian ports from the mid-1850s, entirely without government assistance. From at least 1858 ss *Marion* began a regular steamship service between Port Adelaide and Spencer Gulf

ports, including Port Lincoln. When she was wrecked in Marion Bay the proprietors placed ss *Lubra* on the same line.

- (12) Page 47. By the end of the century 'steamers ... like the *Minnipa* and *Karralta*....' The *Minnipa* was a motorship that did not arrive until 1928. The *Karralta* (one r) was a motor powered sugar lighter imported, for use on the Queensland Coast in 1954, by the Adelaide SS Company. See Michael Page, *Fitted for the Voyage* (Adelaide, 1975), p. 294.

There are a number of minor matters that might be mentioned, but the foregoing will at least not make the article so misleading to researchers who may feel inclined to quote it in later years.

* * * *

REPLY

JOHN YOUNG

I am glad that my paper, originally given verbally to the Adelaide University History Club, and published in the hope that it might contribute to a greater awareness of our maritime history, seems likely to succeed in its object. Like any survey of a new field, its aim was also to indicate the need for further research. I am grateful to Mr Parsons for his diligence in discovering some of the errors which demonstrate this need. The most serious mistake, however, is one which he overlooked. My list of South Australian 'Museums and societies of antiquarians and seamen with an interest in the sea' which is given in footnote 7 does not include the Australasian Maritime Historical Society, of Magill, of which Mr Parsons is the founder.¹ This is an error of tact, as well as of fact, and I apologise.

When it comes to historical details, however, Mr Parsons's comments are more distinguished for their acrimony than for their accuracy. He believes that the firms listed on page 31 were, initially, stock and station agents and later became 'shipping firms' in the sense that they were in the business of sending goods in ships. In fact it was the other way round. N. G. Butlin explains in *Investment in Australian Economic Development 1861-1900* how the role of Richard Goldsborough, Thomas Mort (who incidentally was also a shipbuilder in Sydney), Dalgety, and the N.Z. Loan and Mercantile Company changed. They ceased to be merely wool merchants, became mortgage financiers and often station owners.²

On page 33, I emphasised that the choice of steam or sail was available to intending coastal passengers and that, at least until 1875, ketches carried people as well as cargo. The existence of a steamship service to Wallaroo is further evidence of the existence of these alternatives.

We also seem to be in agreement on the early importance of inter-colonial shipping, though we use different examples to illustrate it. The phrase 'by 1850' includes the whole period before 1850. My example of intercolonial trade, covering several years, comes from the 1840s. Mr Parsons shows that it began 'no later than 1839', which may mean that I did not need to be so cautious. It complements, rather than contradicts what I wrote.

More research clearly needs to be done on nineteenth century nautical terminology. The terms 'ketch' and 'barge' were, I suspect, used loosely, and differently in different places. If I am wrong, I would be glad to see the difference between them defined. Strictly speaking, in modern usage, a barge is a vessel with a particular form of hull, while the term 'ketch' describes a rig. There can thus be ketch-rigged barges like the Thames 'boomie' barges, but no barge-rigged ketches.³ The *Annie Watt* was a ketch rigged vessel, that is, she had two masts: the after one, being shorter, was the mizen. (If it had been the longer of the two she would have been a schooner). The mizen was stepped forward of the rudder post instead of aft of it (which would have made her a yawl). She is nevertheless described in contemporary records as being of barge rig.⁴ I discussed the local usage of these terms in notes 28 and 29 of my paper.

I have not been able to get to Hobart to see the *Annie Watt's* registration and records of her dimensions. My figures are derived from measuring the vessel herself, the living document. The present distance from the leading edge of the stem at deck level to the outside of the planking at the stern is a fraction of an inch under 68 feet. If bulwarks and the fiddle piece under the bowsprit were included in the overall length, it would be 44 inches longer. This raises the question of the definition of the length of 63.7 feet which the builder refers to. More research seems to be needed here too. When I said she drew 5 feet 6 inches, that is what I meant, though she has hogged about six inches so that this refers to her maximum draft at the stern.

I am accused of being 'confused and misleading' about the unions in Port Adelaide, though Mr Parsons declines to be specific. It is not, however, the uncritical perusal of contemporary newspapers, as he recommends, which will enable us to understand the period. We need not merely to list facts and to repeat stories, but to compare and correlate sources and to analyse relationships. South Australian historiography is glutted with chronicles: it is time we began to write some histories.

Steam subsidies were certainly sought and often obtained in most colonial societies. It would involve some interesting theoretical calculations to prove that they were unnecessary even though some steamships operated, as did all sailing vessels, without them.

To describe the *Coquette*, the centreboard vessel built in the yard of the 'Maid and Magpie,' as a yacht as opposed to a trading vessel is to make an anachronistic distinction, but the *South Australian Register* of 27 June 1857 reports that 'Mr Townsend Duryea ... is at present engaged in the construction of a cutter intended for trading on Lake Victoria and the river Murray.' The reporter goes on to differentiate between her 'measurement, about 8 tons,' presumably her 'Thames tonnage,'⁵ and her 'actual capacity for 15 tons.' Her expected draught with ten tons of cargo was expected to be 20 inches, with 15 tons, from 23 to 24 inches. A further article, dated 23 September, refers to the visit of Duryea, the new owner, to Wellington and a sailing match between his vessel, the *Coquette*, the *Victory* and the *Wasp*. One race does not mean that she was nothing but a 'yacht,' while it is clear from the available documents that she was intended to carry cargo. Mr Parsons is correct, however, in saying that she was sailed through the Murray mouth.⁶

To say 'What the newspaper cited did not say — because everyone interested already knew,' etc., is to read quite a lot into the evidence. It is also assuming rather

more than the evidence will bear to conclude that people in South Australia in 1857 were aware of or interested in the design details of the *Lady Nelson*, which visited Australian waters so long before formal colonisation in South Australia began.⁷ It was as a result of American rather than British experience that the structural problems associated with moving keels of both kinds were reduced. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the adoption of drop keels for open water and the structurally weaker centreboard for sheltered water in Australia in the 1850s had more to do with widespread contact with Americans and American shipping, as a result of the gold rushes, than with the isolated precedent of the *Lady Nelson*.

Mr Parsons is correct when he states that the name 'Port Misery' was introduced by a hostile contemporary, but that does not mean that it did not strike other contemporaries as apt. In 1838 it probably did. However, to be on the safe side the sentence 'Port Misery, they called it' should have read 'Port Misery, as one critical contemporary christened it.'

I argued that the need for local vessels to bring whaling products to Port Adelaide for transhipment was one of the factors stimulating the growth of a local fleet in the first years of settlement. Mr Parsons, however, cites the thesis by W. J. Hosking to suggest that this was not the case. What the thesis in question does say is as follows:

The loading and anchorage facilities at Rosetta Cove also presented serious problems as the wrecks [of the *Solway* and the *South Australian*] showed. Summer was dangerous not only for its gales, but also because the hot sun often caused the oil casks awaiting shipment to leak. In later years the problem was minimised by shipping the oil as it was taken, to Port Adelaide, for shipment to England.⁸

Later on he makes it clear that this involved transhipment from small vessels:

In the 1840s, however, the various proprietors employed their own small cutters, and hired others, to take the oil, as it was collected, to Port Adelaide. Here it was sold to an expanding Adelaide market.... Most of the oil, of course, was regularly shipped to the English Market. The proprietors also used their cutters to ferry men and supplies to the station. Ten or fifteen such vessels were used. Most were built at Port Adelaide, but several were built at Encounter Bay.⁹

An Appendix F supplies a list of these vessels with their rig and tonnage.

I am grateful to Mr Parsons for his helpful scrutiny.

Footnotes

1. This society should not be confused with the Australian Association for Maritime History, which publishes *The Great Circle*, a journal of maritime history.
2. N. G. Butlin, *Investment in Australian Economic Development 1861-1900* (Cambridge, 1964), ch. 5, especially pp. 128-131.
3. H. Benham, *Down Tops'l: The Story of the East Coast Sailing Barges* (London, 1951). Sail plans on inside cover and ch. 4, 'Ketch barges and passage making,' pp. 56-68.
4. A. E. Sawtell, *Sawtell's Nautical Almanac* (Adelaide, 1877), p. 30.

5. Thames tonnage of a vessel is arrived at by the formula:

Length Between Perpendiculars — beam x ½ beam (all in feet)

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- See Eric Hiscock, *Cruising Under Sail* (Oxford, 1950), p.3, for a full discussion.
6. I am grateful to Mr R. J. Noye of Clare for drawing my attention to this information. He also pointed out that another vessel, the *Mosquito*, built at Dry Creek the same year, was taken overland to the Murray.
7. The *Lady Nelson* was a naval survey vessel which worked in Australian waters, including those of Tasmania, New South Wales, what is now Queensland and the Northern Territory and New Zealand between 1800 and 1825. See James Grant, *Narrative of a Voyage of Discovery performed in His Majesty's vessel the Lady Nelson of sixty tons burthen with sliding keels, in the years 1800, 1801 and 1802 to New South Wales* (London, 1803), Australiana Facsimile ed., 1973, no. 28. See also Ida Lee, *The Logbooks of the Lady Nelson* (London, 1915).
8. W. J. Hosking, 'Whaling in South Australia 1837-1872' (B.A. Hons thesis, Flinders University, 1973), p. 23.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 20. Hosking's sources are Captain Hart, 'Encounter Bay, its Anchorages, Fisheries and General Capabilities,' *South Australian Magazine*, vol. 1, no. 4, Oct. 1841; Simpson Newland, *Memoirs* (Adelaide, 1926); and the 'Blue Book' or *Schedule of Taxes, Duties, Fees and all other sources of Revenue* (1841).

REVIEWS

Travelling Back: The Memoirs of Sir Walter Crocker.

Macmillan, Melbourne, 1980. Pp. vii + 222. \$24.95.

Sir Walter Crocker is a Renaissance man — scholar, farmer, diplomat, soldier, administrator, proconsul. In these memoirs, which originated as scripts for ABC radio talks, he recounts his wide experiences, evoking people and places, with prejudice, as all good autobiography should. The result is a strong but enjoyable brew.

He was born of fifth generation South Australian small farming, Methodist stock; frugal and independent. His father owned a grazing and wheat property at Parnaroo, north of Peterborough, and Sir Walter still farms in the Alma Hills. He is proud of his yeoman's values of self-reliance, suspicion of cities — 'where men become like monkeys in a cage, unclean and aggressive' (p. 94) — big government and bureaucrats. Nevertheless, he spent most of the 1920s being educated in cities. He read Classics at the University of Adelaide, History and Law at Oxford, and then went to Stanford to write a book on the Japanese population problem.

At Balliol Crocker fell under the spell of two dynamic forces: British Imperialism and the internationalism of the new League of Nations. He was also intoxicated by the high civilisation of Europe.

The big point about an Oxford education before...World War II...is that, while the academic or professional training was excellent..., the main education was social — how to behave, how to live. (p. 24)

Imperial idealists of the Round Table had such an effect on him that, after Stanford, he joined the Colonial Service in Nigeria. He became, to use words he quotes from Santayana, one of the 'sweet boyish masters' who ruled the Empire justly with gentlemanly *noblesse oblige* (p. 78). Law-giver, farming consultant, explorer — the varied and peripatetic life of a District Officer in the African bush was 'the most satisfying life I have ever lived' (p. 81). Like Lord Lugard, or Sir Hubert Murray, he saw the Imperial task as that of gradually easing the black and brown Empire into the twentieth century. It would be a long haul, longer than his lifetime, and development must be appropriate to need. Crocker now regrets the Empire's passing:

The British Empire with more wisdom and more luck might have lasted more than the century or two it did, and the world would have been better for it. (p. 97)

At the time, however, he became very upset by the inefficient and too rigid administration of Whitehall officials who did not 'understand the native', and in 1936 he left to join the International Labour Office in Geneva, writing a stinging indictment of Nigerian government from a radical conservative standpoint. (Sir Walter does not tell us, but as one reviewer of another of his books remarked: 'That the book embarrassed the Colonial Office was clear from its omission from official

bibliographies of Nigeria at the time'. *Times Literary Supplement*, 7 April 1972.)

Geneva did not satisfy either. He arrived to witness the impotence of the League in the face of the dictators. Too many of the officials had a 'lack of spirit' (p. 99). Not so Crocker, who, upset by the talking shop mentality in the Palais des Nations, made plans to join the Republican forces in Spain, though Franco won before he could get there. Crocker's conservatism is the antithesis of totalitarianism.

After a brief trip to Japan, now transformed into 'a land of fanatics and bullies' (p. 114), Crocker was motoring across France from Geneva in May 1940 to join up when Paris fell. He just managed to scramble aboard a ship at Bordeaux with, among others, 'a couple of Rothschilds' and Eve Curie. His war was spent mostly in West Africa, and at the end in India, administering, procuring food, engaging in diplomacy. One important job was to prepare an escape route across the Sudan in case the Allies were driven from Cairo. The war deepened his cynicism. He notes bitterly that he met Graham Greene in the Secret Service in Sierra Leone who spent most of his time writing, 'a sign of good sense if not of patriotism' (p. 124); remembers an American propaganda film, *A Yank in Libya* when no Americans participated in that campaign; and comments that the Vichy regime was the only alternative for France in 1940-1 (pp. 122, 129).

The war's end marked a watershed in Crocker's life, and in history. The years since, he says, have been characterised by 'a worsening in civilisation and in humanity's lot in general. Why...is not entirely clear?' (p. 134). Though he spends the rest of the book telling us.

Crocker was one of the first appointments to the United Nations where he headed the Africa section. Here he found the same fatal flaws as in its predecessor, but magnified. It was absurdly overbureaucratised and too democratic — one country, one vote — for its own good and ours. New York was the wrong place to put it, as this subtly contributed to American domination and the ill effects of the alienation of the Palestinians in the face of the New York Jewish lobby and the favouring of Taiwan over China. Trygve Lie, the first Secretary-General, 'had little of anything that was relevant to his important office' other than his smile (p. 165). Disillusioned with the Americanisation of the western world with its 'worship of money, hedonism, psychological instability and violence' (p. 168), Crocker fled to the ANU as its first professor of international relations in 1949. This too, failed to satisfy, and in 1952 he entered the Australian diplomatic service.

Promised a place 'among the few forming Australia's foreign policy' (p. 178), he spent 18 years discovering time and again how naive he was to have believed that informed diplomats make the decisions rather than politicians with an eye on the electorate. It's a pity he didn't have more influence. He was an early advocate of recognition of China, opposed the Vietnam war, and supported standing up to Indonesia over Dutch New Guinea.

Some of the most interesting parts of the book, for me, were the assessments of great contemporaries. There is an extended debunking of the Churchill myth — 'The man who takes Napoleon as a standard reveals certain things about himself....Power and war were surely his deities.' (p. 138). Nehru was prone to 'acting and...chicanery'; Kennedy 'greatly overrated and misunderstood' (p. 182).

On Menzies and Casey his shafts strike home. Menzies' 'performance was mainly negative', 'will he rate much higher than a politician highly adept at winning votes?', 'I rarely left him without a feeling of blighted hope.' He didn't read books.

He bowed to the Americans over West Irian but failed to back them against France and Britain over Suez. 'His supreme achievement was that...he kept Evatt out of the Prime Ministership' (pp. 184-7).

Crocker admired Casey as a civilised man and a statesman. 'Casey could never have welcomed the Queen to Canberra, as did Menzies, with a verse, misquoted too, from a seventeenth century love lyric' (p. 187). Casey's probity and style were admirable, but his refusal to indulge in the infighting and backstabbing of party politics made it impossible for him to attain the top of the greasy pole. His great achievement was to pioneer Australia's acceptance of a role in Asia with the Colombo plan and SEATO.

He saves his highest accolade for Sir Thomas Playford. This yeoman (like Crocker) who ruled South Australia benevolently for 27 years in a quiet, efficient, Puritan-like way, industrialising the state against all odds, came close to being the ideal ruler. Playford was concerned with 'the public interest, with the cold facts, and with reason and reasonableness' (p. 191).

The book ends with some confessions. 'It is not easy to escape the feeling that average men are but the matrix for a creative minority' (p. 107). He believes in a benevolent, Platonic conservatism. He unveils openly a — nowadays odd — adherence to genetic determinism. Multi-racial England is on the slippery slope to chaos but 'The genes which made England must be there still' (p. 209). But underlying all is a tolerance, a reasonableness, a dedication to gentlemanly conduct as his generation understands it. He admires Pascal and tells us to 'hold fast' and stoically though joyfully face life.

I could question Crocker's biting criticisms of his fellows, his views about Anglo-Saxon superiority, his imperialism, his often flawed and intuitive logic, his elitist conception of civilisation, but the supreme honesty of this book is refreshing and disarming. It is rare in literature, especially in memoirs, that a man bares his life's assumptions so candidly and fully. We should be grateful for such a good window into his extraordinary life.

Carl Bridge,
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South Australian Biographies 1980.

Blue Book of South Australia and Biographies Australia, 1980. 136 pp. \$41.

The publisher, V. C. D. Barnes, an Adelaide psychologist, is himself listed in this reference book. I suppose anyone who has thought of a new way of making money out of book publishing in Australia nowadays deserves recognition.

Several thousand South Australians, including this reviewer, received a form letter in March 1980 which began as follows:

We are presently compiling the Blue Book of South Australia. Your success in the community has earned you the right of public recognition among your peers — the who's who of South Australia.

The Blue Book will feature several thousand biographies of South Australians of achievement — chief executives of sizeable companies, the professions, community service and the arts.

The Blue Book is intended for sale only to persons whose biographies are featured and to libraries.

The beauty of such a scheme is that the publisher knows in advance how many of the biographees are going to buy a copy before he puts in a print order.

The number of prominent South Australians not included in the book is truly staggering, but, as the publisher explained, 'some persons declined to submit the necessary information.' Moreover, he continued, 'the Publisher is not omniscient (and would therefore appreciate creative suggestions and nominations for future editions).' Of the 779 South Australian residents listed in the 1980 edition of *Who's Who in Australia*, only 167 (or 22.8 per cent) appear among the 1872 entries in *South Australian Biographies* and of these 38 are members or former members of parliament. Only a minority of sitting members of the State and Federal parliaments are included. Sir Thomas Playford and Steele Hall are out, along with former non-Labor politicians Sir Lyell McEwin, Sir Philip McBride, Dr A. J. Forbes, Sir Glen Pearson, Sir John McLeay, Sir Arthur Rymill and Sir Alexander Downter (who died after the publication of the book). On the other hand, former Labor Premiers Dunstan and Corcoran are in, but Peter Ward spoilt his witty and otherwise incisive review of the book in the *Sunday Mail* (8 March 1981) by suggesting that they were the two lone representatives of political Labor. 'The Labor Party has never really been Who, has it?', he asked. A more careful perusal of the contents would have revealed the names of nine other sitting Labor politicians besides J. D. Corcoran, viz. Senator J. L. Cavanagh, Dr Neal Blewett, R. K. Abbott, G. L. Bruce, K. C. Hamilton, Dr D. J. Hopgood, G. R. A. Langley, T. M. McRae and J. P. Trainer.

The same chaotic picture emerges in every other field of endeavour. You will find some church dignitaries such as Archbishop Rayner and Bishop Renfrey but you will not find Archbishops Reed, Beovich and Gleeson or Bishops Kennedy and Gallagher. A mere handful of people in the arts, including Colin Thiele, are in, but you will not find Colin Ballantyne, Geoffrey Dutton, Richard Meale, Jim Sharman or Max Harris. A minority of academics are in, but out are the present Vice-Chancellors of Adelaide and Flinders Universities, and the former Vice-Chancellor of Adelaide, Sir Geoffrey Badger, as well as the Directors of the South Australian Institute of Technology and Roseworthy Agricultural College. Some judges are in, but Justice Roma Mitchell, the former Chief Justice, Dr J. J. Bray, not to mention former judges such as Sir Roderic Chamberlain and Sir Charles Bright, are out. Only a handful of famous sportsmen and sportswomen are in, but even this minuscule contingent does not include Sir Donald Bradman. The headmasters of St Peter's College and Prince Alfred College do not rate an entry. You will find some public servants such as G. J. Inns and J. R. Steinle but you will not find others such as Dr D. Srafton, Dr W. G. Inglis, R. D. E. Bakewell or Police Commissioner Draper. Some prominent businessmen are in, but others such as Ian Webber, D. L. Elix, John Bonython, B. R. Macklin, E. H. Burgess and J. I. N. Winter are out. You will not find a single trade union secretary; in contrast, *Who's Who in Australia* carries entries on most of the leading trade union officials, including N. L. Gallagher of the Builders Labourers' Federation. Some distinguished medicos are

in, but Sir Rupert Magarey and Sir Dennis Paterson are out. So, for that matter, is the legendary Dr Charles Duguid, but it would be rather boring to continue listing the names of prominent South Australians without an entry.

More odd is the inclusion of hundreds of people — all of whom I am sure are upright citizens, contributing to the welfare of the State — who appear to have been chosen by an inscrutable selection process. In fact, the principle of selection is not explained by the publisher and at times it would seem he believed that the ideal reference book would be one which listed everybody in South Australia. That was plainly impossible. So instead we have literally scores of garage proprietors, crash repairers, plumbers, butchers, chiropractors, bus proprietors, and young pharmacists and architects (many of them only in their mid-twenties). Quite a number of the biographees are simply described as 'manager', 'proprietor', 'director' or 'company director'; I suspect many of them are small businessmen. One 'Governing Director' I came across turned out later in his entry to be a 'Self-employed hairdresser' in Bowden.

I cannot resist a passing reference to two entries. A third-year Law student at the University of Adelaide, born in 1946, informs us that he obtained a Distinction in Constitutional Law I in 1973 before becoming a 'Garbage Collector 1976-77', and a suburban naturopath wastes no time in engaging in some public relations work: 'Claims sufferers of diverse diseases benefit from his unorthodox methods and the conventional and other healing professionals seek his advice.' Moreover, a number of biographees do not live in the state, e.g. the veterinarian (born 1955) in North Yorkshire who plans to return to South Australia 'in due time' but is 'constantly frustrated by pressure of work,' not to mention two Indian-born medicos resident in New South Wales and Victoria respectively, neither of whom appears to have any connection whatsoever with South Australia. Needless to say, distinguished expatriates such as Keith Michell and Sir Robert Helpmann are not included.

The publisher has not bothered to standardize abbreviations, e.g. managing director appears variously as 'Mg. Dr.', 'Mngng. Dir.' and 'Mng. Dir.' LL.B. often appears as L.L.B. Many of the letters after peoples names could have been deleted as they are paid for by joining a trade or professional association after meeting some non-academic standard. Many of these meaningless initials do not appear in the pretentious 7½-page list of 'Official Abbreviations' to be found at the beginning of the book but which does include countless honours and distinctions not used in any of the entries.

It is difficult to know what is the real purpose behind the enterprise — whether it aims to be a traditional type of reference book in which eligibility depends entirely upon official position, prominence or achievement in some important sphere, or whether it is designed mainly for young professionals and status-conscious members of the petit-bourgeoisie to contemplate their own entries. The publisher told Peter Ward that the undertaking was purely 'an entrepreneurial venture', and I eagerly await the next edition to find out which direction he decides is more lucrative.

John Playford,
Department of Politics, University of Adelaide.



The South Australian Branch of the Australian Medical Association: A Centenary History 1979.

Adelaide, 1981. 101 pp. \$10.50.

The South Australian Branch of the Australian Medical Association has just published this history of its first hundred years. It was written by a committee, three of its members already well known for their historical researches as well as for their medical work, Dr J. Escourt Hughes, Dr R.C. Angove and Dr P.W. Verco, under the President for 1978-79, Dr W.S. Lawson.

The book is well produced. It covers in eleven short factual chapters the medical situation in early South Australia, the formation of the British Medical Association (the B.M.A. remained until 1962 when it became the A.M.A.), the foundation of the Adelaide Medical School, the Adelaide Hospital Row of 1896-1901, certain medicos of unusual influence, the two World Wars, the foundation of a second Medical School (Flinders), hospitals and institutions (including a particularly revealing account of the treatment of the mentally ill), national health schemes, and an epilogue which sums up past and present. Past presidents and the S.A. federal presidents are listed and there is both a select bibliography and an index. There are a dozen photographs. The writing of books by committees entails many difficulties but these have been overcome gracefully in this book. It holds together and is well focused, differing styles or judgements not being in evidence.

The story is fascinating, and the fascination comes out the more clearly because the story is told without any fanfare, even with a touch of the dry-as-dust. The facts speak for themselves. They throw significant light on our social history, such as the early discussions on the professional qualifications (in 1850 nearly two-thirds of those practising medicine in South Australia had not the qualifications for registration); that there was a precursor to the B.M.A. in the South Australian Medical Society, founded as early as 1856, and that it held discussions of a scientific kind; that South Australia was the second branch of the B.M.A. founded outside Britain (Jamaica was the first — a revealing illustration of the relativities in the British Empire a century or more ago); that when the Medical School was started in 1885 there were six students, one of them — inevitably! — a Magarey; the place of Lodges in the past; outlines of the remarkable services of remarkable men like Gosse, Corbin, Cleland, Stirling, the Vercos, and H.S. Newland; and, above all, reminders of the basic traditional values held to by the medical profession.

The training and the attitudes inculcated endured until recently when new values, if not lack of values, come in. The old values were that the interests of their patients as human beings in distress were of prime importance, 'that a doctor may be able to cure sometimes, to relieve often, but to comfort always'. The average layman still prefers this set of values from his doctors to all the machines and specialist services and ancillary personnel now counting for so much. He prefers the essential. He is both puzzled and unhappy about recent events, including the incomprehensible intake of Asian doctors, and also about the rise and the vociferousness of splinter groups breaking away from the A.M.A.

The book is directed towards a medical readership but not a few laymen, above all those with an interest in the history of South Australia, a peculiarly instructive

history, will learn from it. Yet for one reader at least it raises enough matter and questions to call for another volume expanding on certain themes and certain persons. That volume would explain the position of the medical profession in England as well as in its remote off-shoot, South Australia, up until the second half of the 19th century, which in turn would explain why the proportion of unqualified medical practitioners was so big and lasted for so long. It would expand on the story of the Adelaide Hospital Row and tell more about Dr Ramsay Smith and Dr Napier and the affinity of the over-rated Kingston with much that has come over public life and especially public health affairs since the 'Fifties, and on the changes in the social qualities and the standing of recent entrants into the profession. Above all it would tell what it was like to be a doctor serving in the suburbs, and still more in the country, up to the Second World War, doing everything from drawing teeth to accouchements, performing difficult surgery without anaesthetists or even nurses to help them, spending hours driving out to farms and stations, and on duty 24 hours a day 7 days a week. There are still a few survivors of this era and it is urgent that their recollections be tape-recorded before they have all gone.

Until recent years, which have been marked by exaggerated egalitarianism, a new money-mindedness and a new jettisoning of the old values of *noblesse oblige* and service in the old liberal professions, and a rather dehumanizing specialization, doctors in South Australia had a particularly high standing in the community as well as a high social rating. The reservations felt about lawyers in general were not felt about doctors in general. This was over and above the fact that human beings tend to have an instinctive interest in the doctor's work and life. That is why doctors have been good copy for any newspaper and why their reminiscences have so often become best-sellers, and not only in America. There is also the fact that some of the best known of modern novelists have been doctors, including Somerset Maugham.

May the medical profession not lose the repute it still enjoys, and deservedly, among the average South Australian — the noblest as well as the most demanding performance of all, as physician or as surgeon! Not to lose it will require not just the qualities of good examinees but qualities which are even less common and more difficult, those of exceptionally balanced and good men.

W.R. Crocker

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